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JUDGE J. BRAXTON CRAVEN, JR.: PORTRAIT
OF A PRAGMATIST
The scope of this commentary is difficult to define. It is in part a
survey, in part a memorial and in part a critical analysis of Judge Craven's
contributions to the jurisprudence of the Fourth Circuit. Other pieces in this
issue have provided a personal sketch of Judge Craven by those who knew
him. This comment attempts to complement that picture by a consideration
of Judge Craven's opinions in several areas of the law.
This consideration can be broken down into three main elements. First
is a description of Judge Craven's thoughts about his role as a federal judge.
Next is a discussion of his view of the function of the federal courts and their
proper relationship to state tribunals. The remaining sections examine a
variety of substantive areas in which Judge Craven was especially active.
This commentary is not a comprehensive survey of Judge Craven's
opinions. It is instead a thematic development of his attitudes toward the
problems he faced as a federal judge and his contributions to their solution.
There are certainly many of Judge Craven's opinions that are not discussed
here; we hope that those that are presented give a fair picture of his career on
the federal bench.
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDGE

J. Braxton Craven, Jr., was by his own admission an "introspective"
judge.' Throughout his judicial career he never tired of reflecting upon the
tensions and contradictions implicit in the simple query posed by Cardozo:
"What is it that I do when I decide a case? ' 2 Judge Craven was quick to
confess that he was a "result-oriented" judge.3 He did not pretend to
"define justice, but. . . [was] quite certain that it exist[ed], both abstractly
and in the context of every adversary proceeding." 4 For him "legal probI. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977, 977 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Paean to Pragmatism]. Other law review articles written by Judge Craven include: Craven,
Foreword to Corrections:A Symposium on PrisonReform, 45 Miss. L.J. 601 (1974) [hereinaf-

ter cited as Foreword];Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on theJudge: A Personal
Comment, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1975, at 150 [hereinafter cited as Personal
Comment]; Craven, Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-Brown Rides North, Maybe,

73 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as Vocabulary]; Craven, Personhood: The
Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699.
2. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
3. Paeanto Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 977.

4. Id. at 980.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

lems"I were "only people's problems for which the law sometimes [could]
afford answers." 6 He professed to feel no discomfort in those instances
when the binding hand of precedent absolutely precluded a just result. In
such instances the decisionmaking process was neither long nor arduous.
The judge simply had to "plunge the knife with averted gaze." 7 Of greater
interest were those situations when he was not bound by precedent. Here
Judge Craven felt free, through creative interpretation of the law, to reach a
just result in the case before him. If presented with a choice between
certainty of application and fairness of result, he would most likely choose
the latter: "Certainty in the administration of justice is not the valued goal it
was once thought to be, for it is increasingly recognized that the search for
certainty sometimes produces only certitude."8
Inevitably, Judge Craven would strive to find a means of "drawing the
line at another angle, of staking the path along new courses, of making a
new point of departure." 9 Nevertheless, he was a careful innovator. He was
quick to recognize that the freedom to make a choice was necessarily
inhibited by the knowledge that in such situations the judge might easily
inject "into judicial decisions value judgments that may not have enduring
validity and may even turn out to be wrong." ° He was acutely aware that
the standards of justice must be found in "the life of the community""I and
not exclusively through a judge's own private notions of right and wrong.
Similarly, he knew that judicial activism had to find expression as an
extension of custom and precedent. He was careful in his opinions not to
sever links to custom, precedent and community, for he realized that
without proper external restraints the path of creative interpretation was
prone to degenerate into whim, caprice and bias. Judge Craven never
hesitated, when possible, to adapt the path of the law to the exigencies and
uncertainties of life. His steps in that direction, however, were measured
and cautious, for he was aware that even rigid adherence to precedent was
preferable to unprincipled decisionmaking.
In four opinions, remarkable for their candor and immediacy, Judge
Craven was able to give some insight into the philosophy, emotions and
limitations inherent in his process of decisionmaking. 12 In Perkins v. North
5. Id.at 979.
6. Id.

7. Id.at 978.
8. Sivertsen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 423 F.2d 443, 446-47 (4th Cir. 1970)
(Craven, J., dissenting).
9. B. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 113.

10. Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 977.
11.

B. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 105.

12. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 361 F.
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Carolina,3Perkins, in a petition for habeas corpus, challenged the constitu-

tionality of his conviction under the North Carolina "acts against nature"
statute.1 4 Perkins contended that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
and that the length of his sentence constituted a cruel and unusual punishment. He also contended that he had been denied effective assistance of
5
counsel. On the merits, Judge Craven found the statute to be constitutional1
but granted Perkins relief on the ground that he had been denied effective
assistance of counsel. 16 In the course of his pungent opinion, however,
Supp. 825 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lawton v. Tarr, 327 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Perkins v.
North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
13. 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
14. At the time Perkins was decided, the statute read in its entirety as follows: "If any
person shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against nature, with mankind or
beast, he shall be imprisoned in the State's prison not less than five nor more than sixty years."
25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533Y, as adoptedby Rev. Code of N.C. ch. 34, § 6 (1854), and amended by Law
of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 167, § 6, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 407 (formerly codified, as amended, at
N.C. GEN.STAT. § 14-177(1953))(amended 1965). The subsequent statutory historyis discussed
in note 21 infra. Judge Craven reviews the history of the statutory language at 234 F. Supp. at
335. Perkins had been convicted for committing fellatio.
15. 234 F. Supp. at 336. Judge Craven held that the vagueness of the statutory language
had been cured by the numerous interpretations of the statute by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. He also held that Perkins' 20 to 30 year sentefce,-although unreasonable, could not
constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" because it was within the "astounding" statutory
limits of 5 to 60 years. Id. at 337. For further discussion of the sentencing issue in Perkins, see
note 48 infra.
InHart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), Judge
Craven was again faced with the question of the constitutionality of a statutorily mandated
sentence. The issue was whether a mandatory life sentence under West Virginia's recidivist
statute was cruel and unusual punishment because it was based on prior convictions for
forgery, interstate transportation of forged checks and perjury. Unlike his decision in Perkins,
Craven was able to find a basis for holding the statute unconstitutional.
For the appropriate interpretation of the eighth amendment, Judge Craven looked to the
Supreme Court's decision in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Under Weems, the
punishment for a crime should be in proportion to the offense, for it is possible that a prison
sentence could be so out of proportion to the offense as to violate the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), provided Craven
with the proper test for determining whether Hart's sentence was so disproportionate. The test
involved consideration of a combination of objective factors.
The first factor was the nature of Hart's offense. Judge Craven's emphasis here was on the
fact that none of Hart's three convictions involved any violence or danger to the person. 483
F.2d at 140-41. The second factor was the legislative purpose of the punishment, which Craven
found to be deterrence of crime and protection of society from habitual criminals. Id. at 141.
He expressed his belief that a life sentence for a person who committed 3 relatively minor
crimes over a 20 year period was unnecessary to accomplish these purposes. Id. The third
factor was a comparison of Hart's punishment with the punishment he would have received in
other jurisdictions. A survey of state statutes revealed, "West Virginia's recidivist scheme is
among the top four in the nation in terms of severity, and may be number one." Id. at 142
(footnote omitted). The final factor that Judge Craven considered was a comparison of punishments in West Virginia for other crimes. First degree murder, rape and kidnapping were the
only other crimes that carried a mandatory life sentence, and the penalties for a variety of
violent crimes ranged from 1 to 18 years. Id. In light of these considerations, Craven concluded
"that the sentence imposed upon Hart is constitutionally excessive and wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offenses he committed, and not necessary to achieve any legitimate
legislative purpose." Id. at 143.
16. 234 F. Supp. at 339. Judge Craven held that counsel in Perkins had not been "afforded
reasonable opportunity to investigate and prepare for trial." Id.
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Judge Craven made it known that, although he was bound to find the statute
constitutional, it deserved to be struck down: "Since 1869 the statute has
remained unchanged-in itself a shocking example of the unfortunate gulf
between criminal law, and medicine and psychiatry.' 17 Judge Craven
thought it unconscionable and senseless to send a homosexual to prison for
up to sixty years for committing an "act against nature":
Putting Perkins into the North Carolina prison system is a little like
throwing Brer Rabbit into the briarpatch. 8 Most doctors who have
studied homosexuality agree that prison environment, including
close, continuous, and exclusive contact with other men, aggravates and strengthens homosexual tendencies and provides an unexcelled opportunity for homosexual practices. For the confirmed
homosexual, imprisonment can accomplish no rehabilitative function; instead it provides an outlet for the gratification of sexuallydeviate desires.' 9
It was characteristic of Judge Craven to articulate his dissatisfaction
with the law in those instances when precedent and legislation precluded his
reaching a just result. When the matter under scrutiny deserved immediate
attention and discussion, Judge Craven was unwilling merely to cite the
20
controlling law and blandly refer the parties to the legislature for change.
Thus, in Perkins, having done what was required of him by upholding the
statute, he proceeded as a concerned jurist to launch a detailed attack on the
statute he had just upheld. One of the most engaging qualities of the opinion
in Perkins is the swiftness with which Judge Craven makes the transition
from upholding the constitutionality of the statute to critiquing its deficiencies. The swift change in tone is attributable to his desire to dispel any aura
of legitimacy that might attach to the statute as a result of its being upheld as
constitutional. The sense of urgency attending the opinion reflects his view
that the decriminalization of homosexual activity was an issue that could not
be put off any longer. Although the issue defied judicial resolution, it was
time that someone began a constructive dialogue as to possible changes in
the law; Judge Craven had no reservations about being the one to do so:
Is it not time to redraft a criminal statute first enacted in 1533? And
if so, cannot the criminal law draftsman be helped by those best
17. Id. at 335.
18. Uncle Remus enthusiasts will remember that Brer Rabbit begged Brer Fox to

roast him, hang him, skin him, snatch out his eyeballs, tear his ears out by the roots,
cut off his legs-do anything but throw him in the briarpatch. Fortunately for Brer
Rabbit, Brer Fox chose what he thought was the maximum punishment. Uncle Remus
by Joel Chandler Harris (New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1916, p.
18).
Id. at 339 n.18 (footnote of the court).
19. Id. at 339.
20. He was also rather critical of judges who did. See Paeanto Pragmatism,supra note 1,

at 979-80.
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informed on the subject-medical doctors-in attempting to classify offenders? Is there any public purpose served by a possible
sixty year maximum or even five year minimum imprisonment of
the occasional or one-time homosexual without treatment, and if
so, what is it? Are homosexuals twice as dangerous to society as
second degree murderers-as indicated by the maximum punishment for each offense?.

.

. These questions, and others like them,

need to be answered. 21
The propriety of Judge Craven's outspoken style on and off the bench
was questioned in the case of Lawton v. Tarr.22 In Lawton, the United
States Attorney directly challenged Judge Craven's capacity to decide a case
impartially by filing a motion asking him to disqualify himself from hearing
the merits of a habeas corpus petition involving a conviction under the
selective service law. Judge Craven had first heard the case as an application
23
for relief under rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which he denied. Lawton then filed a petition for habeas corpus 24 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. As
Judge Craven had already heard arguments on the merits of the case under
the rule 8 petition, it was decided by Judge Craven and Chief Judge
Algernon Butler2 that in the interests of judicial economy Judge Craven
should be assigned as district judge to the Eastern District of North Carolina
in order to hear Lawton's habeas corpus petition. It was at this point that the
United States Attorney filed a motion to recuse on the ground that Judge
Craven's opposition to the Vietnam War, as expressed in an address to a
county bar association, indicated hostility to the selective service law. 26 The
motion to recuse filed in Lawton brought into question whether it was
21. 234 F. Supp. at 340. Judge Craven's plea for change did not go unheeded. In 1965, one
year after the decision in Perkins, the General Assembly amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 to
read as follows: "If any person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind or beast,
he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the court."
Law of May 9, 1965, ch. 621, § 4, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 676 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14177 (1969)). In its deletion of the phrase "abominable and detestable" from the statutory
language, the General Assembly seemed to be responding to Judge Craven's suggestion that the
behavior in question was a medical and psychiatric problem that called for professional
treatment rather than outright condemnation. Although the crime against nature remained a
felony, the 1965 amendment did away with maximum and minimum sentences, thus providing
the sentencing judge with the flexibility to respond to the recommendations of medical personnel regarding the treatment of defendants. As the amended statute does not provide for
"specific punishment," the maximum sentence under the statute is 10 years-a substantial
improvement over the previous maximum of 60 years. See State v. Thompson, 268 N.C. 447,
150 S.E.2d 781 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June
23, 1977, ch. 711, § 15, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 459 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 2).
22. 327 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
23. Id. at 673; see FED. R. App. P. 8(a).
24. Lawton's habeas corpus petition was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
25. Judge Butler was then Chief Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
26. 327 F. Supp. at 671. For excerpts from this speech, see id. at 674 app.
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to
possible for Judge Craven to criticize the laws and policies he was bound
27
apply and still maintain his capacity "to apply the law as written."
Judge Craven's response was an angry, thoughtful, unequivocal
"yes." On the immediate issue of his right to make public speeches, Judge
Craven had the following tart comment:
If my oath of office includes a vow of silence on matters of public
controversy, then I have simply brought it upon myself. But I
believe that a federal judge is privileged to address his local Bar
Association in observance of Law Day without confining his remarks to platitudes in praise of milk
28 and motherhood with perhaps
a flat out condemnation of Hitler.
Moving on to the deeper jurisprudential implications of the motion to
recuse, Judge Craven defended the prerogative of a judge to forthrightly
recognize his personal convictions as to laws and policies even when his
professional duty forced him to uphold contrary conclusions. His response
summarizes his deeply held conviction that a judge need not feel obligated
to suppress his personal disagreement with the laws and policies he is bound
to uphold:
The beginning of intellectual honesty in a judge is the recognition
that, like other men, he has his own predilections and preferences
and intellectual and philosophical attitudes that color and influence
his viewpoints. Achieving it requires that he be constantly on guard
against his own bias, not in pretending that there can be none. I do
not believe that a judge has a duty of loyalty to a political administration with respect to any particular policy of that administration-international or domestic. Nor do I believe that he must
pretend to believe that all policies or even all laws are wise and
just. But I do believe that he must read, interpret and apply laws as
written without regard to whether he would like to see them
changed. 29
Looking back at his judicial record, Judge Craven could think of no instance
when his deep personal opposition to a particular law or policy had interfered with his duty to. "apply the law as written."30 In particular, Judge
Craven harkened back to the decision he had rendered seven years earlier in
Perkins.31 Judge Craven's comments on his disposition of that case provide
27. Id. at 672.
28. Id. at 671.
29. Id. at 671-72.
30. Id. at 672. Judge Craven noted that his long standing public opposition to capital
punishment had not prevented him from participating in "capital cases at both trial and
appellate level." Id. He also looked back "over the selective service cases in which [he had]
participated as a member of the Fourth Circuit," and noted that "[tfime and again [he had]
voted to affirm sentences of imprisonment inflicted upon those who had violated the selective
service law by refusal to serve in the armed forces." Id. See generally Paeanto Pragmatism,
supra note 1, at 978.
31. Judge Craven was a district judge at the time he decided Perkins.

1978]

PORTRAIT OF A PRAGMATIST

us with a vivid glimpse into the thoughts and emotions that crossed the mind
of the judge in the process of deciding a difficult case:
In Perkins v. North Carolina. . . I expressed my contempt for the
North Carolina statute making the so-called "crime against nature"
punishable by imprisonment up to 60 years. Never in my life have I
wanted more to find a statute invalid, and the opinion plainly
discloses my wish in that regard; but, nevertheless, I found it
impossible
under the law to do so, and I held it valid and enforce32
able.
Ultimately Judge Craven did disqualify himself from considering the Lawton case, but not because of any doubts concerning his "capacity to adjudge
33
and decide the merits fairly both to the petitioner and to the respondent." ,
Rather, he felt that, in light of the motion to recuse, his request to hear the
habeas corpus petition as a district judge might give the appearance that he
had sought out the case and was "eager for an opportunity to interpret that
part of the selective service law at issue." 34 Worried that the assignment of
the case to him as a district judge "could be interpreted as a reaching out for
jurisdiction," 35 he withdrew.
Judge Craven's frank recognition in Lawton that like other men he had
his own "predilections and preferences" 36 complemented his extreme sensitivity to the perils of unprincipled decisionmaking. Thus, his staunch
defense in Lawton of the judge's right to express publicly whatever personal
feelings or attitudes he might entertain toward the subject matter of a case
was qualified by a reluctance to decide a case on the basis of such feelings or
attitudes. His awareness of the dangers inherent in such decisionmaking was
especially apparent in his careful analyses of a judge's sentencing discretion
in United States v. Miller37 and of a judge's contempt power in United
States v. Snider. 8
In Miller, Judge Craven, sitting as a district judge by designation, had
occasion to resentence a convicted bank robber. As he sought to determine
an appropriate sentence, Judge Craven reflected upon the difficulties and
dangers inherent in the sentencing process. He had earlier sentenced peti32. 327 F. Supp. at 672.
33. Id. at 673.
I do not believe that my strong aversion to the Vietnam War and my belief that it is the
most tragic national mistake made in my lifetime will have the slightest effect or

influence upon my judgment as to the time of termination of exposure under the
selective service law.

Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.at 674.
36. Id. at 672.
37. 361 F. Supp. 825 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
38. 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
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tioner Miller and his confederate Carver for bank robbery. 39 Having served
approximately four years of his sentence, Miller filed a petition to vacate,
set aside or correct sentence,4 ° contending that in determining his original
sentence Judge Craven had improperly considered prior convictions that
were now void by reason of Gideon v. Wainwright.4' Judge Craven could
not specifically recall whether he had actually considered the void convictions in determining Miller's sentence. However, as he always took a
defendant's prior criminal record into account in determining a sentence, he
concluded that the void convictions, being the most serious and recent ones
in Miller's record at the time of his original sentencing, "contributed to the
formulation of [his] sentence and enhanced punishment. "42 Miller was thus
"entitled to vacation of his sentence and to be resentenced." 43
As he sought to formulate a new sentence for Miller, Judge Craven
recalled the uneasiness he always felt when as a trial judge he was called
upon to sentence a convicted criminal: "What is now an appropriate sentence? All of my judicial life I have wished for precision in the art of
sentencing, and it eludes me. It seems to me incongruous that trial judges
without either training or experience in penology, are accorded finality in
the determination of punishment."' Judge Craven recalled that as a trial
judge he had attempted to familiarize himself with the field of penology;
however, he did not confuse those efforts with the mastery of penology he
45
felt was essential to the sentencing process.
Judge Craven worried that the broad discretion accorded the sentencing
judge, combined with the typical judge's unfamiliarity with the science of
penology, would force even the most conscientious judge to "impose a
39. Judge Craven was a district judge at the time he originally sentenced Miller. 361 F.
Supp. at 826.
40. Miller's petition was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
41. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Miller was relying on United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,449

(1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge may not consider
previous convictions of a defendant now void by reason of Gideon in formulating an appropriate sefitence. As Judge Craven had been Miller's sentencing judge, it was decided that he was

the judge best qualified to determine whether the void conviction of Miller had contributed to
the formulation of his original sentence.
42. 361 F. Supp. at 827.

43. Id.
44. Id. See generally Foreword,supra note 1.
45. When I was a trial judge, and charged with the responsibility of sentencing, I used
to make myself scan and sometimes read the quarterly entitled "Federal Probation"
devoted to the science of penology. That, plus attendance at a sentencing institute and

visits to three prisons comprised neary all of my training and experience for the
sentencing function. I think it not enough. I have about concluded that the trial judges
I have known (including me especially) are not as qualified by education and experience as are those from other disciplines to decide whether a man should go, nor how
long should he remain in prison.
361 F. Supp. at 828.
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pattern of his personal reactions, philosophy, and animosity" in his sentencing decisions. 6 In effect, the government was asking the sentencing judge
to engage in unprincipled and inherently unreliable decisionmaking in an
area where the need for humane and objective guidelines was essential. 47
Clearly, Judge Craven did not relish or trust the autonomy given the
sentencing judge:
The truth is that passing sentence is far too delicate a power and
too consequential to be lodged in any man's hands entirely unsupervised. It jars with our traditional notions of human freedom to
say that the exercise of such vast power by one man shall remain
beyond review by anyone else. 41
46. Id. at 827. The subjective, imprecise and unguided nature of this decision is amply

illustrated by Judge Craven's description of the determining factors behind the original sentence imposed on Miller:
I sentenced Miller and his confederate, Carver, for bank robbery. Carver got ten
years. . . .He carried the weapon used in the robbery, and in my opinion, was the
more culpable of the two. Miller got eight years. I thought then, and think now, that he
is not violence-prone, and probably would not deliberately harm another person, even
to escape apprehension and punishment for a serious offense. Nevertheless, bank
robbery is a serious matter, and I believe somewhat in the validity of the deterrent
theory, despite there being much evidence to the contrary.
Id. at 826.
47. Judge Craven noted that the urgency of this problem was heightened by the fact that
"[n]ine out of ten defendants plead guilty without trial. For them the punishment is the only
issue, and yet we repose in a single judge the sole responsibility for this vital function." Id. at
827.
48. Id. (quoting address by Judge Sobeloff, Symposium on the Appellate Review of
Sentences, Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Sept. 24, 1962), reprintedin 32 F.R.D. 249, 268 (1962)). Judge Craven's fears of the absolute
discretion given the sentencing judge had been realized earlier in Perkins, when the state judge,
for reasons best known to himself, gave Perkins a 25 to 30 year sentence instead of the usual 5
year sentence given those convicted of committing "crimes against nature." See generally
notes 14 & 15 and text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
Judge Craven was able to implement some of his ideas on the proper exercise of sentencing
discretion in United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969). After his plea of guilty,
defendant in Williams was examined by a psychiatrist who recommended that Williams receive
treatment for drug addiction. All of the evidence presented to the judge before sentencing
showed that Williams was a drug addict. Defense counsel requested that the judge direct the
Attorney General to examine Williams in order to determine his eligibility for treatment. The
trial judge thought that this examination would be carried out even without his recommendation
and refused to give such a directive. On appeal, Williams requested to be resentenced and
considered for treatment under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4252 (1970),
which provides that the court may put an offender believed to be an addict in the custody of the
Attorney General for a determination of whether he is an addict likely to be rehabilitated by
treatment.
Judge Craven found that the trial record made no mention of the Act and that the trial judge
did not exercise his discretion under the Act because it was not brought to his attention
sufficiently. 407 F.2d at 944. According to Craven, such a failure to exercise discretion was
error on the part of the trial judge, for Williams had a right to the exercise of the judge's
discretion. Id. at 944-45. Craven apparently viewed the Act as an aid in determining the
sentence, and he seemed to feel that such an aid should not be ignored by a sentencing judge.
This notion of a right to the exercise of discretion at sentencing has been extended to a
number of sentencing alternatives. In United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971), the
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Perhaps in no other instance is a judge more likely to inject personal
value judgments into his decisionmaking than in the exercise of the criminal
49
contempt power for misbehavior in court. In United States v. Snider,
Judge Craven considered whether a court should hold a person in contempt
for refusing to engage in a symbolic act required of all those in attendance.
The precise question before the court in Snider was "whether a failure to
stand (accompanied only by such interruption of proceedings as are thought
necessary by the district judge to explain the consequences of contempt and
cite the alleged contemnor for his actions) [was] 'misbehavior' within the
meaning of [the federal contempt statute]." 5 0 This issue raised intriguing
questions regarding the relationship between the judiciary and citizenry in a
pluralistic, democratic society:
How much respect is it right for the judicial branch of the government to demand from citizens, and why is respect demanded and
even ritualized as it is? Is a showing of respect either necessary or
desirable to maintain a good judicial system, or is it merely a
cultural bias? 51
Judge Craven's response recognized that in a democratic society
" 'real respect of the citizenry for the judiciary is earned, not commanded.' "52 He stressed that the limited purpose of the contempt power in the
federal courts was to ensure the efficient administration of justice. The most
that a federal judge could demand of those in the courtroom was that they
not interfere with the conduct of a fair trial. Judges in the heat of trial tended
to forget that the contempt powers were not designed to perpetuate the
judge, through inadvertence, failed to consider the Young Adult Offenders Act, Pub. L. No. 85-

752, § 4, 72 Stat. 846 (1958) (formerly codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970)) (current
version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 4216 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)). The Fourth Circuit, citing Williams,

held that an appellate court can look at a sentence to see whether discretion was exercised and
remanded for resentencing. 450 F.2d at 498. Similarly, in United States v. Ingram, 530 F.2d 602
(4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit found error in a failure to exercise discretion in a trial judge's
policy not to sentence armed bank robbers under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 1115,
64 Stat. 1086 (1950) (formerly codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970)) (current
version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5005-5026 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).

49. 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974). Snider was a criminal tax case. Defendant, a devout
Quaker opposed to the Vietnam War, had claimed three billion dependents on a tax withholding
form. Defendant was prosecuted for wilfully supplying false or fraudulent information that
would require an increase in the tax to be withheld. For a discussion of this aspect of the case,
see text accompanying notes 368-76 infra.

50. 502 F.2d at 658. The federal contempt statute is found at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) and
provides in relevant part: "A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or

imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-(l) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice."
51. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 201 (1971).
52. 502 F.2d at 660 (quoting In re Chase. 468 F.2d 128, 137 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting)).
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dignity of the court at the expense of an individual's rights. Thus, if the
rising requirement was not essential to the functioning of the court, the
judge, even though offended, must tolerate those who silently choose not to
rise:
[T]he fact that the authority of federal courts to punish contempt
has been codified is recognition of the fact that such a power,
unrestrained by judicial discretion, can encroach upon the very
rights and privileges which the courts are designed to foster. For
that reason the language of the statute defining the authority to use
such power must be closely considered and the judges who are
given that authority are admonished to be "men of fortitude, able
to thrive in a hardy climate," and continually "on guard against
confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the
administration of justice.' 53
Applying these principles, Judge Craven concluded that "[tihe rising
requirement seems . . . not essential to the functioning of the court; as
such, the failure to rise does not constitute a material obstruction." 54 He
conceded "[t]hat the custom of rising contributes to the functioning of the
court by 'marking the beginning and end of the session' and by 'serv[ing] to
remind all that attention must be concentrated upon the business before the
court' ";55 however, he noted that "the words of the clerk or the judge may
serve this function as well.' '56 Moreover, Judge Craven doubted "that
failure to rise per se, whether stemming from religious belief, conscience or
symbolic protest [could] be punished as 'misbehavior' within the meaning
of [the federal contempt statute] without violating the Constitution." 57 To
require an individual who had not disrupted court proceedings to rise against
his will by a threatened use of the contempt power was hardly distinguishable from requiring a school child to salute a flag against his will. 58 In
the course of the opinion Judge Craven refused to follow the rule adopted by
the Seventh Circuit that permitted a contempt citation for mere failure to rise
if the judge found that such behavior had obstructed the administration of
53. Id. at 658 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947), and Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958), respectively).

54. Id. at 659.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. Although Judge Craven did not premise the decision on constitutional grounds, he

noted that such a construction of the statute might raise serious first amendment questions:
"Where behavior in the courtroom reaches the level of speech or expression, it is protected

absent 'an imminent . . . threat to the administration of justice.... ..
Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972)) (footnote omitted).

Id. (quoting In re

58. Id. at 660 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942)). Judge

Craven noted that "improper language or gestures accompanying such a refusal [to rise] may be
separately punishable as contempt." Id. at 659.
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justice. 59 Such a rule was unacceptable in Judge Craven's view because it
improperly invited a judge to apply a subjective standard based on the
offensiveness of the conduct to him:
Under the [Seventh Circuit rule] the same conduct in one court
would be contempt while in another it would not, depending upon
the judge. We find it difficult to accept such a subjective interpretation of "misbehavior." Either it is or it is not contemptuous, and
such a judgment should not rest on the judge's sensibility but upon
the purposes served by the requirement. 60
Judge Craven's functional approach to the symbolic act-contempt cases
epitomizes his fine sense of the limits of judicial power. Judge Craven was
among those few judges who could penetrate through the personal emotion
inherent in an open defiance of the court to analyze objectively the competing values involved and to establish priorities.6 1 His analysis in Snider
perceived that a refusal to engage in symbolic acts "involve[d] neither an
actual disruption of the trial nor an obstruction of judicial processes, but
rather an invasion of the court's claims to respect and dignity. '"62 Such
behavior would rarely disrupt the trial in fact but was bound to offend the
judge's ideology or social values. The use of the contempt power in such
situations would not preserve order but rather would enforce the values of
the judge "by requiring symbolic acts not directly related to the needs of
judicial administration."63
Judge Craven had a strong opinion about the appropriate use of the
contempt power. He thought that it should not give to the judge the
prerogative of enforcing respect for his social values; rather, it should give
to the judge the means by which to assure an orderly search for truth and
justice. Underlying the discussion in Snider is the notion that in the American system of justice the judge is no better than the man he tries or the law
he is bound to uphold. 64 The judge holding court must tolerate expressions
59. The Seventh Circuit, on facts similar to Snider, found that the mere failure to rise
coupled with the interruption of the trial by reason of the time consumed in citing defendant for

contempt constituted misbehavior obstructing the administration of justice. In re Chase, 468
F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972). Thus, depending on the patience of the district court judge, mere
failure to rise could easily constitute contempt of court in the Seventh Circuit.
60. 502 F.2d at 659.
61. For a survey indicating the capricious and arbitrary decisions of judges in symbolic
act-contempt cases, see Dobbs, supra note 51, at 201-02.

62. Id. at 200.
63. Id. at 204.

64. See generally 502 F.2d at 648 n.7A (account of trial of William Penn). One writer has
noted that in England the contempt power traditionally was not used solely to ensure the

efficient administration of justice. English judges also exercised the contempt power to enforce
class distinctions between themselves and litigants. The traditional English view of the contempt power continues to plague the American cases. Dobbs, supra note 51, at 201-03.
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of dissent that do not threaten the proceedings, for the judge is not an
autocrat but a public servant. It was this simple but nevertheless profound
insight into the role of the judge in a democratic society that enabled Judge
Craven to dismiss confidently predictions of the dire consequences that
65
would follow from the holding in Snider:
To so hold will not, we think, tend to diminish respect for the
judiciary and for the administration of justice. We do not envision,
as the result of our decision today, disorder flourishing in the
courtroom. Instead, we anticipate the custom of rising upon the
convening and adjournment of court will continue and become
more significant because wholly voluntary. There was a time when
an unwary parishioner was tapped by the warden to enforce traditional religious observance, including rising, the bowing of knee
and head. The gestures of piety are still observed-but without
coercion.
We have no doubt that the judges of this circuit will continue
to maintain order in the courtroom and to conduct business expeditiously. We think they fully share our belief that "real respect
of the citizenry for the judiciary is earned, not commanded. '"I
The opinions in Miller and Snider underscore Judge Craven's insistence in Perkins and Lawton that an innovative, result-oriented judicial
philosophy has no validity unless it functions within the framework of law,
precedent and community standards. Thus in Miller Judge Craven expressed his discomfort with the autonomy given him to sentence prisoners
because when passing sentence he had no need to justify his decision in light
of statutory or precedential guidelines. Lacking any countercurrents to
temper and constrain his thinking, Judge Craven exercised his sentencing
discretion with extreme caution lest his decision reflect merely personal
opinion. Similarly, in Snider Judge Craven carefully refrained from permitting the use of the contempt power to impose the trial judge's ideology and
values on litigants and courtroom spectators; rather, he condoned its exercise solely to ensure the efficient administration of justice.
On the other hand, when there was a legal framework to provide
restraint and stability, Judge Craven did not hesitate, when not bound by
precedent, to interpret the applicable law in a manner that would permit a
just result. Only in such a context, he felt, was there sufficient assurance
that a judge's propensity to inject personal values into his decisionmaking
65. See Judge Widener's dissent in Snider to the effect that the judge's inability to enforce
the "Everyone rise" order through the contempt sanction "could only lead to a further
degradation of the courts." 502 F.2d at 665.
66. Id. at 660 (quoting In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128, 137 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting)).
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would not convert a principled search for justice into an exercise in judicial
tyranny and paternalism. When the just result had to be justified in light
of current legal doctrine the decision taking shape would have to find a niche
in the established framework or fall. If the desired result could not be
viewed as a tenable extension of existing doctrine then the judge had
warning that to reach such a result would be tantamount to imposing his
personal views on the litigants before him. In such cases, then, Judge
Craven felt free to analyze the relevant law exhaustively in order to determine whether an interpretation that would satisfy justice was attainable.
Judge Craven's vigorous dissent in Atkins v. Schm utz ManufacturingCo. ,67
where he scrutinizes the scope of the Erie doctrine in order to determine
whether Erie principles prevented a just result, presents a marked contrast to
his reluctance in Miller and Snider to exercise the sentencing discretion and
contempt powers accorded to federal judges.
STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONS: IN PURSUIT OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

The appealing facts and peculiar disposition of the heavily litigated
Atkins case set the stage for a classic exposition of Judge Craven's resultoriented judicial philosophy. 68 The majority of the Fourth Circuit panel that
initially heard Atkins thought that the rule of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 69
compelled them to deny plaintiff Atkins a trial on the merits. Judge Craven,
however, argued strongly that the law controlling the disposition of Atkins'
appeal was sufficiently in flux that Atkins need not be denied a trial on the
merits. Moreover, the branch of the Atkins litigation before the Fourth
Circuit raised serious questions about the scope and import of the Supreme
70
Court's decisions in Byrd v. Blue Ridge RuralElectric Cooperative, Inc.
67. 401 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1968) (Craven, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearingen banc,

435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971). The prior litigation of Atkins in
the Sixth Circuit was reported at 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
68. Judge Craven filed a lengthy dissenting opinion.
69. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Guaranty Trust the Supreme Court held:

that a state statute of limitations must be applied by a federal court in a diversity case,
even though statutes of limitations may be regarded as "procedural" for some other
purposes, in order to ensure that "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a

litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 59, at 273 (3rd ed. 1976) (quoting 326 U.S. at 109). The
outcome determinative test announced in Guaranty Trust tended to favor state substantive
interests at the expense of federal procedural interests for "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any
rule of procedure that cannot have a significant effect on the outcome of a case." Id. Although
the scope of the Guaranty Trust rule was uncertain, it was clear that under the rule federal

procedural interests were to take a back seat to state substantive interests in cases of conflicts

between the two.
70. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, a diversity action for injuries from negligence, defendant
raised the defense that plaintiff was its employee under the South Carolina Workmen's Com-

pensation Act, and that the Act provided plaintiff's sole remedy. A South Carolina court had
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and Hanna v. Plumer.7 1 Thus, rather than briefly note his disagreement,
Judge Craven undertook to demonstrate, through an extensive analysis, why
the federal courts were not compelled to deny Atkins a trial on the merits.
Perhaps Judge Craven hoped that his lengthy dissent would provoke an en
banc rehearing in which his position would be vindicated. If he did, his
hopes were fulfilled a year later, when the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
withdrew its earlier opinion in Atkins and granted plaintiff a trial on the
merits.

72

On the merits, Donald Atkins could hardly have presented stronger
equities in his favor. On June 22, 1961, while working in Virginia, Atkins
became entangled in a machine manufactured and sold by defendant. As a
result of his injury, Atkins had both of his feet amputated. He brought suit
against the manufacturer alleging negligence in the design and construction
of the machine.

73

There were several aspects of the substantive injury suffered by Atkins
from which he could draw a limited measure of consolation. At least he
could comprehend the physical forces that had injured him. He also knew
there were others who had suffered similar injuries and that there was a
possibility of recovering damages to compensate for his injuries. The procedural injuries suffered by Atkins in pursuit of his rights against the
defendant, however, were of another magnitude. The "procedural booby
traps" 74 that prevented Atkins from having the merits of his case heard must
have been, to him, incomprehensible and unique. Even worse, Atkins could
not hope to receive money damages to assuage the hurt caused by these
"procedural" injuries.
held that this defense was to be passed on by the judge rather than the jury. Smith v. Fulmer,
198 S.C. 91, 15 S.E.2d 681 (1941). The Supreme Court held that in federal court a jury must pass
on this defense. In Byrd the Court did not engage in the Guaranty Trust analysis of determining
whether the federal procedural rule, if adopted, would change the outcome of the state
litigation, but rather compared the relative strengths of the conflicting state substantive and
federal procedural interests being asserted. The Court concluded that since the South Carolina
rule was not "intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the

parties," the state substantive interest in this rule was slight. 356 U.S. at 536. On the other
hand, the Court found that there was "a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to
disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." Id. at 538.
71. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna the Court held that "Erie is not the proper test when
the question is governed by one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the rule is valid
when measured against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, it is to
be applied regardless of contrary state law." C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 55, at 258 (footnotes
omitted). Further, the Court in Hanna reaffirmed Byrd's balancing approach in those instances
when there is no federal rule directly on point and the court has to make "the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice." 380 U.S. at 471.
72. 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
73. 401 F.2d at 731.
74. Id. at 735 (Craven, J., dissenting).
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Atkins' procedural troubles began when his lawyers discovered that the
defendant's only place of business was in Kentucky. Since Virginia had no
"long-arm statute" in 1961,75 it was determined that the defendant would
have to be sued in Kentucky. At this juncture, a consideration of the
Kentucky and Virginia statutes of limitations applicable to Atkins' cause of
action became crucial. Kentucky prescribed one year 76 and Virginia two
years7 7 as the period of limitations. At the time of suit "Kentucky decisions
were understood in the federal courts to hold that in a suit filed in Kentucky,
based upon a cause of action arising in another state, 'the statute of
limitations of another state, if longer, is applicable.' "78 Consequently, suit
was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky on June 19, 1963, more than one year but less than two
years after the injury. 79 Unfortunately, while the suit was pending, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that in such cases the Kentucky one-year
statute of limitations would prevail over a longer period of another state and
that this rule should apply retrospectively. 80 Thus, unexpectedly, Atkins'
suit in Kentucky was doomed. Taking advantage of these changes in
Kentucky's conflicts law, defendant had the suit dismissed. The judgment
was upheld by the Sixth Circuit. 81 Atkins' only recourse was to file suit in
Virginia. On March 13, 1967, almost six years after the injury occurred, but
before the decision of the Sixth Circuit was issued, Atkins filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, 82 taking
advantage of that state's new long-arm statute. 83 This time, defendant raised
the bar of Virginia's two-year statute on a motion for summary judgment.
The district judge granted the motion. 84
75. Virginia passed a long-arm statute in 1964. It is currently codified as VA. CODE §§ 8.01328 to -330 (1977).
76. Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 71, art. III, § 3 (1873) (formerly codified as KY. REv. STAT. § 413.

140 (1972)).
77. Law of Apr. 6, 1954, ch. 589, 1952-54 Va. Acts, 1954 Reg. Sess. 764 (formerly codified
as VA. CODE § 8-24).
78. 401 F.2d at 732 (quoting Collins v. Lambert Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 362, 364 (6th Cir.

1962)) (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 731.
80. Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965) (statute of limita-

tions); Wethington v. Griggs, 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965) (retrospective application); see 401 F.2d
at 732.
81. 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967). The Sixth Circuit decision
was controlled by Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), which holds that a

federal court in a diversity action must apply the forum state's conflict of laws rule. Klaxon
was recently reaffirmed in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per
curiam).
82. 401 F.2d at 732.
83. See note 75 supra.
84. 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967). The court found "that plaintiff could not fit himself

into any of the instances in which Virginia suspends the running of the statute." 401 F.2d at 732;
see 268 F. Supp. at 408.
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On appeal, the issue before the Fourth Circuit panel was whether the
tolling effect of a pending federal suit on Virginia's statute of limitations
should be governed by state or federal law. The majority agreed with the
Sixth Circuit that the "equities strongly favor[ed] appellant''85 and noted
that the pendency of the Kentucky claim would satisfy any legislative
purpose on the part of Virginia "to guard against slumbering claims and
would have provided ample opportunity for discovery and presentation of
relevant evidence.'"86 Nevertheless, the majority felt it was precluded by the
rule of Guaranty Trust from applying federal law to determine whether
Virginia's statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of the action in
Kentucky. 8 7 There was no discussion of the possible effect the Supreme
Court's more recent decisions in Byrd and Hanna might have on the
application of the GuarantyTrust rule. Apparently the majority thought that
Guaranty Trust, involving as it did a state statute of limitations, could not
be distinguished. Thus, the majority agreed with the district judge that
88
Virginia's tolling statute was dispositive of the case.
Judge Craven did not agree that Guaranty Trust was controlling on
whether state or federal rules should determine the tolling effect of a
pending federal action on Virginia's statute of limitations. Rather, he believed that the Supreme Court's decisions in Byrd and Hanna had introduced a principle of flexibility in determining choice of law in those
instances in which state substantive interests and federal procedural interests
collide.8 9 In light of Byrd and Hanna Judge Craven thought that a federal
court no longer had to apply the mechanical "outcome determinative" test
of Guaranty Trust that tended to favor state substantive interests unduly.
Thus, "a mechanistic resort to Virginia tolling statutes and imprecise
85. 401 F.2d at 733-34.
86. Id. at 734.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. There has been sharp disagreement among the lower courts as to the scope and import

of the Byrd and Hanna decisions in determining choice of law in cases of conflipt between state
substantive and federal procedural interests. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 59, at 277. One
group of cases limits Byrd and Hanna to their facts and continues to apply the rule of Guaranty
Trust in all other instances; "[o]ther cases continue to consider whether a state rule is one of
substance or procedure and to balance the strength of the competing federal and state interests." Id. For an analysis critical of the initial Atkins decision and advocating a broad reading
of Byrd and Hanna, see Note, FederalCourts-The "Erie Doctrine" and Tolling of the State

Statute of Limitations, 47 N.C.L. REV. 715 (1969); for critical analyses of the en banc Atkins
decision, advocating a narrow view of Byrd and Hanna, see Note, State Statutesof Limitations
In FederalCourts: By Whom Is The Statute Tolled? 1971 DUKE L.J. 785; Note, ErieDoctrineTolling Effect on Statute of Limitationsof PriorPending Suit in FederalCourt Is a Question of
FederalLaw, 50 TEx. L. REV. 162 (1971). For a survey of the literature on this subject, see C.
WRIGHT,

supra § 59, at 271 n.1.
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Virginia state court decisions interpreting them" 90 was no longer compelled: "I regret that I am unable to persuade the court that we may
faithfully follow the Erie-Guaranty-Byrd-Hannadoctrine without necessarily denying this plaintiff a trial on the merits." 91 Under Byrd and Hanna,
federal procedural interests that conflicted with state substantive law were to
be considered carefully and, when "affirmative countervailing considerations'' 92 existed, federal law was to prevail. Following this line of thought,
Judge Craven was convinced that a path existed by which Donald Atkins
could be given a trial on the merits in a manner that would not offend the
concept of federalism embodied in the Erie doctrine. Judge Craven's dissent
tracked this delicate path.
The dissent was premised on the contention that the tolling effect of
pending litigation in the federal courts was a "purely procedural [problem]
involving the method of operation of the federal courts. "9 In support of this
contention, he drew an analogy to federal procedure under the transfer of
venue statutes, 94 under which the tolling effect of a suit pending in federal
district court was determined as a matter of federal law without regard to
state tolling statutes. 95 He noted that under the transfer of venue statutes the
filing of suit in the original district court had the effect of tolling all
applicable statutes of limitations. Thus, when "an obstacle to an expeditious
and orderly adjudication on the merits" 96 arose in the original district court,
a plantiff could "transfer" the original proceeding to another district instead
of commencing a new proceeding that might then be barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 97 In the federal system, then, one needed to
commence a particular suit only once. By timely filing suit, the plaintiff
satisfied the substantive policies of diligence, avoidance of stale claims, and
90. 401 F.2d at 735 (dissent).
91. Id. at 734 (dissent).
92. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. at 537.
93. 401 F.2d at 736 (dissent).
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1970). Judge Craven's analogy focused on § 1406, which
deals with transfer in cases when venue is improper. Section 1404 deals with those instances

when venue is proper but inconvenient. Section 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a
district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it
be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought."
95. The equitable statutory policy of permitting a transfer rather than requiring dismissal
of suits when venue was improper or inconvenient is thoroughly discussed in Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman, 369 U'.S. 463 (1962).
96. 401 F.2d at 736 (dissent). Judge Craven suggested that where such obstacles to

reaching the merits were present, venue had been laid "in the wrong division or district" as
contemplated by the statute. Accord, Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1967);

Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1967).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970); see Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463,466-67 (1962).
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repose embodied in a state statute of limitations.9 8 The configuration of a
suit, once it was filed, was a matter for federal determination.
Judge Craven suggested that Atkins' predicament was virtually identical to that of a plaintiff who unexpectedly discovered he was in the wrong
forum and applied for a transfer of venue. Like the plaintiff whose case was
dismissed for improper venue, Atkins was exposed to the danger that his
subsequent suit would be barred by the statute of limitations. The filing of a
suit by Atkins in Virginia district court while his Kentucky litigation was
pending but no longer viable was the equivalent of a statutory transfer of
venue. Thus, the tolling effect of pending litigation, like the transfer of
venue, should be recognized as a "purely procedural [problem] involving
the method of operation of the federal courts' 99 and should be determined as
a matter of federal rather than state law. As a transfer of venue case involved
the same procedural concerns as the tolling effect of pending litigation in a
subsequent suit on the same cause of action, the federal policy of tolling in
the former situation ought to be extended to the latter.
Having determined that there was a strong federal procedural interest in
allowing Atkins to have a trial on the merits, Judge Craven, in compliance
with the teachings of Byrd and Hanna, examined Virginia's tolling statute 1°° and the case construing it cited by the majority.10 1 He pointed out that
10 2
the case relied upon by the majority was dated, readily distinguishable 3
1 0°
and could not be read "as a statement or an analysis of state policy."
98. Accord, 401 F.2d at 734 (opinion of the court).
99. Id. at 736 (dissent).
100. VA. CODE § 8.01-229 (1977).
101. Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 170 Va. 88, 195 S.E. 525 (1938).
102. Plaintiff in Jones had commenced his action in the wrong state forum while plaintiff in

Atkins had filed suit in the proper federal forum-the only.forum available to him at the time.
Thus, the precise holding in Jones-"thatthe statute of limitations of Virginia was not tolled by
the commencing of an action in the wrong state forum," 401 F.2d at 740 (Craven, J., dissenting)-did not necessarily control the tolling problems presented by Atkins. Moreover,
In Jones, the plaintiff began a second action after the dismissal of a prior, timely
proceeding and sought to exclude from the statutory period the time during which the
earlier action was pending. The [court] held that this period could not be excluded and
barred the later-commenced action. . . . Atkins, in fact, commenced the present

Virginia action while the Kentucky proceedings were still pending and during the
period in which those proceedings continued to toll the running of the Virginia statute.

Id. at 741. Judge Craven's point was that the majority was not duty bound to follow the broad
dicta in Jones for the purposes of determining how the highest court in Virginia would dispose
of Atkins. In effect, Atkins presented a "fact situation not previously considered by Virginia's
highest court." Id. at 735. Thus, assuming that Guaranty Trust controlled the disposition of

Atkins, a federal judge was free to find that, as a matter of Virginia law, Atkins' pending suits in
Kentucky tolled Virginia's statute of limitations. Accord, Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435
F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) (analyzing parallel Virgihia

authorities).
103. 401 F.2d at 741 (dissent). As the holding in Jones was narrowly based, it could hardly

be cited as an authoritative source of Virginia's tolling policy.

230
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Further, Virginia's statute of limitations and its companion tolling statute
certainly did "not enunciate a state policy that a Virginia resident who is
injured in Virginia shall not be entitled to a trial on the merits against a
nonresident tort-feasor." 10 4 Thus, the Byrd-Hanna balancing of state substantive interests against federal procedural interests revealed no strong state
policy contrary to the federal goal "of removing whatever obstacles may
impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies
on their merits. ,' 105 In fact, Virginia's recent enactment of a long-arm
statute indicated a similar desire by the state to facilitate trial on the merits in
such instances. Upon close scrutiny, then, the apparent conflict between
state and federal policies on tolling discerned by the majority through its
mechanical application of the Guaranty test was nonexistent.
Judge Craven's dissent in Atkins demonstrated the positive and constructive nature of his result-orientation. His method went beyond mere
statement of preconceived conclusions. All the judges who heard the Atkins
case agreed that Atkins ought to be granted a trial on the merits. 106 To Judge
Craven the initial question presented was whether the law dispositive of
Atkins' case was capable of being responsibly interpreted in a manner that
would produce this desired result. Operating from this beginning point, he
reasoned that the recent Supreme Court warnings in Byrd and Hanna
against compromising the institutional integrity of federal procedure in the
application of the Erie doctrine warranted a holding that the tolling effect of
pending litigation in a federal court was to be determined as a matter of
federal rather than state law. The interpretive challenge for Judge Craven in
Atkins was to show how the tolling effect of pending litigation "involv[ed]
the method of operation of the federal courts" 10 7 and why it fell within the
rationale of the Byrd-Hanna doctrine. This was the essence of Judge
Craven's method: to make the search for just results and principled, innovative interpretation of the law indispensable one to the other.
Judge Craven's dissent in Atkins was subsequently adopted in an en
banc hearing of the case. On resubmission the full court reversed the panel
opinion and held instead "that the tolling effect of the pendency of an
identical suit in another federal court is to be determined as a matter of
federal rather than state law and that the Virginia statute of limitations was
tolled by the action brought by Atkins in the Western District of Ken104. Id. at 740-41 (dissent).
105. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962), quoted in 401 F.2d at 737
(dissent).
106. 401 F.2d at 733-34 (opinion of the court) (quoting Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372
F.2d at 764 (6th Cir.)).
107. Id. at 736 (dissent).

1978]

PORTRAIT OF A PRAGMATIST

tucky." 10 8 Chief Judge Haynsworth fully developed Judge Craven's previous suggestion in dissent that the Erie doctrine as modified by Byrd and
Hanna safeguarded the institutional integrity of federal procedure against
unwarranted interference by conflicting state substantive interests. The
broad interpretation given Byrd and Hanna in Atkins has since found
109
increasing acceptance by the other courts of appeals.
The crucial insight emerging from Judge Craven's dissent in Atkins
was a recognition that when state substantive and federal procedural inter110
ests "come into conflict, there [can] be no wholly satisfactory answers."
Thus, blind reliance on such simplistic formulae as "substance-procedure"
and "outcome determination" would inevitably produce distorted results
unduly favoring either state law or federal law depending on the standard
being used. Such questions, as Judge Craven's analysis in Atkins demonstrated, had to be left to "the ad hoc determination of judges keenly aware
of their responsibilities to two sovereigns."' 111 Judge Craven also used this
balancing approach to deal with difficult abstention questions in the cases of
Crawford v. Courtney" 2 and Lynch v. Snepp. 113 Taken together, Judge
Craven's applications of the Erie and abstention doctrines exhibit a pragmatic, even handed attitude toward the problems of state-federal relations.
In considering the appropriateness of abstention, he carefully guarded
against undue federal interference with state affairs. On the other hand,
when faced with the Erie task of determining on which issues state law was
controlling, Judge Craven sought to check the intrusion of state law into
matters that involved the method of operation of the federal courts.
The litigation in Crawford v. Courtney 1 4 "began as a land condemnation action in a state court of West Virginia." 1 5 Pursuant to the power of
eminent domain, a state court condemned a piece of church property and
108. 435 F.2d at 527-28 (en banc).
109. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal

dismissed, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974); Prashar v.
Volkswagen, Inc., 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974); Sun Sales
Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1972); Johnson Chem. Co. v. Condado Center,
Inc., 453 F.2d 1044 (1st Cir. 1972).
110. C.WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 59, at 278.
111. Id.; accord, Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert.

denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
112. 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971).

113. 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). Other abstention
decisions by Judge Craven included: AFA Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th

Cir. 1973); Webster v. Perry, 367 F. Supp. 666 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (three-judge court; McMillan,
J., concurring and dissenting), vacated and remandedforentry of new judgment forappeal to the
court of appeals, 417 U.S. 963 (1974).
114. 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971).
115. Id. at 490.
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awarded compensation to the landowners in the amount of $29,400. The
fund from the condemnation was deposited in that court pending determination of who was entitled to the money. The trustees of the condemned
church property and the heirs of the grantor of the church property asserted
conflicting claims to the fund. The heirs based their title on the deed to the
church, which contained a reversion clause in favor of the heirs of the
grantor in the event that the property ceased to be used as a place of worship.
West Virginia law provided that conflicting claims to the fund created by the
condemnation were to be resolved as part of the original condemnation
proceeding. 116 While the state proceedings were pending, the heirs brought
a diversity suit for declaratory relief in federal district court "to establish
117
their asserted right to the fund."
Judge Craven noted initially that, when asked to adjudicate the rights of
a litigant to a fund in the possession of a state court, a federal court had to
consider carefully the " 'ancient and important rule, not confined to those
cases which are technically in rem but applicable to all cases involving
specific property, that where the property is in the actual possession of one
court of competent jurisdiction, such possession cannot be disturbed by any
other court.' "118 In fact, when the action in the federal court was in rem, the
rule of Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson' t9 absolutely barred
that court from exercising its jurisdiction "if the property . . . [was]
already in the custody of a state court of competent jurisdiction."' 120 Judge
Craven conceded that the absolute bar of PrincessLida did not apply to the
facts in Crawford; however, he felt that the historic policy of federal
noninterference with disputed property in the possession of a state court
116. W. VA. CODE § 54-2-18 (1966). West Virginia also provides that in the event of

conflicting claims the judge may appoint a commissioner to take evidence. Id.; accord, 451
F.2d at 490.

117. 451 F.2d at 490. Suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia. Generally,
Mere difficulty in determining state law does not in itself justify a federal court's
declining to exercise its [diversity] jurisdiction. . . . Congress has adopted the policy
of opening the federal courts to litigants in diversity cases and we cannot close the
door to the federal courts merely because such a case involves a difficult question of

state law. .

.

. Thus this judge-made doctrine of abstention may be applied only

where there are special circumstances.
AFA Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J.).

Compare Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), with Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943), and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).

See generally Gowen & Izlar, FederalCourt Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43
TEX: L. REv. 194 (1964).

118. 451 F.2d at 491 (quoting W. BARRON & A. HOLTlOFF, FEoRAL PRACTICE AND
245 (1960)).
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119. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
120. C. WRIGHT, supra note 69. § 25. at 97 (footnote omitted).
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demanded that the federal court voluntarily abstain 12 1 from entertaining the
action of the heirs for declaratory relief: "[Princess Lida] does not mean,
we think, that the [federal] court, although having undoubted coordinate
jurisdiction, may not yet go another mile in pursuit of cooperative federalism and decline to adjudicate title to a fund possessed by the [state] court in
an eminent domain proceeding." 122 Judge Craven correctly perceived that
the problems of comity and federalism addressed by the PrincessLida rule
were still present when a plaintiff sought federal adjudication of his rights to
a fund in the possession of a state court. The federal judgment would not
immediately interfere with the possession of the state court, but a potentially
intractable state-federal conflict could arise when the federal plaintiff sought
to bind a state court with a federal judgment recognizing plaintiff's right to
123
the fund:
Voluntary abstention within the sound discretion of the district
court-as opposed to compulsory Princess Lida-type abstentionwhen a state court holds the property in dispute depends, we think,
not upon facile applications of labels, whether "in rem" or "quasi
in rem." However convenient such labels may be in a Princess
Lida sense, beyond that they are mere abbreviated descriptions of
situations pregnant with potential state-federal conflict.2 4
Judge Craven also noted that the specialized and local nature of the
eminent domain proceeding involved in Crawford was a special circumstance justifying abstention by a federal court. 15 West Virginia had specifically provided that conflicting claims to a fund created by a condemnation
121.

"If in the interest of federalism there is some measure of discretion to decline

jurisdiction, we think this case a peculiarly appropriate one for the exercise of that discretion."
451 F.2d at 491.
122. Id. at 492.
123. Cf. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608 (1893).
[Tihe federal court can entertain actions against administrators [and] executors. . . in
which plaintiffs seek to establish their claims against an estate. . . . The federal
action in such a case will establish claimant's right in a fashion that will be binding in
the state proceedings, but the federal court cannot order actual distribution of property in the custody of the state court nor give execution on its judgment.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 25, at 98-99.
124. 451 F.2d at 492.
125. Judge Craven was relying on Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959), in which the Supreme Court ordered abstention, relying heavily on the "special
nature of eminent domain" proceedings. Id. at 29. But see County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), in which the Court denied abstention, rejecting the deference given eminent domain proceedings in City of Thibodaux. "The two cases, taken together,
do establish that an abstention doctrine can apply in eminent domain cases." C. WRIGHT, supra
note 69, § 52, at 223. Thus, the fact that an eminent domain proceeding could be had in the state
courts would not per se mandate abstention. The availability of the eminent domain procceding,
however, could be considered as a factor in determining whether the particular issue presented
in federal court posed a special danger of state-federal friction. See generally Gowen & Izlar,
supra note 117, at 200-06; Wright, The Abstention DoctrineReconsidered,37 TEx. L. REv. 815,
820-22 (1959).
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were to be resolved as part of the original eminent domain proceeding. 126 A
separate federal adjudication of this issue while the original eminent domain
proceeding was still pending in state court would be contrary to the West
Virginia policy of resolving such questions in one proceeding. In effect, the
issue presented for resolution in Crawford "involved a specialized aspect of
a complicated regulatory system .of local law" 127 that was within the peculiar competence of local courts. Thus, by not exercising its diversity jurisdiction in Crawford, the federal court avoided needless and unseemly
8
conflict with West Virginia's exercise of its eminent domain powers.12
The case of Lynch v. Snepp129 presented Judge Craven with an abstention problem analogous to that posed in Crawford. Once again he was asked
to determine whether a particular abstention doctrine was to be limited to the
specific holding of the case in which it was first announced or was to be
applied in light of the general notions of equity, comity and federalism on
which the doctrine was premised. The specific rule of abstention in question
was the doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris and its companion
cases: 130 "[A] federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution
begun prior to the institution of [a] federal suit except in very unusual
13 1
situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury."
The purpose of this doctrine was to prevent improper intrusions by the
federal courts on the right of states to enforce their own laws in their own
courts. 132 At the time Lynch was decided the Supreme Court had "not yet
reached or decided exactly how great a restraint [was] imposed by
[Younger] principles on a federal court asked to enjoin state civil proceedings." ' 133 The facts of Lynch squarely raised this unresolved question.
126. W. VA. CODE § 54-2-18 (1966).

127. C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 52, at 222. This justification for abstention was definitively established in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
128. Judge Craven's reliance on City of Thibodaux to support a Burford type abstention,
see note 127 and accompanying text supra, seems proper. See note 125 supra.
129. 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
130. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle

v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S.
200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).

131. C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, § 52A, at 232 (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66,69
(1971)).
132. Id. § 52A, at 229.

133. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In Mitchunm,
the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was an express exception to the bar of the antiinjunction statute, 28 id. § 2283. However, the Mitchum Court stressed that a federal court
being asked for injunctive relief under § 1983 was nevertheless subject to "the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state

court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 243. The Court referred to Younger v. Harrisfor a discussion of
these principles. Id.
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The events that gave rise to the litigation caused an "unfortunate
juxtaposition of federal and state judicial powers." 13' 4 In the aftermath of
severe disturbances in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, school
system, the state district solicitor obtained a preliminary injunction in state
court "restraining all but students, employees, those with permission from
school authorities, law enforcement officials, and parents transporting children to or from school from entering school property. '"135 Plaintiffs in
Lynch challenged this injunction in federal court by bringing suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,136 contending that the state injunction violated their rights of
free speech and assembly under the first amendment. The district court
responded by granting a preliminary injunction that had the effect of "restraining in part the enforcement of [the] state injunction that undertook to
control access to the public schools of Mecklenburg County by the public."1

37

Judge Craven recognized at the outset of his analysis -that the federal
and state interests asserted in Lynch were equally compelling:
The state's interest in the matter and the jurisdiction of its courts is
predicated upon state police power and the maintenance of peace
and the preventing of disruption in the operation of the public
schools. The interest of the federal court, equally legitimate, is the
vindication and protection of freedom
of speech and assembly
138
pursuant to the first amendment.
If the state's interest in Lynch had been asserted through a criminal proceeding, it was clear that the federal interest in the first amendment question
would have had to yield. Younger had specifically held that, absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court could not enjoin a state criminal
proceeding pending federal adjudication of constitutional challenges to the
state action. The state enforcement action enjoined in Lynch, however, was
a civil proceeding. The question was whether the policy of federal noninterference with state enforcement proceedings announced in Younger was
premised on the special nature of state criminal proceedings or whether it
139
rested primarily on "general notions of comity, equity, and federalism."
It was evident to Judge Craven that the doctrine announced in Younger
could not rest on nice distinctions between criminal and civil, enforcement
134. 472 F.2d at 770.
135. Id. at 771-72.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
137. 472 F.2d at 770. If Younger were applicable to the enjoining of civil proceedings by the

state then the district court, notwithstanding its authority under § 1983, had to take into account
Younger principles before granting injunctive relief. See note 133 supra.
138. 472 F.2d at 770-71.

139. Id. at 773.
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proceedings; rather, his analysis in Lynch sought to demonstrate that the
Younger doctrine was based on "itlhe long standing public policy against
federal interference with state court proceedings.'140 According to Judge
Craven, this policy of comity "antedate[d] the Constitution"' 4' and was
142
founded in part on the traditional restraint exercised by courts of equity.
Over time these mixed notions of comity and equity had been reinforced and
sharpened by the concept of federalism, which posited
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States. 43
From the interplay of this "jurisprudential brew of many interdependent
principles and traditions" 1" had emerged the notion of federal noninterference on which Younger was based-" 'that the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not
to issue such injunctions.' "145 Given the fundamental importance of the
historical concept of federal noninterference with pending state proceedings,
Judge Craven concluded that the rationale of Younger should apply to civil
actions commenced by the state:
These general notions of comity, equity, and federalism, applied
since the early days of our Union of States and most recently
restated in Younger and its companion cases, occupy a highly
important place in our history and our future. Their application
should never be made to turn on such labels as "civil" or "criminal" but rather upon an analysis of the competing interests in each
case. 146
140. Id. at 772.
141. Id.
142. Generally, a court of equity will not act "'when the moving party has an adequate

remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.'" Id. (quoting
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44).

143. Id. at 773 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44).
144. Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1973) (Aldisert, J.,concurring). Judge Aldisert

found Judge Craven's discussion of the applicability of Younger in a civil context in Lynch "to
be the most scholarly discussion of this point." Id.

145. 472 F.2d at 773 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 45).
146. Id. at 773. The Supreme Court has given limited approval to the proposition that the

application of Younger principles should not depend on whether the state action sought to be
enjoined is denominated as civil or criminal. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975),

the Court held that a federal injunction against a civil action brought in state court by state
authorities to have a film declared a nuisance under an obscenity statute was improper unless
the Younger test was satisfied. The Court cautiously limited its holding to the facts of the case,
and gave some credence to the civil-criminal distinction by noting that the obscenity proceeding
before the Court was "in important respects. . . more akin to a criminal prosecution than are
most civil cases." Id. at 604. For a broad reading of Huffman in accord with Judge Craven's
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As the plaintiffs in Lynch could not show that the threat to their constitutional rights was both great and immediate and was such that it could not be
eliminated by their defense of the pending state proceeding, Judge Craven
reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction.
Judge Craven's willingness, in appropriate circumstances, to abstain
from exercising federal jurisdiction further illustrates the controlled, balanced nature of his activist philosophy. If an exercise of federal jurisdiction
had the potential for creating unseemly interference with the state judicial
system and the federal plaintiff could not establish that it had no adequate
remedy in a state court, then Judge Craven felt that the policy of federalism
demanded that the litigants resolve their problems in a state court. Admittedly, in the context of an individual case it was difficult to perceive why
litigants who had established federal jurisdiction over the subject matter
should be inconvenienced for the sake of federalism.14 7 In any given litigation one was hard put to demonstrate that state-federal relations had been
benefited by referring would-be federal litigants to the state courts. In fact,
one could seriously question whether at this juncture in the nation's development one should be seriously concerned that the vigorous exercise of
federal jurisdiction would imperil the fabric of the union.
Judge Craven, however, did not believe that the historical origins of
federalism should be taken for granted. He was convinced that the curious
diplomacy between state and federal governments required by our unique
federal system was essential to the current and future well being of the
union. He saw abstention as a means by which a federal court could fulfill
the sensitive and vital task of easing the tensions that were bound to arise as
a result of the concurrent jurisdictions of state and federal courts. He felt that
to belittle the cumulative impact of repeated federal judicial intrusions into
state prerogatives was to ignore the potential for discord inherent in a federal
system. To Judge Craven federalism was not a static, self-executing system
analysis in Lynch, see Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975): "Huffman thus establishes that the principles of comity and
federalism which are at the heart of Younger are not to be discarded simply because the state
action sought to be enjoined is yclept civil." Id. at 432; accord, Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d
691 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975). For preHuffman cases in accord with Lynch, see Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), application for stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201
(Rehnquist, Circuit J., 1972); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972). The Supreme Court has followed Huffman with an even broader interpretation
of Younger in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
147. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346-47 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webster v.
Perry, 367 F. Supp. 666, 671 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (three-judge court; McMillan, J., concurring and
dissenting), vacated and remandedfor entry of new judgmentfor appealto the court of appeals,
417 U.S. 963 (1974).
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of governance, but rather, one premised on the desire of the parties involved
to respect the prerogatives of the other. Such mutual respect could only be
fostered by a willingness to seek adjustment and compromise whenever
clashes between state and federal interests were imminent.
CIVIL RIGHTS

Perhaps the most complex and farreaching of Judge Craven's judicial
contributions rest within the implementation of the constitutional guarantees
afforded in the area of public education by the historic case of Brown v.
Board of Education.148 Craven once described Brown as "unique for
intellectual honesty," 149 but his concern for a pragmatic approach in actually effecting the broad mandates of Brown and its successors remained
paramount in the desegregation decisions in which he played a part. 5 0 The
issues that arose in the wake of Brown and that Craven had to deal with
centered primarily upon three basic questions: (1) when is a unitary school
system achieved for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment;' 5 1 (2) what
remedies are available to the local governing unit or school board in order to
establish or preserve such a system; t52 and (3) what relief, if any, should be
148. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 1954 decision (Brown 1) was followed in 1955 by a second
decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown J1),which directed desegregation with "all deliberate speed," id. at 301.
149. Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 988.
150. He articulated the difficulties in applying the principles of Brown in a speech for the
West Virginia Law School in 1970 in which he declared:
It is not at all surprising that the Court has not quickly and finally answered these
questions. It should not distress, I think, even the most ardent advocate of civil rights
that sixteen years after Brown v. Board of Education we still do not know how much
and to what extent the decision must be implemented. . . . Like Humpty-Dumpty,
the Court sometimes means precisely what it means, neither more nor less, and quite
sensibly is willing to take the time to allow the inferior courts to experiment with
words, giving content and meaning to the doctrine which has been expounded. The
truth is that the Court is wise enough to know that it does not know precisely what
ought to be done and must be required.
Vocabulary, supra note 1, at 2-3; see Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 990. Such an
approach was difficult for Craven to apply in light of the broad language of desegregation
adopted by the Supreme Court, yet he maintained that "[i]nterpretations of the Constitution,
like the Constitution itself, are intentionally. . . framed in the broadest terms. The Court is far
too wise to fall into the error of precision." Vocabulary, supra at 2.
151. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232,236 (1970) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). In Burger's concurring opinion, he defines a unitary system as one " 'within which
no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color.' " Id. at 237
(quoting Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam)). Craven likened this "cryptic" definition to the conversation between Humpty-Dumpty and Alice:
"When I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." L.
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 124 (1875), quoted in Vocabulary, supra note I, at 2
(omission by Craven). Nevertheless, Craven remarked that the Court's definition of a unitary
school system was "sort of like defining a dog as a quadruped mammal. That is perfectly true,
but it does not help distinguish a dog from a cat." Vocabulary, supra at 2.
152. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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239

afforded victims of discriminatory conduct by such governing
153
authorities?
Two early desegregation-related decisions by Judge Craven, Felder v.
Harnett County Board of Education54 and Sparrow v. Gill, 155 epitomize
his deep concern for balancing the "rightness" of the progress achieved by
a judicial decision and the "institutional needs" of the courts to be viewed
not as proponents of policy but as "bodies wielding moral force."' 156 In

Felder the Fourth Circuit concluded that the efforts by a school board to
establish a unitary school system through the use of freedom of choice and
vague districting plans were inadequate 157 in the face of the Supreme
Court's decision in Green v. County School Board.158 Harnett County
schools had been completely segregated until 1964 when a freedom of
choice plan was implemented. 5 9 The district court found the freedom of
choice plan inadequate in light of the fact that only 4.3% of black students
were attending previously all-white schools.160 That court also rejected the
153. See Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).
It was within the framework of these questions that Craven recognized the uncertainty of
the judicial task in the area of school desegregation:
Like the rest of us, the Court learns from experience-the experience of the inferior

federal courts. Trial balloons constantly soar aloft from the United States District
Courts. Some are shot down in flames by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
while others are allowed to orbit indefinitely. Implementing new constitutional dogma
is largely a matter . .. of trial and error-with the lower courts trying and the
Supreme Court calling the errors.
Paeanto Pragmatism,supra note 1, at 990-91 (footnote omitted). See also Vocabulary, supra
note 1.
154. 409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1969).
155. 304 F. Supp. 86 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
156. Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 990. See also A. Cox, Tim WARREN COURT
(1968). Craven suggested that "Americans do not much care to be governed by a bevy of
platonic guardians. Probably the Court cannot maintain its tremendous moral force without the
symbolism that the Constitution-and not merely the predilections of nine persons--controls
decisions." Paeanto Pragmatism, supra at 990.
157. 409 F.2d at 1073.
158. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, Justice Brennan indicated that freedom of choice was
only a tool in implementing Brown and that a school board has the "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38. Craven viewed Green as a necessary and
pragmatic step after Brown: "In Green v. County School Board the Court turned to exhortation. Only a desegregation plan that promised to work and work now would suffice. The goal to
be attained was ringingly proclaimed: Neither black schools nor white schools, just schools."
Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1,at 989-90 (footnotes omitted).
159. 409 F.2d at 1071. The district court found that on August 21, 1964, there were 13,000
students in the school system, approximately half of whom were black students. There were 20
public schools in the county, 6 of which were for black students. In the face of this evidence,
the district court found that the system was racially segregated and ordered that if the Board did
not establish an adequate plan for pupil assignment, it was to implement a freedom of choice
plan. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam opinion. 349 F.2d 366 (4th
Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
160. 409 F.2d at 1073. The district court's decision was rendered on July 23, 1968.
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remedial plans submitted by the Board. t61 Craven, writing for the majority
in an en banc decision, acknowledged that the later plans were an improvement over those submitted earlier to the district court by the Board, but
was concerned that they lacked specificity and failed to foreclose the
possibility that the neighborhood districts "will be gerrymandered to perpetuate the dual school system."1 62 For this reason he struck down the plans
as ineffective in establishing a unitary school system. He did not, however,
consider the School Board's appeal to be frivolous for the purpose of Rule
and thus denied appellees'
38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
163
request for double costs and counsel fees.
In Felder one finds Craven in what eventually proved to be a familiar
position in the area of desegregation. The mandates of Green required the
summary rejection of the plans submitted by the school board, but Craven's
own reluctance to characterize the appeal as a "pattern of evasion and
obstruction" reflected his repeated concern for the balance to be struck in
such cases:
[I]t seems to me, it is doubtful that there is any unconditional right
to racial balancing in the schools, or put differently, it may be that
such right must be balanced against cost and inconvenience and
educational purposes other than integration for its own sake. While
no one would seriously suggest, absent a non-invidious reason, that
a black school and a white school located back to back may be
161. The second remedial plan was proposed by the Board on August 5, 1968, and provided
for the closing of three all-black high schools in the 1968-1969 school year as well as the
assigning of the students to various white high schools. There was, however, no attempt made
to deal with the Harnett County elementary schools as the Board concluded that this problem
called for further study. The district court rejected this plan and noted that "the time for 'study'
had passed." Id. at 1072.
The third plan, suggested by the Board on August 19, 1968, included the same features in
regard to the high school closings and assignment of the students; elementary school children

were to be assigned to neighborhood schools with transportation provided for all students. The
district court found this plan to be ineffective as well. Id. at 1073.

162. Id. at 1074-75. The Board's final plan also evidenced a failure to deal with future
employment practices or expansion of the present system so as to dismantle the segregated

facilities.
163. Id. at 1075. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: "If a court
of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38. Judges Sobeloff and Winter dissented from

that portion of the opinion, declaring that the present appeal "was merely to retard compliance." They thus favored at least the award of reasonable counsel fees in order to "discour-

age further dilatory tactics." 409 F.2d at 1076 (Sobeloff, J., joined by Winter, J., concurring
and dissenting). Sobeloff noted that the Board's legal position in its brief included the theory
that "the Harnett County Board of Education does not have to work toward the objective of the
correction of racial imbalance in its various public schools." Id. The remaining dissenter, Judge
Bryan, concluded, contrary to his brothers, that the decisions at both the trial and appellate
levels were "meddlesome and oppressive" and maintained that "[o]verreadiness to oversee is
disruptive of school operation; too, it encourages captious faultfinding . . . . " Id. at 1077
(Bryan, J., dissenting).
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continued as separate institutions, neither has it been urged yet, so
far as I know, that a new bridge must be built over Puget Sound or
64
San Francisco Bay to permit pairing of black and white schools.1
Plaintiff in Sparrow v. Gill maintained that section 115-186(e) of the
North Carolina General Statutes, 165 which does not compel state-provided
school bus transportation to pupils residing within corporate limits of the
municipality in which their school is located, and section 115-190.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, 166 which provides that the state would not
deny state transportation to residents in an area that had been incorporated
into any municipality since February 6, 1957, were unconstitutional as
violative of the equal protection clause. 167 Plaintiff's daughter resided within municipal limits on February 6, 1957, and attended school approximately
one-and-one-half miles away. The issues for Craven were (1) whether the
state's conclusion that school bus transportation was more crucial for county
students than for city students was reasonable and (2) whether such transportation was more important for those city students in areas within the
municipality limits after February 6, 1957.168 In deciding these issues, he
was careful to limit the scope of the equal protection challenge to the
traditional test of reasonable classification:
This is not a "civil rights" case; nor is it a voting rights case; nor
does it deal with any constitutional guarantee accorded special
164. Vocabulary, supra note 1, at 9-10.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-186(e) (1975) provides in part:

No provision of this Subchapter shall be construed to place upon the State, or
upon any county or city, any duty to supply any funds for the transportation of pupils
- . . who live within the corporate limits of the city or town in which is located the

public school in which such pupil is enrolled or to which such pupil is assigned, even

though transportation to or from such school is furnished to pupils who live outside the

limits of such city or town.
166. Id. § 115-190.1 provides:
In each and every area of the State where school bus transportation of pupils to
and from schools is now being provided, such school transportation shall not be

discontinued by any State or local governmental agency for the sole reason that the
corporate limits of any municipality have been extended to include such area since
February 6, 1957, and school bus transportation of pupils shall be continued in the

same manner and to the same extent as if such area had not been included within the
corporate limits of a municipality.

In each and every area of the State where school bus transportation of pupils to
and from school is now being provided, such school transportation shall not be
discontinued by any State or local governmental agency for the sole reason that two or

more municipalities have consolidated and the corporate limits of the new, consolidated municipality includes such area, and school bus transportation of pupils shall

be continued in the same manner and to the same extent as if such area had not been
consolidated and had not been included within the corporate limits of the new,
consolidated municipality.
167. 304 F. Supp. at 88. Craven concluded that the statutes created three classes of

students: (1) those residing outside municipal limits; (2) those residing in areas brought within
municipal limits subsequent to February 6, 1957; and (3) those students who had resided within
the municipal limits as they existed prior to February 6, 1957. Id. at 90.
168. Id. at 90.
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priority in the scale of human liberty. No one has a constitutional
right to ride a school bus. His is merely the right not to be excluded
from a benefit which is conferred by the state upon fellow citizens
whose claim to it is no more "reasonable" than his. 69
Craven upheld section 115-186(e) on the grounds that the legislature's
distinction was reasonable in light of the fact that city students, unlike
170
county students, generally have easier access to public transportation.
With regard to section 115-190.1, however, he concluded that the arbitrary
date of February 6, 1957, "is wholly unrelated to the end apparently sought
to be achieved" and that such a distinction between the two classes of
students "runs counter to common observation."171 He rejected the state's
position that the date was necessary to limit state expenditures and suggested
that such a purpose could be achieved without favoring one group of citizens
over another. 172
The decisions in Felder and Sparrow suggest, therefore, that before
the advent of the major Fourth Circuit desegregation cases, 173 Judge Craven
recognized the positive duties placed upon the federal judiciary under
Brown I and .I to dismantle segregated schools. At the same time, however,
he was unwilling to hold the local and state authorities to unreasonable
burdens in their attempts to comply with Brown:
Fundamentally it is still true that courts exercise only a veto power
in the constitutional domain. In school cases the positive duties
arise out of the negative command: thou shalt not practice invidious discrimination in the public schools ...
I think we can more profitably concern ourselves with what is
169. Id.
170. Id. at 90-91. He declined to go further and require a "measured-distance-from-school
basis" on the ground that that issue was a political question for the legislature. Id. at 91.
171. Id. at 91. Craven was quick to point out that "judges need not be blind to what other
men see: that cities like Charlotte or Winston-Salem may have annexed areas since 1957 that are
now more 'urban' than areas long within the city limits of other towns in a declining or static
growth pattern." Id.
172. Id. Sparrow had a significant effect upon North Carolina's state-provided transportation programs. As a result of the decision, many local school boards were forced to decide
whether to halt transportation for children in the annexed areas alone or to discontinue such
transportation altogether. The Governor and the Advisory Budget Commission eventually
authorized the State Board of Education to take advantage of the Nine Months School Fund in
order to provide the amounts required to begin transportation of all urban school children. See
Styers v. Phillips, 277 N.C. 460, 468-69,178 S.E.2d 583, 588 (1971). Plaintiff in Styers attacked

this administrative decision on two grounds: (1) the legislature did not authorize the money
involved for the purpose for which it was to be used; and (2) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-186(e)
(1975) prevented the State Board from using these funds for urban transportation of students.
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this claim. 277 N.C. at 471, 178 S.E.2d at 590.
173. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court sub nom. Bradley v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973); Wright v. Council

of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

1978]

PORTRAIT OF A PRAGMATIST

reasonably practicable for a school board to do to correct inequality of educational opportunity-North and South-rather than hav-

ing our attention diverted to how a particular school system may
have become that way ....

17

In Brunson v. Board of Trustees 175 the Fourth Circuit was faced with
exactly this question-what constitutes "reasonable" effort on the part of
a local school board to establish a unitary system through the use of a
freedom of choice plan? The majority upheld the district court's finding that
the board's plan was inadequate. 176 Judge Craven joined in this decision as
to the invalidity of the plan but dissented from the district court's approval
of an alternative Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
plan. 177 The HEW plan would have resulted, he felt, in a majority of black
students in each school; the white minority would range from five percent to
seventeen percent. 178 In light of this result, Judge Craven feared a mass
exodus of white students from the public school system, thereby defeating
the principles of Brown. 179 He warned "that judges in fashioning remedies
174. Vocabulary, supra note 1, at 5, 8.
175. 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970).
176. Id. at 820. The school system in 1969 had 2408 black students and 256 white students.
Two schools remained virtually all white and the remaining four schools in the system were
attended by black students alone. The freedom of choice plan had "resulted in token desegregation only." Id. at 821 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
177. Judge Craven was joined by Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judge Bryan.
178. 429 F.2d at 821. Judge Craven declared that "[t]his may be 'desegregation' but it is
not, in my opinion, 'integration.' " Id.
179. Id. at 822. Judge Craven remarked that "the federal courts, when plunged into
sociology and educational theory, are into something they know very little about." Id. at 821
n. 1. See also PersonalComment, supra note 1, at 154. In Brunson Judge Craven referred to the
testimony of Dr. Thomas F. Pettigrew as illustrative of the principle that "little advantage is
gained for children of either race, and some harm may result, from placing children in a school
where they are in a distinct racial minority" and that the ideal situation is a viable racial mix
with whites in the majority. Such a situation would provide better educational opportunities for
the black students in the minority. 429 F.2d at 821 n.l. Judge Craven's use of the Pettigrew
thesis was questioned by Judge Sobeloff in his concurring opinion:
[The thesis's] central proposition is that the value of a school depends on the
characteristics of a majority of its students and superiority is related to whiteness,
inferiority to blackness. Although the theory is couched in terms of "socio-economic
class" and the necessity for the creation of a "middle-class milieu," nevertheless, at
bottom, it rests on the generalization that, educationally speaking, white pupils are
somehow better or more desirable than black pupils. . . . The inventors and proponents of this theory grossly misapprehend the philosophical basis for desegregation. It
is not founded upon the concept that white children are a precious resource which
should be fairly apportioned. It is not, as Pettigrew suggests, because black children
will be improved by association with their betters. . . . But school segregation is
forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to the black children and
immeasurably taints the education they receive. This is the precise lesson of Brown.
Id. at 826 (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
Later, in Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Bradley v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973), Craven
expressed doubts himself as to the value of Pettigrew's "viable racial mix" theory:
In Brunson . . . I wrote favorably of such an approach because of my dismay
that white fleeing had actually occurredand would unquestionably continue until there
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cannot successfully ignore reality," 18 0 and on this basis he rejected the
HEW plan as extreme and representing an "unyielding fidelity to the
arithmetic of race." 181 In his conclusion Judge Craven revealed his fundamental adherence to the concept that the principles of Brown do not
embrace fixed racial percentages to the detriment of both races, but rather
that the implementation of Brown should achieve a mutuality of respect
through "integration," not "desegregation":
Perhaps my hope is too idealistic: that there can be achieved,
even in Clarendon County, some degree of mutual respect, trust,
confidence, even friendship, between black and white children. It
won't occur without their knowing each other, and concededly
there will be little contact under the HEW plan.
The living insult to black people inherent in segregation as one
aspect of prejudice will be eradicated when black and white people
come to know and understand each other as one people in one
nation. In that endeavor
I am unwilling to write off even one
82
county in one state.
As Felder, Sparrow and Brunson suggest, Brown, as interpreted by
Judge Craven, required that the approach employed by the courts be marked
by an acute sensitivity towards "not what must be done to dismantle, but
what must be done to afford equal protection in terms of equal educational
opportunity for all children."' ' 8 Craven never expressed reluctance in rejecting inadequate desegregation plans; nor did he hesitate in striking down
those statutes that stood as an obstacle to the constitutional guarantees of the
equal protection clause. But he was reluctant to extend the remedy afforded
beyond the wrong. This reluctance probably arose from a belief that the
were neither black schools nor white schools, but just black schools only. . . . Even
so, I acknowledge doubt about my approach in that case and an increased respect for
the viewpoint of Judges Sobeloff and Winter expressed in opposition.
Id. at 1063 n.5. As late-as 1975, Craven's perspective on white flight as a factor to be considered
changed once again; he concluded that "it still seems to me that some is better than none."
PersonalComment, supra at 155.
Only one white pupil enrolled for the 1973-74 session; thus my fears about white flight
have been realized. If. . . white flight can never be a relevant factor in considering
the appropriate remedy for dismantling a dual school system, then Judge Sobeloff
wins. But he would not be happy to know that the schools of Clarendon County are all
black (save one) nor to envision with Mr. Justice Marshall the specter of all-black
schools in Detroit.
Td. (footnotes omitted); see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
180. 429 F.2d at 821. There was evidence that 110 white students had already left the white
public schools in favor of a white parochial school in the area, and in oral argument it was
revealed that approximately 100 more whites had applied for admission to the private school in
September 1970. Id. at 822.
181. Id.at 822.
182. Id. at 823.
183. Vocabulary, supra note 1, at 8.
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assessment of double fees or the implementation of a plan that might in its
severity defeat the very purpose of Brown would serve only to aggravate the
difficult and tedious progress inherent in changing attitudes as well as

changing schools.
In view of Judge Craven's contributions in the area of desegregation, it
is perhaps ironic that he was forced to remove himself 184 from taking part in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educationl" 5 at the appellate
level. As he had dealt with similar questions in Swann as a district court
judge, 8 6 he was precluded from hearing the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 47.187
He was able, however, to consider an ancillary proceeding in Swahn 188 that

tested the constitutionality of section 115-176.1 of the North 'Carolina
General Statutes, the North Carolina anti-busing statute.1 89 Craven found
that a portion of the statute interfered with the school board's performance
of its affirmative constitutional duty to comply with the equal protection
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 190 The statute was designed to
184. 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970).
185. 451 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
186. In 1965 Craven served as Federal District Judge for the Western District of North
Carolina. At that time he heard an earlier version of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966). The questions
before Craven at that time included: (1) The validity of a freedom of choice option combined
with a zoning plan; and (2) whether certain school districts had been gerrymandered to prevent
desegregation. Judge Craven concluded that the plan submitted by the Board complied with the
mandates of Brown. Id. at 671-72.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970) provides that "[nlo judge shall hear or determine an appeal from
the decision of a case or issue tried by him." In his order of disqualification, Judge Craven
quoted from an address given by Walter B. Hill to the American Bar Assocation in 1899:
"'Such an appeal is not from Phillip drunk to Phillip sober, but from Phillip sober to Phillip
intoxicated with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published decision.' "431
F.2d at 137.
188. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 503 (W.D.N.C. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (1975) reads in part:
Where administrative units have divided the geographic area into attendance
districts or zones, pupils shall be assigned to schools within such attendance districts;
provided, however, that the board of education of an administrative unit may assign
any pupil to a school outside of such attendance district or zone in order that such
pupil may attend a school of a specialized kind including but not limited to a vocational
school or school operated for, or operating programs for, pupils mentally or physically
handicapped, or for any other reason which the board of education in its sole discretion deems sufficient. No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school
on account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a
balance or ratio of race, religion or national origins. Involuntary bussing of students in
contravention of this Article is prohibited and public funds shall not be used for any
such bussing.
190. 312 F. Supp. at 509-10; see Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Northeross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 236 (1970) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See also Vocabulary, supra note 1, at 1-3. Judge Craven viewed this affirmative constitutional
duty as a change in traditional constitutional doctrine:
The major difficulty with school cases -arises out of the thought necessity of
making the Constitution speak affirmatively rather than with its traditional negative
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prohibit school boards from assigning or involuntarily busing students
because of race or in order to racially balance the school system. 191 Craven
concluded that such an effect was violative of the equal protection guarantees afforded under Brown:
The Constitution is not color blind with respect to the affirmative duty to establish and operate a unitary school system. To say
that it is would make the constitutional principle of Brown I and II
an abstract principle instead of an operative one. A flat prohibition
against assignment by race would, as a practical matter, prevent
school boards from altering existing dual systems. ....To say that
bussing shall not be resorted to unless unavoidable is a valid expression of state policy, but to flatly prohibit it regardless of cost,
extent and all other factors-including willingness of a school
board to experiment-contravenes, we think, the implicit mandate
of Green that all192reasonable methods be available to implement a
unitary system.
Once again, Craven was vitally concerned with the right of the local
school board to experiment in their sensitive task of desegregation. To
the extent that the statute here contravened those rights in that busing could
never be used as a remedy to achieve a unitary system, he held it unconstitutional. 193
The Supreme Court agreed with Craven's findings and reiterated the
necessity for permitting the school board to make use of such methods as
busing in providing an adequate remedy. 194 Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the Court, noted in accordance with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education'95 that "the Constitution does not compel any particular
degree of racial balancing or mixing, but when past and continuing constituvoice. Until recently the Constitution has been more like the Ten Commandments than
the Sermon on the Mount. Constitutional dogma has ordinarily been framed in terms
of "Thou shalt not."
Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Desegregationof Public Schools: An Affirmative
Duty to Eliminate Racial Segregation Root and Branch, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 53 (1968).
191. See Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F. Supp. 1218, 1226 (D. Del. 1974).
192. 312 F. Supp. at 509-10. Judge Craven also declared that a school board must always
engage in some degree of racial balancing if it desires to take affirmative steps to dismantle a
segregated system.
193. A year after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Swann, Judge Craven
wrote:
In the long run a rule of law or its implementation that does not have the support of a
majority of the American peoj~le will not survive. . . .In my opinion, Brown has that
support and is here to stay. Massive, long-distance bussing does not have that support
and, in my opinion, is a temporary expedient. . . .There is also in Swann the
intimation that such extreme remedies may become inappropriate whenever a system
becomes "unitary."
Paean to Pragmatism, supra note 1,at 991 (footnote omitted).
194. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. at 46.
195. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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tional violations are found, some ratios are likely to be useful starting points
196
in shaping a remedy."'
The process of dismantling school systems with a history of racial
segregation included the right afforded by Swann to local school boards to
require bus transportation if necessary as a tool to seek the necessary
objective of desegregation. In the school redistricting cases' 97 the Fourth
Circuit addressed a narrow but crucial question left unaddressed in Swann-

may a federal court enjoin state and local officials from establishing new
school districts when the existing district is in the process of desegregation? 198
The first of these cases was Wright v. Council of Emporia.199 Prior to
1967 Emporia was an incorporated town and part of Greensville County,

Virginia. In 1967 the town severed its connection with the county, 2200°1
requiring that it provide free schooling for the children within its borders.

In 1968 Emporia entered into a contract with the county whereby the county
would continue to provide education for the city students if the city would
pay for a portion of the school system's total cost. 2° 2 In 1969 the district
court ordered the desegregation of the existing school facilities20 3 under a
196. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. at 46. Burger concluded that
race could be used in establishing a remedy for dual systems:
Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional
violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school
authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems ...
. . .[A]n absolute prohibition against transportation students assigned on the
basis of race, "or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio," will similarly hamper
the ability of local authorities to effectively remedy constitutional violations.
Id.
197. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F:2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972);
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S.
484 (1972); Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971).
198. Several other circuits had dealt with a similar problem, but the resolution of the
question was far from final. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971);
Stout v. United States, 448 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1971); see Haney v. Board of Educ., 410 F.2d 920
(8th Cir. 1969).
199. 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), rev'g Wright v. County School
Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
200. Id. at 572.
201. VA. CODE § 22-93 (1973). The record indicated that Emporia was prompted to
adopt its independent status because of dissatisfaction with the county's method of revenue
allocation from a newly enacted state sales tax. 442 F.2d at 572.
202. 442 F.2d at 573. Emporia had considered operating its schools independently of the
county but concluded that such an operation might prove impractical.
203. Attempts to desegregate Greensville County Schools began in 1966 when the Wright
petitioners brought suit to compel the dismantling of the existing system. At that time, the
district court approved the school board's freedom of choice plan. Wright v. County School
Bd., 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966).

248
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"pairing plan. ',204 Two weeks after the district judge's order was issued,
Emporia declared its desire to establish an independent school system for the
city. Plaintiffs claimed that such a separation would frustrate the pairing
plan and its purpose to desegregate the schools.2 5 The district court agreed
and refused to amend its previous order against the city. 2°6 The two factors
that influenced the district court in reaching its decision were the shift in
racial balance between the systems as proposed by the city 20 7 and the
decision by the city to leave the county system, thus placing the county's
efforts to establish a unitary system in jeopardy from a financial stand208
point.
20 9
The Fourth Circuit, with Judge Craven writing the majority opinion,
concluded that the district court erred and held that unless the dominant
purpose of the city was "to retain as much of separation of the "races as
possible," the federal district court should not interfere with the formation
of the new school district.2 t0 Craven concluded that the intent of the
separation was not to avoid desegregation, but rather, the evidence suggested, to embark on an aggressive campaign to increase expenditures for the
new city school, as the county officials were unwilling to provide the

necessary funds for the county schools.21' Once again, Judge Craven was
204. 442 F.2d at 573. Pairing plans involve assigning all children in the system enrolled in a
particular grade to the same school. Ordinarily, the school board is required to match all-white
schools with all-black schools. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63
(1972).
205. Wright v. County School Bd., 309 F. Supp. at 675.
206. Id. at 680.
207. Id. at 678. At the time of this, announcement 66% of the students enrolled in the
Greensville County system were black and 34% white. The record indicates that under the
Emporia plan all of the city students would enroll in one high school or one grade school. A
white majority would exist at the high school, 52% white to 48% black. In the grade school,
however, the percentages would be slightly reversed, 54% black to 46% white. The students in
the county system would be 72% black and 28% white if the separation of schools were allowed.
Id. The percentage shift in the county schools would therefore be approximately 6%. 442 F.2d
at 573.
208. 442 F.2d at 674; ef. 309 F. Supp. at 679 (accepting arguendo the financial threat).
209. Judge Winter dissented, Judge Butzner disqualified himself and Judge Sobeloff did not
participate.
210. 442 F.2d at 572. Judge Craven stated the dominant purpose test to be the following:
If the creation of a new school district is designed to further the aim of providing
quality education and is attended secondarily by a modification of the racial balance,
short of resegregation, the federal courts should not interfere. If, however, the
primary purpose for creating a new school district is to retain as much of separation of
the races as possible, the state has violated its affirmative constitutional duty to end
state supported school segregation. The test is much easier to state than it is to apply.
Id.
211. Id. at 574. Both the district judge and Judge Craven agreed that Emporia's proposed
system would be educationally superior to the county system due to its lower student-teacher
ratios, increased expenditures for each student, health services and adult educational programs
as well as a kindergarten program. Id. Craven went on to point out that the district judge found
that there was no evidence of discriminatory purpose and that "the city would, if permitted,
operate its own system on a unitary basis." Id.
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relying upon the legacy of Brown as representing not an unswerving
concern for racial balancing, but rather as affording opportunities for prag212
matic alternatives in fashioning an adequate remedy in the district court.
In a five-to-four vote the Supreme Court rejected Craven's articulation
of the dominant purpose test.2 13 Justice Stewart, for the majority, indicated
that such a test would be virtually impossible to apply in practice. 214 The
primary motive in the redistricting was irrelevant according to Stewart, who
stated that in the future the courts must focus "upon the effect-not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action in determining whether it
is a permissible method of dismantling a dual system.' '215 Stewart concluded that "[t]he existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an
action that has an impermissible effect.' '216 Wright did not embrace the
notion that racial balance alone warranted a rejection of the districting
plan. 2 17 Rather, three other factors were considered more significant in
preventing the separate systems plan: (1) the fear of white flight from the
county schools; 218 (2) the prospect that the city school system would be
212. "In his commendable concern to prevent resegregation-under whatever guise-the
district judge momentarily overlooked, we think, his broad discretion in approving equitable
remedies and the practical flexibility recommended by Brown II in reconciling public and
private needs."Id. Judge Winter dissented from Craven's dominant purpose test on the basis
that each of the redistricting cases differed only slightly from Green. The Green principles place
a burden of heavy persuasion upon the city officials to establish a unitary system and only when
that system comes to fruition can "greater latitude in redefinition of school districts. . . then
be permitted." Id. at 589 (Winter, J.,dissenting). In Wright, Winter based his dissent upon
three considerations: (1) Green requires immediate steps; (2) the critical change in the racial
balance is not the 6% black change but the significant white increase of 27.8% to 48.3% in the
city school; and (3) the subdivision itself will work "adverse psychological effects on the black
students in the county which will be occasioned by the secession of a large portion of the more
affluent white population from the county schools." Id. at 590.
213. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Justices Stewart, Brennan, White, Douglas and Marshall formed
the majority; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist made up the
dissent.
214. Id. at 461-62. Stewart indicated that such a test "finds no precedent in our decisions.
. . .[A]n inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is
fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools, and we have said that" '[t]he
measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.'" Id. at 461, 462 (quoting Davis v.
School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)).
215. Id. at 462.
216. Id. Stewart did indicate that discriminatory purpose by the school authorities "may be
taken into consideration in determining the weight to be given to the proffered justification" by
the board in the creation of new districts. Id. at 461.
217. Id. at 464. It has been suggested that the Court's hesitation to include racial balancing
as an element in their refusal to recognize the separate systems arose from the prohibitions
against the establishment of certain balances expressed in Swann. The Supreme Court, 1971
Tenn, supra note 204, at 65. The Swann Court was unwilling to adopt the notion that schools in
each district must reflect the racial composition of the same district. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 24.
218. 407 U.S. at 464-65. The Court's concern with white flight in the event of redistricting
varied from the conclusions of several lower courts that had refused to consider such a threat to
be relevant in assessing the school board's justifications in efforts to desegregate. E.g.,
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219
much better equipped and financed as opposed to its county counterpart;
and (3) the timing of the city's decision to operate independently of the
county system. 220 The Court declared that in view of these factors the city
failed to meet the heavy burden under Green in justifying its withdrawal
22
from the county system. '
United States v. ScotlandNeck City Board of Education,222a companion case to Wright, originated in a bill (Chapter 31) introduced in the North
Carolina General Assembly providing for the creation of a new school
district out of the existing Halifax County system. 223 Prior to 1969, the
Halifax County schools were entirely segregated. 224 The United States
Department of Justice notified the County Board that steps must be taken to
establish a unitary system in compliance with Green.225 The County Board
and the Justice Department agreed upon an interim plan that called for the
transfer of two grades between two formerly segregated schools, 22 6 but the
County Board refused to adopt a later plan that included an interim period of
geographic attendance zones and pairing as well as plans for the construction of two consolidated high schools. 227 Upon the Board's refusal to adopt
the proposed plans, the Justice Department filed suit. The district court had
ruled that Chapter 31 would unconstitutionally interfere with ongoing desegregation efforts.228 The district judge had also found that the Scotland
Neck residents had three primary goals in the establishment of the separate
district: 229 (1) local control over schools; (2) financing the schools through

Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D. Ga.), vacated in part, 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1971).
219. 407 U.S. at 465.

220. Id. at 465-66; see 442 F.2d at 590-91 (Winter, J., dissenting).
221. 407 U.S. at 467. The Court rejected Emporia's argument that the separation would

provide better educational services, pointing out that no steps had been taken by the city to
assume the operation of the schools. Id. at 468. The Court also noted that an increased quality

in the city schools would work an adverse effect upon the county schools. Id. Whether this
adverse "quality" test should even be considered is questionable. Such a burden would be
virtually impossible to meet if local authorities must conclusively avoid adverse financial and
qualitative consequences as well as discriminatory effects in all redistricting decisions. The
Court chose not to list this factor as paramount but decided "only that a new school district may
not be created where its effect would be to impede the process of dismantling a dual system."

Id. at 470. But see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 204, at 69 n.40.
222. 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1971), rev'g United States v. Halifax
County Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
223. Law of Mar. 3, 1969, ch. 31, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 18. The bill conditioned the new

district upon the approval of a majority of the voters in Scotland Neck. The district was created
on April 8, 1969 by a vote of 813 to 332. 442 F.2d at 575.

224. Halifax County adopted a freedom of choice plan in 1965 but only token integration
resulted. 442 F.2d at 579.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 579-80.
227. Id. at 580.
228. 314 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
229. Id. at 72.
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supplementary property taxes; 230 and (3) prevention of the threat of a mass
exodus of white students from the public schools.
On appeal, Craven was careful to point out that five years prior to
Green and two years before the adoption of a freedom of choice plan by
Halifax County, residents of Scotland Neck were attempting to form a
separate school district. 23 1 He conceded that "the threat of white flight will
not justify the continuing operation of a dual school system," 232 but went on
to suggest that a school board is not prohibited from considering measures in
order to halt white flight from a unitary system:
Indeed it seems obvious that such a purpose is entirely consistent
with and may help implement the Brown principle. It is not the
purpose of preventing white flight which is the subject of judicial
concern but rather the price of achievement. If the effect of Chapter 31 is to continue a dual school system in Halifax County, or
establish one in Scotland Neck, the laudable desire to stem an
impending flow of white students from the public schools will not
save it from constitutional infirmity. But if Chapter 31 does not
have that effect, the desire of its proponents to halt white flight will
3
not make an otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional.23
In examining the effect of Chapter 31, Craven pointed out that the
change in racial balance resulting from redistricting would be an insubstantial three percent 234 and that no particular racial balance of schools has ever
2 35
been constitutionally required.
A transfer plan adopted by the Scotland Neck Board, unlike Chapter
31, did not pass constitutional muster according to Craven. This plan called
for a transfer of students between the Scotland Neck and Halifax County
systems. Each transferee into the city was to pay a certain amount in order to
enroll in the Scotland Neck system. The ratio resulting from the proposed
plan would be a seventy-four per cent white majority and twenty-four per
230. In Judge Craven's opinion the Scotland Neck history in upgrading educational quality
was one of frustration; only one bond issue had passed since 1936. He also pointed out that

despite the "political albatross" of voting on increased property taxes along with the creation
of a new district, the referendum was passed by the residents. 442 F.2d at 580.

231. Id. The residents were unsuccessful in presenting a similar bill before the 1963 session
of the legislature and in 1965 the bill itself was defeated by the Assembly. The group rein-

troduced the bill in 1969 and it was passed on March 30, 1969.
232. Id. at 581.
233. Id. Craven reasoned that the board's transfer plan must be considered separately from

the effect of Chapter 31 in light of the fact that the origins of the plan could be found in the
Scotland Neck Board alone. Id.
234. The Halifax County schools had a ratio of 77% black, 22% white and 1% Indian during
the 1968-1969 school year. If the Scotland Neck students were to leave the county system the
resulting ratio would have been 80% black, 19% white and 1% Indian. Id. at 582. Craven further

pointed out that Chapter 31 would not create a "white refuge" since the racial makeup in the
new city district would be 57.3% white and 42.6% black. Id.
235. Id. at 583 (citing Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232 (1970) (per curiam)).
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cent black minority in the city system. 23 6 Craven concluded that "these
transfers would have tended toward establishment of a resegregated sys237
tem" and that the fourteenth amendment prohibited such a plan.
He was again reversed by the Supreme Court, 238 which agreed with the
district court and the dissent of Judge Winter 239 that the separation of the
districts had " 'the effect of creating a refuge for white students of the
Halifax County School system.' "240
The third redistricting case, Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
District,2 1 involved a similar question of carving out new school districts
by legislative action.242 As in Scotland Neck, the legislature passed several
bills creating new districts in the county, 243 and the citizens of these districts
supported the creation of the new districts by referendum. 211 The district
court found the separate systems to be invalid and granted an injunction
against the operation of the new districts. 245 Craven recognized the similarity among Scotland Neck, Wright and Turner,246 but saw important differences that prompted him to view the legislation establishing the new districts
in Turner as an attempt to create a white haven: (1) the legislation, as
planned, would have substantially altered the percentage of whites in what
remained of the original county system from twenty-seven percent to seven
percent; 247 (2) in both Scotland Neck and Wright the lower courts found
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 407 U.S. 484 (1972). Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion with which Justices

Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall joined; Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result with
the support of Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
239. The three Justices who had joined Chief Justice Burger's Wright dissent also support-

ed his conclusion in ScotlandNeck that significant differences were present between the two
plans. The substantial white majority in the city schools as well as the special legislation
indicated that the action of Scotland Neck was not "the fulfillment of its destiny as an
independent governmental entity" but rather an impediment to the principles of Brown. Id. at
491-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Judge Winter's dissent pointed out that the history of the city
district paralleled attempts by the Halifax County schools to avoid desegregation. 442 F.2d at
591. In Winter's opinion, Craven's rejection of the "white haven" argument did not appear
plausible in light of the significant increase in the percentage of white students resulting from

the proposed redistricting. Id.
240. 407 U.S. at 489 (quoting 314 F. Supp. at 78).
241.

442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971).

242. The history of the attempts to desegregate Warren County schools followed a familiar
course: (1)entirely segregated schools; (2) an ineffective freedom of choice plan; and (3) a final
plan that was to provide for geographic attendance areas. It was to this geographic attendance
plan that the Board expressed strong reservations and that eventually prompted the introduc-

tion of the legislation. Id. at 585.
243. Law of May 26, 1969, ch. 628, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 586 (setting up Littleton-Lake
Gaston School District); Law of May 23, 1969, ch. 578, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 520 (setting up
Warrenton City Administrative Unit).
244. 442 F.2d at 585.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 586.

247. Id. at 587.
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that there were noninvidious purposes in the proposed separation, while in
Turner there was no such finding; 48 and (3) no attempt was made by
residents of the Littleton area to obtain the new school district prior to the
time that "effective integration was imminent. '"249 Thus, the "dominant
purpose" in Turner was the avoidance of racial integration.
The dominant purpose test arose from Craven's genuine desire to allow
a significant amount of freedom to both local governments and the district
courts to implement the practical alternatives of Brown. When, however,
the record did not support a finding of a history of attempts by citizens to
improve schools and the quality of education by the creation of a new school
district or when there was no evidence of noninvidious purpose in the
district's actions, he did not hesitate to strike down the reorganization
scheme as an attempt to carve out a white "refuge." As noted earlier, the
test was short-lived, for the Supreme Court found it and its application
impracticable, 250 as scrutiny of the school board's purpose in each case
would be difficult if not impossible.
In Bradley v. School Board,5 1 the Fourth Circuit was presented with
the sensitive question whether a state may be compelled to revise its county
structure so as to achieve racial balance in pupil assignments. The district
court concluded that such a requirement would not be unconstitutional and
ordered that the Richmond public system consolidate with the public school
2
systems in two other counties, Chesterfield and Henrico.25
The district judge adopted, as did Craven in Brunson, the "viable
racial mix" theory 253 in attempting to resolve the consolidation question.354
The court found that in the Richmond area segregative patterns developed
because of both private and state action and that consequently the residential
school districts were born in an atmosphere of de jure segregation. 5 5 The
248. Id. at 586.

249. Id. at 586-87.
250. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 461-62; see notes 209-13 and accompanying
text supra. The district judge in ScotlandNeck perceived the puzzling nature of such a test and
concluded that "[i]n ascertaining such a subjective factor as motivation and intent, it is of

course impossible for this Court to accurately state what proportion each of the above reasons
played in the minds of the proponents of the bill, the legislators or the voters of Scotland Neck
.. " 314 F. Supp. at 72.
251. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Bradley v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973), rev'g 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
252. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
253. Id. at 194. In Bradley Craven recognized the appealing aspects of the Pettigrew thesis
of viable racial mix but admitted that its appeal faded in the light of the Brunson concurring

opinion by Judges Winter and Sobeloff. See note 179 supra.
254. The district court adopted a lottery plan in order to effectuate the racial mix. 338 F.

Supp. at 187.
255. Id. at 84. The district judge concluded that this background of segregation restricted
educational and job opportunities and thus restricted blacks to low-cost housing in the city. Id.
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district judge concluded that affirmative action was required in order to
dismantle the segregated system 256 and, more significantly, that the powers
of the district court to fashion appropriate remedies should not be circumscribed within the boundaries of Richmond's school district. 257 The
remedy ordered by the judge consisted of a consolidation plan258 that
provided for one school board with representatives from each county to

administer the new district, a district containing six subdivisions of relatively equal numbers of students, and implementation of the plan by busing
students across subdivision lines although most would attend schools within
259
their own subdivisions.
Judge Craven, writing for the majority on appeal, disagreed with the
district court and held that, as there was no evidence of concerted action by
the districts to foster segregated schools, the tenth amendment limited any
denial of equal protection 260 to the boundaries of each district. 26 1
at 85. Blacks were consequently forced to attend black schools because of their residence. In
order to sustain this finding, the district court judge cited recent census figures that indicated
the heavy black concentration within the city itself. The black percentage in the city was
approximately 85% whereas the black percentage for the entire metropolitan area including
Henrico and Chesterfield counties was 25.3%. The counties alone had a black percentage of
6.5% and 11.2% respectively. See Fourth Circuit Review--School District Consolidation: The
ConstitutionalUnit of Equality, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 369, 373 (1973) (citing U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION, VIRGINIA 117-20 table 34 (1971)). In 1970, the black student

ratio in the Richmond city schools was 64.2%, whereas in the same period the public schools in
Chesterfield had a white percentage of 90.5 and those in Henrico had a white majority of 98.9%.
338 F. Supp. at 185.
256. 338 F. Supp. at 81-82.
257. Id. at 79-80. The district judge rejected the notion that political boundaries should be
adhered to in Bradley:
It is essentially a state-created system of local government of schools which is
offered up as a justification for maintenance of separate attendance areas. The
asserted fixed policy of retaining political subdivisions as units of assignment does not
exist, upon examination. The interests served by the policy favoring local control time
and again have been sacrificed to other educational ends. . . . [T]he reality of the
defendants' objections fades when one considers that urban government experts have
studied the area extensively, noted the intensity of the prevailing segregation, and
recommended a cooperative solution.
Id. at 113.
258. Authority to consolidate was vested by statute in both the local school boards and the
Virginia State Board of Education. VA. CODE § 22-100.1 (1973). See also id. § 22-30 which bars
consolidation without local consent. See Fourth CircuitReview, supra note 255, at 376.
259. 462 F.2d at 1072-73 (Winter, J., dissenting).
260. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
Craven pointed out in Bradley that when the tenth amendment conflicts with the fourteenth amendment "it is settled that the latter will prevail." 462 F.2d at 1069. But in Bradley
there was no evidence presented that "any federally protected right" had been infringed since
under Swann one has only the right to attend a unitary school system.
261. 462 F.2d at 1070-71. Craven concluded that the
last vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been wiped out in the public schools of
the City of Richmond and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield and unitary school
systems achieved, and because it is not established that the racial composition of the
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In Bradley Judge Craven was attempting to define the limitations upon
the duties of a lower court judge to fashion practical remedies arising under
Brown I and I:
But we think the adoption of the Richmond Metropolitan Plan
in toto by the district court, viewed in the light of the stated reasons
for its adoption, is the equivalent, despite disclaimer, of the imposition of a fixed racial quota. The Constitution imposes no such
requirement, and imposition as a matter of substantive constitutional right of any particular
degree of racial balance is beyond the
262
power of a district court.
Absent invidious state action in establishing the three districts, Judge
Craven was unwilling to allow the district judge to take the extra step of
disregarding school district boundaries solely because of high black concentration in Richmond:
We think that the root causes of the concentration of blacks in
the inner cities of America are simply not known and that the
district court could not realistically place on the counties the responsibility for the effect that inner city decay has had on the
public schools of Richmond. . . . Whatever the basic causes, it
has not been school assignments, and school assignments cannot
reverse the trend. That there has been housing discrimination in all
three units is deplorable, but a school
263 case, like a vehicle, can carry
only a limited amount of baggage.
Judge Craven's approach in the major desegregation decisions was
marked by a serious concern for the implementation of the Brown principles, yet he retained deep respect for the traditional powers and duties of the
local governing bodies in their efforts to create and effectuate adequate
remedies. Craven's exercise of self-restraint is consistent with his view that
the federal judiciary should recognize that its powers are circumscribed by
traditional notions of federalism and by the powers of local governing
bodies to determine their course in desegregation within the confines of the
schools in the City of Richmond and the counties is the result of invidious state action,
we conclude there is no constitutional violation and that, therefore, the district judge
exceeded his power of intervention.
Id. at 1070.
262. Id. at 1064. Craven relied upon Swann in suggesting that" '[rlemedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are
plenary. Judicial authority enters when local authority defaults.' " Id. at 1069 (quoting 402 U.S.
at 16).
263. Id. at 1066. Winter dissented from the majority opinion and reasoned that "[t]o decree
a single system and interchange of students, notwithstanding historical political subdivision
boundaries, represents no abuse of discretion under existing law." Id. at 1076 (Winter, J.,
dissenting). The mandates of Brown, according to Winter, should not be blunted by artificial
political boundaries nor should state action be so narrowly defined under the fourteenth
amendment so as to preclude its application in Bradley. Id.
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fourteenth amendment. The power of the state to preserve its political
divisions as in Bradley or the right of a local system to form its own district
for educational purposes as in the redistricting cases were examples of the
exercise of legitimate state or local power with which Craven would not
willingly interfere.

This self-restraint is not inconsistent with Craven's result orientation.
Result orientation for Judge Craven did not necessarily mean that the
"right" result was to be reached regardless of the traditional powers of the
state. His belief in the duty of the federal judiciary to defer to the power of
the state and local governments can be readily observed in his strong support

of the abstention doctrine. Those branches of either the federal or state
judiciary that were competent forums should not falter in providing adequate
relief. This did not mean, however, that the federal judiciary, when illequipped to decide such matters, should shed their traditional authority and
assume the ill-fitting wardrobes of their state counterparts. 264 The creation
and implementation of the desegregation plans were duties to be borne by
264. In the labor law area, Judge Craven exhibited a similar respect for the unique remedial
powers of arbitration when it was called for in collective bargaining agreements. In Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973), plaintiff, a public utility company,
filed to enjoin a work stoppage by its employees, but the district court denied injunctive relief
under the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 115 (1970). 484 F.2d at 1210-I1. Craven,
writing for the Fourth Circuit, declared that the wording of the arbitration agreement was so
broad and encompassing in nature that the work stoppage was clearly subject to mandatory
arbitration. Id. at 1213-14. In construing the labor agreement, he indicated that the court should
"resolve all doubt in favor of arbitration, and order arbitration 'unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute.'" Id. at 1213 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)). Craven ordered the case to be remanded for the
issuance of the injunction since the local's no-strike agreement fell within the definition of an
arbitrable dispute. Id. at 1213-15. See also Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW,
530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 876 (1976), in which Craven adhered to
Monongahela in concluding that the refusal of union members to cross a "stranger" picket line
fell within the terms of the mandatory arbitration clause and was therefore subject to federal
injunction. But see Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW, 537 F.2d 1226 (4th
Cir. 1976).
In Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union v. Nolde Brothers, 530 F.2d
548 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), rev'g 382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974), the
Fourth Circuit was presented once again with an important arbitration question: whether a
severance pay dispute under a collective bargaining agreement should be settled according to
the agreement's arbitration clause even though the severance pay dispute arose after termination of the contract. Nolde Brothers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
company's bakery workers that contained both a clause providing that "any grievance"
between the parties was subject to arbitration and a provision that afforded severance pay for
each employee for at least three years in the event the bakery closed. Id. at 549 n. I. Faced with
a union strike over proposed changes in a later contract, the company closed the bakery and
paid wages through the termination date, but refused to provide severance pay or to agree to
arbitrate the issue. The union brought an action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), but the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on
the grounds that the right to severance pay expired with the union's termination of the
agreement. 382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974). The court concluded that there was no issue as
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that governing body, the local school board, which by its nature was best
able to suggest a practical remedy. When that remedy served only to veil the
continued existence of segregation, Craven did not hesitate to reject the
proposal, but that rejection did not reflect the usurpation of the local board's
unique authority to create an adequate desegregation plan.
The slow and tedious desegregation of the dual system in compliance
with Brown I was accompanied by resulting discriminatory practices in
hiring and rehiring procedures for teachers affected by the dismantling of
segregated schools. In Wall v. Stanly County Board of Education265 plaintiff, a black teacher of" 'unchallenged professional and educational qualifications,' "266 was not reemployed because of a decrease in the allocation of
faculty spaces for black schools 267 resulting from the court-ordered adoption
of a freedom of choice plan.2 68 After the transfer occurred, the need for
teachers at the black school diminished and plaintiff lost her position. Judge
Craven declared that such a policy on the part of the School Board was
"repugnant" to the fourteenth amendment:
The premise of such a proposition is that Mrs. Wall was not
employed as a teacher in the Stanly County School system but was
employed as a Negro teacherin a Negro school. Such a premise is
unlawful. It is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, which
to severance pay to arbitrate, and if there were an issue, "[lit had died with the contract that
created it." 530 F.2d at 550.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded the matter for arbitration.
Writing for the court, Craven held that the question to be addressed by the district court was
whether the employer had a duty under the agreement to arbitrate the severance pay dispute
after the agreement was terminated. Id. Craven concluded that the employees' rights to
severance pay did survive the contract's expiration and that "a dispute that turns on whether
parties intended certain accruable rights to be enjoyable," should be arbitrated in this case
"even if the contingency giving rise to the dispute itself transpired after expiration of the
contract." Id. at 552. Craven pointed out that the initial issue of arbitrability should be a matter
to be determined by the court but that the merits of the dispute should be decided by the
arbitrator:
The company's obligation for severance pay depends upon the parties' intent behind
the contract provision for severance pay. A court . . . is not the proper forum in
which to inquire into that intent. If the expiration of the contract were held to strip the
arbitrator of power, the best means of determining the true content of the parties'
original agreement would not be available-which would increase the possibility of the
parties' resorting to economic warfare in support of their respective interpretations.
But this is precisely the kind of industrial unrest that collective bargaining, coupled
with arbitration of difference over contract terms, is intended to avert.
Id. at 553. The Supreme Court affirmed Craven's treatment of the arbitrability issue, reasoning
that the "parties clearly expressed their preference for an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
interpretation of their obligations .... 430 U.S. at 253.
265. 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).
266. Id. at 276 (quoting Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 238, 243
(M.D.N.C. 1966)). Plaintiff had 13 years of teaching experience generally in Stanly County. She
held A.B. and M.S. degrees and was recommended for reemployment for the upcoming 19651966 school term. Id.
267. Id. at 277.
268. Id.
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"forbids discrimination on account of race by2 a69 public school
system with respect to employment of teachers."

In other discrimination cases Craven was willing to strike down discriminatory conduct, but he remained reluctant to mete out what he viewed

as "punishment" in the form of double costs and counsel fees. 270 In
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. ,271 for example, Judge Craven,

writing for the majority, declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied
272
to all facilities engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.
Defendant operated several barbeque drive-ins where blacks were denied
service. 27 Craven concluded that the consumption of fifty percent of the
269. Id. (quoting Franklin v. County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1966)). In
North Carolina Teachers Ass'n v. Asheboro Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1968), the
Fourth Circuit held that black teachers who had lost their jobs teaching black pupils and were
forced to reapply in the position of new applicants suffered a denial of due process and equal
protection. Craven concurred as to the reemployment of those teachers who were unfairly and
discriminatorily displaced, yet he dissented as to the two plaintiffs who were compared with
other teachers engaged in the same certification area and found lacking. The majority held that
both of these plaintiffs "are entitled to an order directing defendant to offer them reemployment in any vacancy within the scope of their certifications without requiring a comparison of
Id. at 746. Craven concluded that the
their qualifications with those of new applicants ....
court's mistake was in its
refusal to recognize that non-invidious displacement can and does create a teacher
classification that is not unreasonable and that does not collide with the fourteenth
amendment.
That there is such a classification-whether or not recognized by the court-is
apparent from the unique status conferred on Miss Peterson and Mrs. Segers by the
court's decision. They are accorded something to be envied by other North Carolina
teachers who sadly lack it: tenure of office. . . .Since this is true for no other
teachers-white or Negro-in North Carolina, I am unable to agree that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands it. Nor does it seem to me
very equal.
Id. at 753 (Craven, J., dissenting in part). But see id. at 748 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
270. See text accompanying notes 154-74 supra.
271. 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), modified per curiam, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (a)-(c) (1970). The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:
(a) Equal access.
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accomodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) . . . Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including,
but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment;
or any gasoline station;
(c) "* " The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of
this subchapter if. . .(2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of
subsection (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a
substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it
sells, [which] has moved in commerce. ...
273. 377 F.2d at 434.
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food off the premises was irrelevant for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act
as "Congress did not intend coverage of the Act to depend upon a head
count of how many people eat on the premises or a computation of poundage
or volume of food eaten.' '274 He declined, however, to award attorneys'
fees to plaintiffs under Title II of the Civil Rights Act275 and, in justifying
that conclusion, suggested that the allowance of attorneys' fees in such a
case hinged upon the good faith of the defendant:
In exercising its discretion, the district court may properly
consider whether any of the numerous defenses interposed by
defendants were presented for purposes of delay and not in good
faith. But the test should be a subjective one, for no litigant ought
to be punished under the guise of an award of counsel fees (or in
any other manner) from taking a position in court in which he
honestly
believes-however lacking in merit that position may
276
be.

The Supreme Court disagreed with his interpretation of the attorneys'
277
fees provision in the Civil Rights Act:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would
have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in
form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he
cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not
for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. 278
Judge Craven refused, therefore, to award "punitive" measures when
a plaintiff alleged and successfully proved a constitutional violation by a
defendant if the defendant litigated the case in good faith. Such an approach
is consistent with his reluctance to penalize defendants absent evidence of
bad faith on their part in conducting the litigation. It is tempting to characterize this concern as naive in light of the excessively burdensome tactics
employed by some defendants in civil rights litigation. Such a characteriza274. Id. at 435.
275. Id. at 437. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970) permits the Attorney General to appoint
counsel, intervene and initiate suits without cost to the victim of the discriminatory conduct.
Section 2000a-3(b) allows the court to authorize payment of reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party, other than the United States, within its discretion. Id. § 2000a-3(a), (b).
276. 377 F.2d at 437. Judge Winter, in a special concurring opinion, disagreed with Craven
on this point and reasoned that "[t]o immunize defendants from an award of counsel fees,
honest beliefs should bear some reasonable relation to reality; never should frivolity go
unrecognized." Id. (Winter, J., specially concurring). He pointed out that the defendant had
raised various spurious defenses such as "the Civil Rights Act was invalid because it 'contravenes the will of God' and interferes with the 'free exercise of defendant's religion.' "Id. at
438.
277. 390 U.S. at 401.
278. Id. at 401-02.
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tion might be unfair, however, for Craven recognized that such harassment
was not uncommon and that a "litigant who increases the burden upon
opposing counsel by such tactics ought ordinarily to bear the cost of
unnecessary preparation. "279 Judge Craven was not only sensitive to the
needs of individual plaintiffs in overcoming evasive tactics employed by
defendants in civil rights litigation, but he was also concerned with the
possible obstacles facing victims of employment discrimination in their
attempts to pursue adequate remedies.
In Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Railroad280 the Fourth Circuit was
faced with the question whether an attempt to conciliate by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964281 is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the filing of a civil suit by
an individual plaintiff. 282 Plaintiff was dismissed from his job by Seaboard 283 and brought a complaint before the Commission on January 14,
1966, alleging employment discrimination. 28 4 The Commission found for
plaintiff but notified him by mail that due to its heavy workload it would be
"impossible to undertake or to conclude conciliation efforts." 2 5 The Commission informed him that he could bring a civil suit within thirty days of
receipt of the letter. 286 Plaintiff's suit, however, was dismissed on the
ground that the EEOC did not engage in conciliation prior to the commence287
ment of the suit.
Judge Craven concluded that a discharged employee need not wait for
the EEOC to engage in conciliation once he had received adequate notice of
his right to bring an action. 288 To Craven, the legislative purpose behind the
provision was unclear, 289 but
the policies and purposes of the Act [were] clearly discernable.
There can be no doubt that Congress intended to attack the prob279. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d at 437.
280.
281.
282.
283.

405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
405 F.2d at 647.
Id. Plaintiff had worked 25 years as a porter for defendant. He was dismissed for a

misdemeanor committed while off-duty. Id.
284.
285.
286.
287.
codified

Id.
Id.
Id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (formerly
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970)) provided in part:
Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved,
. . . that an employer, employment agency, or labor organization has engaged in an
unlawful employment practice, the Commission. . .shall. . . make an investigation
of such charge. . . .If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
288. 405 F.2d at 647.
289. Id. at 649-51; accord,Recent Cases, Civil Rights-Conciliationby the EqualEmploy-
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lem of discriminatory employment practices by first seeking volun-

tary compliance by the nation's employers. But neither can there
intended the remedies provided to be
be any doubt that Congress
29

timely and effective. 0
In Johnson Judge Craven resisted the temptation to adhere rigidly to the
statute and thus to foreclose plaintiff's right to pursue his claim. He reasoned rather that when the agency itself is ineffective in aiding individuals in
the unfair discrimination area, the complainant should not also be denied the
right of private vindication. 2 91 This emphasis upon the right of the individual
to obtain an adequate remedy did not, according to Judge Craven, work
unfairly against the defendant and he concluded that "[a]ll that defendants
292
ask is not to be sued before being persuaded to comply with the law."
Craven was not to be tempted, however, to ignore the policies of the Act in
favor of strict statutory construction. He refused to construct "an edifice of
logic and precedent upon which justice may be sacrificed [so] [t]hat the
result in terms of the people involved would make an Apache cry
"t293

In Moody v. Albemarle PaperCo. 294 the Fourth Circuit addressed two
significant questions also arising under Title VII: (1) what test should be
followed in awarding back pay when an employer has unlawfully discriminated against an employee and the employee has thereby been precluded from the opportunity to earn wages; and (2) what must the employer
show to prove that a preemployment test is sufficiently job related when
such tests are discriminatory in effect. Plaintiffs brought a class action under
ment OpportunityCommission of a Complaint Arising UnderTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 Is Not a JurisdictionalPrerequisitefor the Filingof a CivilSuit, 38 CINN. L. REV. 365, 36769 (1969).
290. 405 F.2d at 651. Judge Boreman dissented and reasoned that private litigation should
be the last resort in such claims and that "unable" to conciliate means that the attempts to
resolve the claim were fruitless. See id. at 654 (Boreman, J.,dissenting).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e was amended in 1972 to include in part: "If within thirty days after a
charge is filed with the Commission. . . .the Commission has been unable to secure from the
respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring
a civil action .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
The EEOC's new powers to bring civil actions have caused some courts to hold the agency
to a higher standard of compliance with the Act. See EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp.
985, 991 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Bartenders Int'l Union, Local No. 41,369 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
292. 405 F.2d at 653.
293. Paeanto Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 979-80. Craven declared that he "never had the
misfortune to be closely associated with a truly conservative judge. I do not mean 'conservative' in the ordinary sense. A more apt word is, perhaps, 'sterile.'" Id. at 979. "On the Fourth
Circuit over the decade I have known it as a participant. . . there has not been a sterile judgewhether or not any one of us may have been labelled as liberal or conservative." Id. at 979 n. 10.
294. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Title VII. 295 The district court found that Albemarle had engaged in discriminatory employment practices in both hiring and according seniority
rights. 296 The district court refused, however, to order any changes in the
297
preemployment testing procedures or to award plaintiffs back pay.
A divided Fourth Circuit, with Judge Craven writing the majority
opinion, reversed the district court on both the testing and back pay findings. Craven concluded that "[b]ecause of the compensatory nature of a
back pay award and the strong congressional policy embodied in Title VII,
. . a plaintiff . . . who is successful in obtaining an injunction under
Title VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.''298 Craven concluded
that no such special circumstances existed and that the district court should
299
have awarded back pay.
*

The Fourth Circuit also reversed the district court's failure to enjoin or
limit Albemarle's testing procedures. 3°° In the test used by the employer,
ninety-six percent of the white applicants and sixty-four percent of the black,
applicants passed. 3°1 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 302 the Supreme Court
had held that employers must demonstrate business necessity to justify the
use of the testing program. 30 3 Craven declared that Albemarle failed to meet
the "job-related" test articulated in Griggs in three primary areas: (1) the
company failed to engage in any significant or objective job analysis; 3°4 (2)
295. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).

296. 474 F.2d at 137. Albemarle did not contest the district court's order to abolish the job
seniority system and to institute a plant-wide system in its place. Id.
297. Id. The district court concluded that the claim for back pay was filed five years after
the action had begun and that the employer did not evidence bad faith in complying with the
Act. Id. at 140.
298. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted).
299. Id. Judge Boreman dissented from the authorization of back pay and concluded that

the award "unlike the grant of attorney's fees, is an element of affirmative relief which has
been entrusted to the more general discretion of the district courts." Id. at 143 (footnote
omitted) (Boreman, J.,
dissenting).
300. Id. at 140.
301. Id. at 138 n.1.
302. 401,U.S. 424 (1971).
303. 474 F.2d at 138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides in part:
[I~t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.

. .

to give and

to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
304. The test results were measured against the subjective standards of supervisors. 474
F.2d at 139; see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A

GeneralApproachto Objective Criteriaof Hiringand Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
EEOC guidelines provide in part: "In view of the possibility of bias inherent in subjective
evaluation, supervisory rating technique should be carefully developed, and the ratings should

be closely examined for evidence of bias." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(4) (1976). quoted in 474 F.2d
at 139.
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it failed to carry out a validation study in crucial job areas; 30 5 and (3) it failed
to demonstrate that hiring employees into a pool was necessary for the
3°6
operation of the business.
Craven's holding in Moody was vacated by the Supreme Court,3 °7
which concluded that back pay should generally be awarded within the
limits of Title VII regardless of the employer's "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent" 30 8 and that the test for back pay should not be conditioned upon Craven's "special circumstances" test. Rather it "should be
denied only for reasons which. . . would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination. . . and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination.' '3 9 The Court agreed with
Craven that Albemarle's validation study was materially defective, yet

Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, pointed out that implicit in the Fourth
Circuit's reversal was the notion that an injunction should issue immediately. 310 Stewart concluded that in light of Albemarle's amendment of these
procedures the district court should have the discretion to fashion other,
31 1
appropriate relief.

Craven's approach in racial discrimination cases under Title VII was
marked, therefore, by the view that access to the Act's remedies should
be broadly afforded plaintiffs injured by discriminatory conduct. 312 In
305. Some testing procedures were approved without a validation study. EEOC guidelines
suggest, although they do not require, that "where a test is to be used in different units of a
multi-unit organization and no significant differences exist between units, jobs, and applicant
populations, evidence obtained in one unit may suffice for the others." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(2)
(1976), quoted at 474 F.2d at 139.
306. 474 F.2d at 140. Judge Bryan dissented as to the invalidation of the testing procedures
on the grounds that the tests were sufficiently job related under Griggs. Id. at 148 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
307. 422 U.S. 405 (1975), noted in 54 N.C.L. Rev. 197 (1976).
308. Id. at 422 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432). The question whether
the tardiness of the employees' back pay demand prejudiced Albemarle was remanded for
further consideration. Id. at 423-25.
309. Id. at 421.
310. Id. at 436.
311. Id. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, found that Craven's PiggiePark rationale
in the award of back pay under Title II was not directly on point, id. at 415, and that the district
court's decision to award such payment must be measured instead against the purposes of Title
VII, id. at 417. Stewart agreed with the Fourth Circuit's findings as to the deficiency of
Albemarle's testing procedures, but he suggested that rather than immediately issuing an
injunction it would be "the more prudent course. . . to leave to the District Court the precise
fashioning of the necessary relief in the first instance." Id. at 436.
312. In Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975), Craven noted that the
record did not demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a probationary employment period because
of his race. Nevertheless, he held that plaintiff's suit wasproper as a class action, even though
several of defendant's challenged actions were not directed against the plaintiff:
Viewed broadly, Barnett's suit is an "across the board" attack on all discriminatory actions by defendants on the ground of race. . . . We believe such a characterization is more consonant with the broad remedial purposes of Title VII itself, and that
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Johnson, for example, he was unwilling to hold that conciliation by the
EEOC was a jurisdictional prerequisite to permitting an individual to bring
civil suit-a decision that would have narrowed significantly plaintiffs'
opportunities to remedy discriminatory employment practices. Moreover,
he thought that the Act's remedies should be afforded swiftly, with good
faith on the part of defendants not relieving the court of its duty to ensure
"removal of all vestiges of discrimination. '313
In equal employment cases involving sex discrimination, Judge Craven
pursued a similar judicial course of supporting ready access to the federal
courts for plaintiffs and implementing broad remedies when discriminatory
conduct by the employer could be shown. In Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne
College3 14 the Fourth Circuit agreed with the trial court's findings that
defendant had not discriminated against a college faculty member because
of her sex and age. 315 Judge Craven dissented and declared that the statistical evidence in the case supported plaintiff's claim of discrimination between female faculty members and male faculty members for the same
work. 316 Judge Craven concluded that the college failed to present "clear
and convincing evidence to explain any disparity in salary between males
and females, demonstrating that such differentials were based upon legitimate, reasonable and nondiscriminatory factors." 317 He maintained that
plaintiff's statistical evidence established at least a prima facie case that
318
should be considered by the jury.
In Cook v. Arentzen3 19 plaintiff, a woman and a Navy lieutenant,
attacked her separation from the Navy under a former regulation requiring
320
all women officers to resign if they became pregnant while in the service.
the district court's less charitable view, under which Barnett could as a class representative challenge only those specific actions taken by the defendants toward him, would
undercut those purposes.

Id. at 547-48. In Barnett the court also declared that "[s]tatistics can in appropriate cases
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, without the necessity of showing specific
instances of overt discrimination." Id. at 549; accord, Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343,
1359, 1361-62 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., joined by Craven, J.,dissenting).
313. 518 F.2d at 550.

314. 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977).
315. Id. at 581. Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory and pecuniary relief for herself and
other female faculty members under Title VII. Id. at 579.
316. Id. at 581 (Craven, J.,
dissenting). Plaintiff, a full, tenured professor, received a salary
of $9,450 in 1968-1969, whereas a male professor in the same department, an associate, tenured
professor, received a salary of $10,200. The evidence also indicated that in the same year
plaintiff received $11,667, another male professor received $12,015.
317. Id. at 582 (Craven, J., dissenting).
318. Id.

319. No. 76-1359 (4th Cir., filed May 6, 1977).
320. The former regulation stated in part: "'The commissions or warrants of all women
officers of the Regular Navy, and of women officers of the Naval Reserve while in an active
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Plaintiff had served over thirteen years in the Navy, but after discovering her
pregnancy, she resigned pursuant to Navy policy.3 21 After the birth of the
child, her commission was not reinstated, and she brought suit for reinstatement, back pay and damages on the grounds that the Navy regulation was a
322
violation of due process and equal protection under the fifth amendment.
The district court disagreed with her contention, holding that the policy
behind the regulation was " 'to assure a manpower supply continuously
available for service worldwide, and to guarantee the efficient performance
of services wherever and whenever needed.' "323
The Fourth Circuit, with Craven writing the majority opinion, reversed
and declared that the "regulation is not rationally related to the objective of
assuring the availability and efficiency of the Navy's personnel.' 324 Craven
dismissed the Navy's argument that pregnancy "leads to the permanent
condition of motherhood" :325
Such a justification rests on " 'archaic and overbroad' premises
which have been rejected as unconstitutional in a host of recent
decisions." . . . There is much to be said for old-fashioned
motherhood; but, we think, it is better said by women than by
government in the form of an inflexible regulation based on a false
and irrational premise: that one who has been pregnant cannot be a
good officer in the Nurse Corps. . . It is enough to rhetorically
inquire: why is Lt. Cook, USNR,26competent to serve and Lt.
Comdr. Cook, USN, incompetent?
Some of the more controversial Craven decisions involve the element
of state action in claims arising in the civil rights area. Plaintiff in Bellamy
v. Mason's Stores, Inc. ,327 a member of the Ku Klux Klan, alleged under
both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)328 that his constitutionally protected
rights of association were denied by a private employer. The district court
duty or training duty status are subject to termination when it is established that the woman

.. .is pregnant ....

'" No. 76-1359, slip op. at 2 (quoting former UNITED STATES NAVY,

BUREAU OF PERSONNEL MANUAL art. C-10330). The regulation was rescinded effective August
1, 1975, and presently a service woman can continue to serve unless she requests to resign in
such circumstances. Id.
321. Id. at 3.

322. See id. at 4. Plaintiff had exhausted all of the administrative remedies available. Id.
323.

Id. (quoting Civil No. 73-332-N, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Va., filed Jan. 9, 1976)).

324. Id. at 6.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 7 (quoting Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1124 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnote

omitted)).
327. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) reads in part:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway, or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done,
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dismissed plaintiff's complaint.3 29 The court of appeals agreed with the
district court's holding and affirmed.330 Craven, writing for the majority,
declined to consider plaintiff's claim that the Klan is a religious organization
under Title V]I. 33 In addressing the section 1985(3) claim, Craven reasoned
that "[a]lthough it is clear that state action is not necessarily an essential
ingredient under this statute, nevertheless we think that some state involvement is necessary in this particular application of the statute in order to
maintain a cause of action.''332 Craven viewed state action as vital in
Bellamy; to hold that the first amendment right of association applies not
only to states but to private persons as well would require
an innovation that must come from the Congress or the Supreme
Court.
. . . [W]e are unable to make the several jumps-without
further guidance from the Supreme Court-from statutory language tracking the fourteenth amendment to the amendment itself
to incorporation of the first amendment to application of that
amendment to333private persons, and while on our way jettison state
involvement.
Bellamy has been cited 334 as narrowing the broad interpretation generally afforded civil rights statutes under Griffin v. Breckenridge,335 which
held that section 1985(3) suits did not require state action in cases involving
racial discrimination. The Griffin court recognized that although "it [is]
understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation
of the equal protection of the laws by private persons . . . there is nothing
inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to
any act in furtherance of the conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the

United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
329. 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
330. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).

331. Plaintiff had alleged in the trial court that the Klan was a patriotic organization and at
the same time declared that the Klan was a religion since its meetings were highlighted by
"religious pomp and ceremony." Id. at 505.
332. Id. at 506. But see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).

333. 508 F.2d at 507. But see Action v. Gannon, 480 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Richardson
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971). In Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir.

1976), Craven reaffirmed Bellamy in a sex discrimination case and declared "that totally
private employment discrimination on the basis of sex does not state a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) for violation of rights following directly and exclusively from the fourteenth
amendment." Id. at 1333-34 (footnote omitted).
334. See Note, Civil Rights-State Action is a Requirementfor the Application of Section
1985(3) to First Amendment Rights, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 677, 685 (1976).
335. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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come from the state." 336 Craven declined to extend the principles of Griffin
to private persons in view of the first amendment claim involved.
In an earlier case of significance, Joy v. Daniels,337 Craven relied upon
the state action theory in deciding that a landlord's use of state eviction
procedures against a tenant in a federally funded low-income project included the requisite state involvement in order to invoke 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 3 31 Plaintiff leased an apartment from defendant. 339 Approximately
one year later, defendant gave plaintiff thirty days' notice to leave the
premises, without indicating the cause for eviction. 340 Plaintiff brought a
section 1983 action alleging that her threatened eviction should be enjoined
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Craven found state action to
support a claim,'premising it upon the following factors: (1) Defendant was
a recipient of mortgage benefits and rent supplements from the Federal
Housing Authority (FHA);341 (2) state eviction procedures were used by
defendant; 342 and (3) state approval was necessary to allow federal participation in these quasi-public housing projects.34 3
Judge Craven then turned to the substantive fourteenth amendment
rights of which plaintiff was allegedly deprived by the eviction. In concluding that plaintiff was in fact entitled to a good cause notice prior to eviction,
Craven declared that the weight of legislative and constitutional background
afforded such rights:
In view of the congressional policies of providing a decent
home (with stability and security) for every American family, and
of prohibiting arbitrary and discriminatory action, bolstered by the
FHA regulations and custom, we find in the scheme of the National
Housing Act and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965
a property right or entitlement to continue occupancy until there
3 44
exists a cause to evict other than the mere expiration of the lease.
336. Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
337. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
338. Id. at 1239; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Federal jurisdiction in Joy was based upon 28

id. § 1343(3) which grants jurisdiction over actions "[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of
any state law" of a constitutional right.
339. The lease itself provided in part:
At the end of one year, lease is automatically renewed from month to month, rent to be
payable in advance without demand on first day of each month. Either party may

terminate lease at end of term or any successive term by giving 30 days' notice in
advance to other party.

479 F.2d at 1238.
340. Defendant in its answer declared that plaintiff "'maintained a slovenly and ill-kept
apartment;' had destroyed window screens; failed to pay rent on time; and, used excessive

electricity." Id. at 1238 n.2.
341. Id. at 1238-39.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1239.

344. Id. at 1241. Craven pointed out in conclusion that as the South Carolina judicial
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In Joy Craven revealed his strong support for extending fourteenth amendment rights to aggrieved plaintiffs when state action was present. When,
however, no state action existed upon which plaintiffs could hang a
constitutional claim, Craven was reluctant, as in Bellamy, to extend the
reach of section 1985(3) to private persons.
CRIMINAL LAW

Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals have relatively limited
opportunities to interpret substantive criminal law, and many of their decisions in this area are of less importance than their decisions in other areas.
Of Judge Craven's decisions, two groups stand out. They may not be of
overriding legal significance, but they reveal a striking contrast in his
interpretations of various statutes. The first of these groups of cases involves
issues that arose out of the war in Vietnam.
Political questions do not surface with great frequency in criminal
cases. Judge Craven, on the court of appeals during the height of the war in
Vietnam, was well known for his opposition to that war. 345 Yet, in all of the
opinions that he wrote dealing with the selective service laws, his personal
beliefs were mentioned only once, in Lawton v. Tarr,346 when the United
States Attorney moved to recuse on the basis of Craven's public expression
of his opposition to the war. 347 His other decisions in this area bear no hint
of his personal beliefs.
During the draft era, many cases arose that dealt with various aspects of
the selective service laws. In United States v. Davis,3 48 for example, the
registrant had been convicted for refusing induction. 4 9 He had not appealed
his 1-A classification and had refused to step forward for induction. At trial,
the district court declined to examine the registrant's file to consider the
propriety of his classification. 350 When the local draft board notified the
registrant of his classification, it had failed to follow new procedures that
required that the registrant be informed of his right to appeal his classification. 351 Writing for the court, Judge Craven held that the local board's error
eviction procedure was constitutionally adequate, a prior administrative hearing was not necessary when the tenant was afforded procedural due process by the state courts. Id. at 1243.
345. See Lawton v. Tarr, 327 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
346. Id.
347. See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra for a discussion of Lawton.
348. 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969).
349. Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 105 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
462 (Supp. V 1975)).
350. 413 F.2d at 150.
351. Local Board Memorandum No. 82 (Mar. 6, 1967) provided that the local draft board
would notify registrant of his right to appeal and give him the name of his appeal agent at the
time his Notice of Classification was mailed. 413 F.2d at 149 n. 1.
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excused the registrant's failure to appeal his classification. 352 Thus, it was
error for the trial court to refuse to examine the classification, 35 3 for the
registrant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies could be excused by
354
the board's action.
The "misleading information" defense arose again in United States v.
Ramey, 355 in which one of defendant's convictions was for failure to report
for an armed forces physical examination. Defendant had registered with a
board in North Carolina, but he was in California when he received his order
to report to North Carolina for a physical examination. Having no money to
return to North Carolina, he reported to a local board in California, but a
board employee erroneously told him that he would have to obtain his
physical in North Carolina. Judge Craven, again writing for the court, held
that having misled the defendant, the Government could not try to hold him
liable for failing to obey the order to report for the physical.3 56 Davis and
Ramey are consistent with a theme that seems to run through many of
Craven's opinions: convictions should not result from the mistakes or
357
misconduct of the government.
In United States ex reL Tobias v. Laird,3 58 Judge Craven refused
to allow the government to err at the expense of a conscientious objector. In
Tobias petitioner sought relief on the ground that he had been wrongfully
denied conscientious objector status by the Army. Despite the unanimous
recommendation of the three officers required to determine the validity of
petitioner's claim, the commanding officer, who had not talked to petitioner, recommended denial of the application because he thought that the
prospect of going to Vietnam caused petitioner to make the request. Petitioner's request for discharge or assignment to noncombatant duties was
routinely denied, even though a finding was made by the Adjutant General
of the Army that the evidence supported a claim for noncombatant classification. Finding that the Army had violated its own regulations, 359 Judge
Craven held that the policy of fairness underlying the regulations required
that petitioner be granted conscientious objector status even though his
352. 413 F.2d at 150.
353. Id.

354. Id.; see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (special circumstances may
justify a failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
355. 503 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1974).

356. Id. at 709.
357. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 478-94 infra. A different view, however, seems to
apply to cases that involve fourth amendment claims. See text accompanying notes 528-47

infra.
358. 413 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1969).

359. Craven noted that a Department of Defense Directive seemed to permit either the
discharge or the assignment to noncombatant duties of a conscientious objector. Id. at 940.
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objections did not crystallize until he faced the prospect of going to Viet360
nam.
Judge Craven's opinion in Tobias was relied upon and extended by the
Fourth Circuit in United States ex rel. Lehman v. Laird,3 61 in which the
court discharged a serviceman who had been denied conscientious objector
status. Citing Tobias, the court stated, "This court has recognized that the
prospect of Vietnam duty may act as a catalyst for requesting discharge as a
conscientious objector but does not by itself constitute a basis in fact for
denial of discharge. "362 The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction of
Muhammad Ali (then Cassius Clay) for refusing induction, 363 approved the
rulings of Tobias and Lehman.364 As in these cases, the Court held that
conscientious objector status should not be withheld "simply because of the
circumstances and timing of the petitioner's claim. "365
Coleman v. Tolson36 6 also involved a claim for discharge from the
Army. Petitioner had been granted a student deferment upon his enrollment
in college. The college's administrative regulations required a number of
students, including petitioner, to take a reduced number of credit hours.
This reduction would not, however, have prevented petitioner from graduating in the usual four-year period. Nevertheless, upon hearing that the
petitioner was seven hours short of the credit necessary to be classified as a
third-year student, the local board reclassified him as 1-A and he was
inducted into the Army. Although the Selective Service regulation based
deferment on credits being earned at a pro rata rate throughout the four years
of college, Judge Craven noted the injustice of denying deferment to a
student who would graduate in four years but who temporarily lacked the
proper number of credits due to no fault of his own. If the regulation were
followed precisely, half of the freshman at Morgan State College would
have lost their deferments. Considering such circumstances, Craven held
that if the college certifies that the registrant will graduate on time and if it is
reasonably likely that he will do so, he is entitled to his deferment. Then,
finding no basis in fact for petitioner's 1-A classification, Craven ordered
him discharged from the Army. 6 7
Judge Craven's opinion in Coleman reflects the common sense approach that characterizes many of his opinions. This approach is also at the
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
430 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 99.
Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971) (per curiam).
Id. at 703.
Id.
435 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1064-65.
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base of his opinion in UnitedStates v. Snider,36 8 in which the court reversed
convictions for supplying false or fraudulent information on income tax
369
withholding exemption certificates and for criminal contempt of court.
Defendant was a Quaker who, pursuant to his opposition to war, decided
that he could not continue voluntarily to pay taxes. He therefore claimed
three billion dependents (the world's population) on the Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate that he gave to his employer. He also sent a
letter to the Internal Revenue Service with this form explaining his claim.
His employer continued to withhold money from his pay for several months,
but, receiving no reply from the Internal Revenue Service, returned the
withheld amounts. Later that year, Snider was convicted of wilfully supply370
ing his employer with false or fraudulent information.
It is apparent that Judge Craven saw Snider's claim of three billion
dependents as exaggeration for the purpose of symbolic protest. 37t The
statute was an obstacle to reversing the conviction, however, for its language required only that the information be "false or fraudulent. ' ' 372 Although the usual meaning of "false" is "not true," 373 the court noted that
the word is often given other meanings in statutes. After examining these
other meanings in a number of statutes, 374 Judge Craven stated:
[I]n order for a taxpayer to be convicted of supplying "false or
fraudulent" information contrary to section 7205 the information
must either be (1) supplied with an intent to deceive, or (2) false in
the sense of deceptive-of such a nature that it could reasonably
affect withholding to the detriment of the government. 375
Because a jury could not find that a claim of three billion dependents was
368. 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).

369. See text accompanying notes 49-66 supra for a discussion of a criminal contempt issue
in the same case.
370. 502 F.2d at 649. I.R.C. § 7205 provides: "Any individual required to supply information to his employer. . . who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information. . . shall...

upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both."
371. 502 F.2d at 646. Judge Widener, in a vehement dissent, saw the majority opinion in a
different light:
Although the reversal of the tax conviction is thinly veiled in the guise of an improper
definition of "false or fraudulent," it is in fact nothing more nor less than a ruling that

a Vietnam War protestor may not be required to be punished for a willful refusal to
pay withholding taxes on account of a political belief. The real extent of the ruling is

revealed by the dismissal of the indictment, rather than ordering a new trial under
proper instructions .

. ..

Id. at 661 (Widener, J., dissenting).
372. See note 370 supra.
373. 502 F.2d at 651 n.10. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY

(1961)).
374. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2) (1970); 18 id. § 1001; see 502 F.2d at 651-52.
375. 502 F.2d at 655.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

"false or fraudulent" under this definition, the court
reversed the conviction
3 76
and ordered that the indictment be dismissed.
Snider may be viewed as a case in which statutory interpretation
imposed a greater burden on the prosecution, enabling Judge Craven to
avoid convicting a person for an act that could be reasonably viewed only as
symbolic protest. In another area of criminal law, however, Craven's

statutory interpretation affirmed a broad reading of federal jurisdiction in
order to uphold the convictions of persons who were clearly engaged in

criminal activity lacking any element of political expression. It seems that
he was quite willing to find that the statute applied to their conduct. The

statute in question was 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which forbids the use of a facility
in interstate commerce to promote, establish or carry on any unlawful
activity. 377 In United States v. Wechsler, 78 defendants had been convicted
of violating and conspiring to violate section 1952 in bribing county officials.
Jurisdiction under the statute was established by Judge Craven's finding that depositing a check used to pay a bribe in a bank for collection was
the use of a facility in interstate commerce. 379 The check had been drawn on
376. Id. at 656. In deciding Snider, Craven distinguished and declined to follow two cases
from other circuits that had taken a more literal view of the meaning of "false." United States
v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Malinkowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973). The result, however, does not seem to have "undermine[d]
statutory law required for the administration of a voluntary tax system," as feared by Judge
Widener in his dissent. 502 F.2d at 660 (Widener, J., dissenting). In Shea v. United States, 506
F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the petitioner's conviction for supplying
false or fraudulent information. About a month before filing his withholding certificate claiming
20 dependents (instead of the 6 previously claimed), petitioner had written a letter to the
Internal Revenue Service expressing his general intent to resist paying taxes. Id. at 1227. The
court held that the information that petitioner had supplied could have deceived the government, id. at 1227-28, and this fact required a decision different from that in Snider.
377. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970) provides in part:
Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than five years, or both.
378. 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968). One question on appeal was
the ex post facto application of the law. Before the statute was enacted in 1961, defendants had
committed acts that would have supported indictments for bribery under Virginia law because
they had passed money to county officials. Id. at 346-47. It was after the statute was enacted,
however, that a check was deposited and the officials voted as they had promised. The statute
was therefore applicable, according to Judge Craven, and the ban on ex post facto laws was not
violated. Id. at 347.
379. Id. at 347 & n.3. Craven noted, "Banks have often been held to be involved in
interstate commerce for other purposes. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bank of America, 130 F.2d 624 (9th
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a Virginia bank and endorsed by a Washington, D.C. bank. Craven found
this action to be a sufficient connection between the unlawful activity and
380
the use of a facility in interstate commerce, as required by the statute.
Defendant in United States v. LeFaivre38t was convicted of violating
section 1952 as a result of his gambling operations. These operations were
wholly within Maryland and predominantly in Baltimore; nevertheless, they
involved approximately half a million dollars annually. At trial, fourteen
out-of-state negotiable instruments were introduced to establish defendant's
use of facilities in interstate commerce. Because of this minimal connection
(considering the extent of defendant's operation), defendant questioned
whether Congress ought to regulate criminal activity that is local in nature
through Congress' power over commerce. Judge Craven, writing for the
court, declined to restrict the application of the statute, stating that the courts
cannot restrain Congress when its actions are within the limits of its
382
powers.
Defendant in LeFaivre also contended that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Rewis v. United States383 and under the cases interpreting
Rewis384 prosecution was no longer permissible under section 1952 just
because a few checks drawn on out-of-state banks were involved in a purely
local operation. Rewis held that section 1952 could not be used either to
prosecute people who crossed state lines to go to a local gambling establishment or to prosecute the operators of such an establishment because some
customers crossed state lines. 385 Judge Craven, however, stated that the
Cir. 1942) (National Labor Relations Act); Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., 45 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1942) (Fair Labor Standards Act)." Id. at 347 n.3.
380. Id. at 347 n.3. The Fourth Circuit relied on Wechsler in United States v. Salsbury, 430
F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970), a case in which § 1952 was invoked to convict a defendant who
financed a large gambling enterprise. Defendant often received payment by check, which he
cashed at a local store. The store, in turn, deposited the checks in a bank. Because some
of the checks were drawn on out-of-state banks, defendant was prosecuted under § 1952. Citing
Wechsler, the court upheld the conviction, stating that a gambler cannot use interstate facilities
to clear checks from illegal activities. Id. at 1048.
Craven also wrote the opinion in United States v. Parzow, 391 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 823 (1968), decided the same day as Wechsler. Like Wechsler, Parzow
involved the bribery of a county official in Virginia. Payment for the bribery was accomplished
by mail. As in Wechsler, Craven found that such use of facilities in interstate commerce was

sufficiently related to the unlawful activity to constitute a violation of § 1952. Id. at 241.
381. 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).

382. Id. at 1290. Defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
383. 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
384. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. McCormick, 442
F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Altobello, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971). Judge

Craven's opinion sought to distinguish all of these cases. 507 F.2d at 1293-94. Even if the cases
were not distinguishable, he declined to follow them, rejecting "any narrowly restrictive
reading of [§ 1952]." Id. at 1294.
385. 401 U.S. at 811-12.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

purpose of Rewis was to prevent the extension of section 1952 beyond its
literal language.38 6 Hence, because the activity in LeFaivre was clearly
covered by the statute, Craven declined to investigate the legislative history
387
of section 1952 to see whether Congress truly intended such coverage.
The scope of federal jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions can be controlled
by prosecutorial discretion, Craven suggested, adding that he refused to read
section 1952 to require that interstate travel or the use of facilities in
388
interstate commerce be a "substantial" or "integral" part of the crime.
Such travel or use of facilities "need only facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of the illegal . . . business.'"389
Judge Craven's statutory interpretation in the draft cases and in Snider
provides an interesting contrast when compared with the statutory interpretation in the section 1952 cases. The draft cases and Snider involve defendants who might be considered less culpable morally than the defendants in
the section 1952 cases. Although Craven's opposition to the war in Vietnam
may have contributed to this view of those defendants, improper actions by
the government (as in Davis, Ramey and Tobias) may have also influenced
his attitudes. Whatever the cause, it is clear that the interpretations of the
statutes in cases such as Coleman and Tolson, which strictly construe the
meaning of the draft statutes, differ quite strikingly from the broad, literal
interpretation of section 1952.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Judge Craven wrote numerous opinions dealing with criminal procedure, most of which fall into two broad areas that reveal different facets of
his judicial personality. In cases that concerned defendants' right to a fair
trial, Craven was scrupulous in his insistence on safeguarding the interests
of defendants. But when the essential fairness of the trial was not an issueas when the seizure and introduction of evidence of guilt were in questionhis focus seemed to shift to the practical necessities of law enforcement.
Judge Craven recognized that the determination of venue is more than a
mere technicality and that proper venue is required for a fair trial. In United
386. 507 F.2d at 1294.

387.
388.
389.
nothing

Id. at 1295. "
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297 (quoting the trial judge's jury charge). Judge Craven further held that
in the statute requires a knowing use of facilities in interstate commerce; therefore, it

was immaterial whether defendant knew that cashing out-of-state checks involved the use of

facilities in interstate commerce. Id. In addition, because federal law makes aiders and abettors
principals, women who received bets over the telephone, with no knowledge of the out-of-state
checks, were also liable for violation of § 1952. Id. at 1298.
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275

States v. Walden,390 defendants were charged with violations of federal
bank robbery laws. The conspiratorial and transportation acts were alleged
to have taken place in South Carolina, but the banks that defendants were
charged with entering in order to commit robbery were not in South Carolina. Nevertheless, defendants were tried in South Carolina on all charges. On
appeal, they claimed that venue for the unlawful bank entry charges was
improperly laid in the South Carolina district. Judge Craven's opinion for
the court pointed out that the sixth amendment provides that trials shall take
place in the state where the crime was committed. 391 Furthermore, such
provisions are for the benefit of the defendant, and doubts as to venue
should be resolved in his favor. 392 Craven held that entry into the bank to
commit robbery is the act proscribed by the statute, and that such entry
could take place only in the state where the bank was located. 393 He refused
to approve venue in South Carolina based on the presence of an accessory in
that state. 394 Recognizing that a prosecution for conspiracy has some advantage to the government, he declined to enlarge this advantage by allowing
forum shopping for the substantive offenses: "The right to a trial before a
jury of the vicinage is fundamental and such a trial ought to be held at the
place of commission of the substantive offense. The Sixth Amendment may
not be ignored . . . ,39.
Judge Craven viewed jurisdictional matters in the same light as questions of venue. In Long v. Robinson,396 a federal district court had ruled that
the Maryland laws that lowered the juvenile age limit from eighteen to
sixteen in Baltimore alone were unconstitutional. By a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, petitioner in Woodall v. Pettibone397 raised the question
whether Long would be applied retroactively. Craven held that a hearing for
the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction was a critical stage in the criminal
process, 398 because it was the juvenile's only chance to raise the defense of
390. 464 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867, 410 U.S. 969 (1972).
391. Id. at 1017. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
392. 464 F.2d at 1017.
393. Id. at 1018.

394. Id. at 1019-20.
395. Id. at 1020.
396. 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971). Under the laws

invalidated in Long, 16 and 17 year old juveniles arrested for crimes in Baltimore were tried as
adults, but persons of equal age tried outside of Baltimore were initially subject to the

jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.
397. 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
398. Judge Craven considered the result controlled by an earlier decision, Kemplen v.

Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of Kemplen, see text accompanying
notes 434-55 infra.
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diminished responsibility as a juvenile: 399 "To deny juveniles in Baltimore
the opportunity of such a defense and to allow it to all other juveniles in
Maryland seems to us so fundamentally unfair as to impeach the validity of
the 'adult' proceedings and render unreliable the guilty verdicts obtained in
these proceedings.' "0 The doubt thus cast on the adult convictions led
4
Craven to approve the retroactive application of Long. 01
The Woodall court recognized possible difficulties in implementing its
decision, and therefore ordered expunction of the improper convictions from
the records of affected persons who raised the issue. 40 2 The determination of
whether expunction was required was ordered to be done on a case-by-case
basis, 4°3 with an important consideration being "whether or not waiver to
the adult criminal courts would likely have been granted."4° Information
supplied by petitioner's counsel revealed that 122 persons would be affected
by the court's decision, and Judge Craven held that these persons could
benefit from the Woodall decision. 0 5 He suggested that these persons'
convictions would be prima facie null and void, but that the state would
have the opportunity to show that the juvenile court would have waived
jurisdiction to an adult court. 4'
Walden and Woodall show Judge Craven's great concern for the
elements that contribute to the inherent fairness of a trial. He recognized that
pretrial matters such as venue and jurisdiction play important roles in the
protection of the rights of an accused. As a complement to this concern for
the integrity of the trial, several of Craven's opinions revealed a preference
for disposing of charges by trial rather than by dismissal on threshold
grounds such as double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial. In UnitedStates
v. Smith,4°7 petitioner claimed that the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
399. 465 F.2d at 52.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. This solution allowed the state to avoid the task of discovering each improper
conviction. Id.
403. Id.

404. Id. at 53.
405. Id. These 122 people were either imprisoned, institutionalized, on probation or on
parole. Id.
406. Id. In deciding Woodall, Craven failed to anticipate one of its possible applications.
Petitioner in Douglas v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 399 F. Supp. I (D. Md. 1975), presented the

question of whether pre-Long convictions could be used for impeachment purposes in a trial
held before Long was decided. The district court, believing that Judge Craven had not considered this question when he stated in Woodall that the effect of the Maryland laws was to

impeach the validity of the adult convictions, declined to extend Woodall to this situation. Id.
at 9. The court was unwilling to increase the state's burden by applying Long to more than the

122 persons named in Woodall. Id. at 11. Furthermore, the court thought that in cases such as
petitioner's, imprisonment did not result solely from improper pre-Long convictions, but from
a fair trial. Id. at 11-12.
407. 390 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1968).
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amendment40 8 barred his retrial after the reversal of his conviction. At the
first trial of petitioner and his co-conspirators, the court had declared a
mistrial because several jurors had read a prejudicial newspaper article.
Petitioner, being tried by the judge alone, did not join in the motion for a
mistrial, but neither did he object to it. He was convicted at a second trial,
but the conviction was reversed and he raised the fifth amendment issue.
Taking note of the very heavy caseload in the district courts, Craven's
majority opinion pointed out that completion of petitioner's trial would have
resulted in separate trials for petitioner and some of his co-conspirators, with
the possibility of several undesirable consequences. 4°9 These considerations
and the fact that there was no unfair purpose behind the declaration of the
4 10
mistrial led Craven to approve a third trial for all defendants.
The sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial4 11 was at issue in
United States v. MacDonald.4 12 Unlike Smith, in which Judge Craven
approved a retrial over a colleague's dissent, the MacDonald court, with
Craven dissenting, held that defendant's right to a speedy trial had been
denied. These cases involved difficult issues of fact, and in each case,
Craven called for a trial on the merits. This inclination to have disputes
resolved by trial evinces a deep-seated belief in the value of courts as fact
408. The fifth amendment provides in part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ..
"U.S. CONST. amend. V.
409. 390 F.2d at 424. Because the trial was for conspiracy, Craven felt that separate jury
and non-jury trials might have removed "the sometimes helpful influence of the jury verdict on
the trial judge's findings on close, difficult questions of credibility, and the likelihood of
contradictory verdicts would have been enhanced." Id.
410. Id. Another case in which a petitioner sought to have his charge dismissed was
United States v. Davis, 369 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967). The jury
had acquitted petitioner of four counts of violating federal liquor laws, but it could not reach a
verdict on a fifth count, so a mistrial was declared. Petitioner asserted that collateral estoppel
should have prevented his retrial on the fifth count. The basis of this assertion was petitioner's
claim that the acquittals showed that the jury found as a fact that he was not present at the
illegal distillery and thus could not be guilty of the fifth count. The court, through Judge
Craven, recognized the possible validity of such an interpretation, but went on to show that
other valid interpretations were equally likely; he explained that the acquittals could have been
based on the jury's finding that petitioner had been present but had not committed the acts
charged in the other four counts. Id. at 778-80. Because the issue of petitioner's presence was
not necessarily the basis of the favorable verdicts, Craven refused to foreclose consideration of
this issue by dismissing the fifth charge. Id. at 780.
411. See note 391 supra.
412. 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977) (No. 75-1892).
MacDonald, a former Army doctor, was indicted for murder four and a half years after he had
been accused and detained by the Army for the same offenses. The Army dismissed the charges
against him, but investigations by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division and the FBI
continued sporadically. During this time, MacDonald sought to have the case resolved and did
nothing to contribute to the delay. The court found that the sixth amendment's guarantee of a
speedy trial applied to MacDonald. Id. at 208. In his dissent, Judge Craven disagreed at length
with the application of the sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial to the military
proceedings to which MacDonald had been subjected. See id. at 209-14 (Craven, J., dissenting).
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finders. Craven's confidence in the system's ability to reach a just decision 413 was likely a strong factor in his view of threshold challenges to
criminal proceedings.
Other pre-trial matters such as the composition and impartiality of the
jury were also subjects that seemed to be of great concern to Judge Craven.
In Witcher v. Peyton,414 petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that blacks were unlawfully excluded from the grand jury that indicted him
and from the venire from which his jury was selected. Although petitioner's
county had a population that was approximately one-quarter non-white, no
grand jury in the five years prior to his conviction had included more than
one black. About eight percent of the people on the jury list from which the
venire for his jury was chosen were black, and the fact that these people
were black was designated on the list. The seven people on the grand jury
that indicted petitioner included one black, and the venire of thirty-five
4 15
included three blacks, none of whom were selected to serve on the jury.
County officials testified that they did not select grand jurors or jurors at
random because they wanted to find the best qualified people. In addition,
they testified to the effect that race was indicated on the lists to avoid
discriminating against blacks.
In an earlier hearing, the court of appeals had held that petitioner's
pleadings stated a prima facie case of unlawful exclusion of blacks from
service on grand and petit juries. 416 On remand, the district court denied
relief, stating that petitioner had failed to establish deliberate and purposeful
discrimination. 417 Judge Craven concluded that blacks were substantially
underrepresented on petitioner's grand jury and on the venire from which his
jury was selected.4 18 Moreover, Craven found that this "[d]isproportionate
representation was recurrent, systematic and relatively uniform in degree." 4 19 In light of these findings, he held that the county officials' denials
420
of intentional discrimination did not negate petitioner's prima facie case.
He proceeded to highlight the importance of a truly representative jury:
"'Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any
413. See Paeanto Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 980.
414. 405 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1969).

415. Virginia law required that a grand jury consist of five to seven persons, VA. CODE §
19.2-195 (1975), with four votes necessary for an indictment, id. § 19.2-202. Thus, by limiting
the number of blacks on a grand jury, an indictment could be returned without the concurrence
of a black. 405 F.2d at 728. Similarly, the number of blacks on the venire was always less than
the number that could be peremptorily challenged. Id. at 728-29.

416. Witcher v. Peyton, 382 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1967).
417. 405 F.2d at 726.

418. Id. at 728.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 729.
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method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative
group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and
should be sturdily resisted.' "421
As shown by Witcher, Judge Craven felt that a representative jury was
essential to the integrity of trial by jury. Absence of prejudicial bias was
another element that he considered to be essential to the fairness of a jury
trial. Appellant in United States v. Johnson422 was black, and he requested
that his conviction be reversed because of the trial judge's failure to question
potential jurors about racial prejudice. In Ham v. South Carolina,423the
Supreme Court had held that under the facts presented to the Court,42 4 due
process required that a defendant be allowed to have the jurors questioned
about racial bias. Judge Craven, writing for the court in Johnson, agreed
with the Second Circuit4 25 that Ham did not establish a per se rule that
426
would call for reversal without regard to actual prejudice to the defendant.
In reversing Johnson's conviction, however, Craven predicted "that only in
the extremely unusual case will the prosecutor be able to sustain his heavy
burden of showing that the error [of failing to ask about racial prejudice] was
harmless." 427 Furthermore, although the judge must ask the question, not
every question suggested must be asked, and "[a] general query whether
any juror is unable to judge the case fairly because of race, creed or color of
the defendant should suffice. "428
Johnson can be seen as an extension of the concern for the integrity of
the jury that Judge Craven expressed in Witcher. United States v. Hankish429 showed that this concern extended beyond the time when the jury is
impaneled. On the second day of Hankish's trial, a local newspaper printed
421.

Id. at 728 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)). In a case that did

not involve a jury trial, the Fourth Circuit, per Judge Craven, held that defendant's intelligent
and voluntary guilty plea was valid despite the systematic exclusion of blacks from the grand

jury that indicted him. Parker v. Ross, 470 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1972).
422. 527 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1975).

423. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
424. These facts from Ham are set out in Johnson: defendant "was a bearded black and a
well-known civil rights worker charged with the possession of marijuana ....
527 F.2d at
1106. The court of appeals also noted that the racial composition of the jury and prosecution
witnesses was not mentioned. Id.
425. United States v. Grant, 494 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974).
426. 527 F.2d at 1106.
427. Id. at 1106-07.

428. Id.at 1107. Pursuant to this instruction about appropriate questions, a federal district
court upheld a state court judge who asked whether any member of the jury "would have any

problem rendering a fair and impartial verdict with the accused being a black man and the
alleged victim [of rape] being a white woman." Johnson v. Maryland, 425 F. Supp. 538,540-41
(D. Md. 1976). The court held that such questioning "more than met the suggestion of the

Fourth Circuit in United States v. Johnson." Id. at 541.
429. 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1974).
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an article that described Hankish as a racketeer who directed a large theft
ring. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request for the judge to
question the jurors to see whether any of them had read or discussed the
article. On appeal, Hankish and a codefendant claimed that this refusal was
error, and Judge Craven agreed: "To put into the jury box an impression
that Hankish was a racketeer and director of a multistate theft ring, and the
implication that Matthews [the codefendant] was a participant, is highly
prejudicial." 430
Adopting the practice of the Seventh Circuit, 4 31 Judge Craven set out
for the first time the procedure to be followed in the Fourth Circuit when
there is a possibility that the jury has received prejudicial information:
"[Wihen highly prejudicial information may have been exposed to the jury,
the court must ascertain the extent and effect of the infection, and thereafter,
in its sound discretion, take appropriate measures to assure a fair trial.'432
In recognition of the fact that not all newspaper articles that appear during
trial are prejudicial to the defendant, Craven held that this procedure need be
433
followed only when "there is substantial reason to fear prejudice."
As in the cases that dealt with venue and jurisdiction, the cases that
bolstered defendant's jury trial rights demonstrated Judge Craven's insistence upon maintaining the integrity of the trial. These decisions attest to his
strong desire to afford the criminal defendant a fair trial. Probably the most
effective way of safeguarding the rights of defendants is to provide assistance of counsel, and in Kemplen v Maryland434 Craven contributed to the
expansion of the right to counsel. Kemplen involved the rights of a juvenile
at the hearing in which the juvenile court could waive jurisdiction and allow
the juvenile to be tried as an adult. At the hearing, petitioner was not told of
his right to counsel, nor did the court appoint counsel for him. Petitioner's
hearing was held prior to the decision in In re Gault,435 which held that due
process rights, including notice and counsel, are required at proceedings that
determine delinquency. The district court denied Kemplen's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Gault, if applicable to waiver
hearings, should not be applied retroactively. 436 Judge Craven's opinion for
430. Id. at 76.
431. See Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833
(1969).
432. 502 F.2d at 77 (citations omitted).
433. Id. (citations omitted). Several Fourth Circuit cases have followed the rule adopted in
Hankish. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976); Martin v. United States, 528
F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1015 (1975).
434. 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).

435. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
436. Kemplen v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Md. 1969).
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the court of appeals reversed this decision and held that the requirements of
Gault were applicable to waiver hearings and that Gault was to be applied
43 7
retroactively.
In analyzing whether Gault would apply to waiver hearings, Judge
Craven started from the position that Gault demands full due process at any
438
juvenile court proceeding that can affect the juvenile's substantial rights.
Because the waiver hearing can determine the extent of punishment that a
juvenile can receive upon conviction,4 39 Craven found the hearing to be a
critical stage in the process of determining guilt: "[lit seems to us nothing
can be more critical to the accused than determining whether there will be a
guilt determining process in an adult-type criminal trial."44 Craven also
equated counsel's role at sentencing to the role counsel could play at a
waiver hearing, providing favorable information to the court in order to
suggest possible methods of rehabilitation. 441 Moreover, counsel could
assist the juvenile in the assertion of the defense of diminished responsibility
because of juvenile status.' 2 In view of these considerations, the court held
that the right to counsel, either appointed or retained, was applicable to
waiver hearings. 443 To ensure the full value of this right, Craven also held
that due process requires that the juvenile, parents and counsel be given
adequate notice of the proceeding.'"
Turning to the issue of the retroactivity of Gault,445 Judge Craven
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Stovall v. Denno 446 for the
criteria used in such decisions: " '(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards.' "447 Craven declared that the
purpose of the new rule was to maintain the fundamental fairness of the
waiver proceeding. 448 The retroactive application of the Supreme Court's
right to counsel cases449 heavily influenced a decision in favor of retroactivi437. 428 F.2d at 175-77.

438. Id.at 173.
439. Id. at 174 (citing Law of April 27, 1945, ch. 797, sec. 1,§ 48K, 1945 Md. Laws 967
(formerly codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. XXVI, § 61 (1957) (repealed 1969)).
440. Id.
441. Id. at 174-75.

442. Id. at 175.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Craven noted that other courts had split on this issue. Id. at 175 n.15.

446. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
447. 428 F.2d at 176 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 297).
448. Id.
449. See, e.g., Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393
U.S. 2 (1968); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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ty under the first criterion.4 50 As to the second factor, reliance, Craven
stated: "Longstanding reliance is clearly not enough to overbalance the
individual's right to counsel at a critical point in a criminal action against
him."451 Similarly, in considering the third criterion, Craven felt that any
disruption would not be severe enough to justify ignoring people who had
been imprisoned because they were not represented by counsel at juvenile
waiver hearings. 452 On the basis of this analysis, Craven held for the court
that the requirements of counsel and notice at waiver hearings would be
453
applied retroactively.
Kemplen was a significant extension of the right to counsel under the
rule established by Mempa v. Rhay, 454 in which the Supreme Court held
that "appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be
affected." 455 In contrast to the broad reading of Mempa adopted in Kemplen, Judge Craven's opinion in Bearden v. South Carolina45 6 rests on an
extremely narrow45 7 interpretation of Mempa.
Bearden presented the question whether states are required to appoint
counsel for indigents faced with possible parole revocation. Judge Craven
began his analysis by construing Mempa to apply only to the right to
counsel at sentencing deferred subject to probation. 458 His opinion recognized, as in Kemplen, that Mempa summarized the Supreme Court's right
to counsel cases as requiring counsel" 'at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.' "I"5
Despite this recognition, Craven expressed his belief that the result in
Mempa was based on an assumption that appointed trial counsel would not
450. 428 F.2d at 176-77.

451. Id.at 177.
452. Id.
453. Id. Craven went on to suggest a remedy for petitioners who asserted claims under the

decision in Kemplen. Under his suggested procedure, either a state court or a federal district
court would reconstruct the circumstances at the waiver hearing and determine whether the
judge would have waived juvenile jurisdiction if he could have considered all of the information

that competent counsel might reasonably have put before him at the time. Id. at 178. If the
reviewing court should find that waiver was inappropriate, the subsequent conviction would be
vacated. Id. The conviction would stand, however, if the court should find that waiver was

appropriate. Id.
454. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).

455. Id.at 134. This decision guaranteed the right to counsel at probation revocation
hearings.
456. 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916, cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 972

(1972).
457.
Winter,
458.
459.

Craven's interpretation was termed "niggardly" in the dissenting opinion of Judges
Sobeloff and Butzner. Id. at 1096 (Winter, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 1091.
Id. (quoting Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134).
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be overly burdened by continuing representation at deferred sentencing
proceedings and on the fact that certain rights might be waived if not
asserted at these proceedings. 460 By not interpreting Mempa as a decision
based on an accused's right to continued liberty, as the dissent did, 461
Craven's opinion was able to avoid requiring counsel at all parole revocation
hearings because of the burden such a requirement would impose on the
original trial counsel. 462
In holding that the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment do not require states to provide counsel to indigent
parolees at revocation hearings, 463 Judge Craven acknowledged that the
appointment of counsel may be required in certain situations.' 44 To decide
465
when counsel would be required, he adopted a case-by-case approach,
suggesting two situations that might necessitate the appointment of counsel:
(1) instances in which the parolee denies violating the conditions of parole,
and (2) cases in which "the fairness of the proceeding would be impaired by
counsel's absence." 466 Craven also indicated that the assistance of a parole
or probation officer might be sufficient to meet the requirements of funda467
mental fairness and due process.
Bearden thus applies a quite limited right to counsel to suspected
parole violators. Judge Craven gave assurances4 68 that Bearden was not a
469
rejection of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hewett v. North Carolina,
which relied heavily on Mempa to extend the right to counsel to probation
revocation proceedings. Although it is true that Bearden does not detract
from Hewett, Bearden does seem to deviate from the intent shown in
Hewett and Kemplen to follow Mempa by applying the right to counsel to
all criminal proceedings.
Although Bearden showed that Judge Craven was unwilling to apply
the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel to all possible
situations, he did believe that the right should not be diminished by attempts
460. Id. at 1092.
461. Id. at 1097 (Winter, J., dissenting).
462. Id. at 1092-93. The court also mentioned the administrative nature of a parole revocation proceeding and the parens patriae relationship between a parole board and a parolee. Id. at
1093.

463. Id.at 1093.
464. Id. at 1094-95.

465. Id.at 1095.
466. Id. at 1094-95. These two situations were noted in Jones v. Rivers in the concurring
opinions of Judges Sobeloff, 338 F.2d 862, 878 (4th Cir. 1964) (violating conditions of parole)

(Sobeloff, J., concurring), and Haynsworth, id. at 879 (fairness of the proceeding) (Haynsworth, J., concurring).
467. 443 F.2d at 1095.
468. Id. at 1094.
469. 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
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to prevent defendants from consulting with their attorneys. In Geders v.
United States, 470 the Supreme Court held that a trial judge who ordered a
defendant not to consult with his attorney during an overnight recess denied
that defendant his right under the sixth amendment. Geders expressly
reserved the question whether this right would be denied by such an order
during a short recess during the trial day. 47 1 This question arose first in the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Allen.472 During defendant's testimony,
the court took two short recesses, and the judge directed defendant not to
talk to anyone during the recesses.
Judge Craven's approach to the issue began with an examination of the
nature of the sixth amendment right to counsel. In his view, "It is so
fundamental that there should never occur any interference with it for any
length of time, however brief, absent some compelling reason." 473 The
reason asserted to justify the prohibition was fear that the defense attorney
474
would improperly coach the defendant in order to shape his testimony.
Craven was unimpressed by this reason, pointing out that the probability of
such occurrences was low, that improper coaching during a short recess was
unlikely to be effective, that the prosecutor could cross-examine a defendant
about any coaching and then impeach his credibility, and that any plan to
testify falsely was likely to be completed before trial. 475 He therefore held
unconstitutional restrictions on a defendant's right to talk to counsel during
short recesses. 476 This extension of Geders, in addition to protecting defendants' sixth amendment rights, avoids burdening the courts with claims
477
of prejudice resulting from prohibiting a defendant to talk to his lawyer.
Through his decisions in Kemplen and Allen, Judge Craven helped
broaden the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to the assistance of
counsel. Even the assistance of an attorney may not suffice to protect the
rights of the defendant, however, in cases that involve misconduct by the
prosecution. In such instances, only the later review of an appellate court
may be able to negate the prejudicial effects of such actions. Judge Craven
authored several opinions in cases of this sort and, like the draft cases
involving the misleading information defense, 478 these opinions demand
"fair play" in criminal trials.
470. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
471. Id. at 89 n.2.
472. 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977).
473. Id.at 633.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. M. at 634. The court applied the new rule prospectively, holding it applicable only to
trials held after its decision. Id.
477. Id. at 633.
478. See text accompanying notes 348-57 supra.
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Petitioner in Ganger v. Peyton479 was convicted of assaulting his wife.
At the time of trial, the prosecuting attorney was also representing Ganger's
wife in a pending divorce action. The district judge found that the prosecutor
had offered to drop the assault charge if Ganger would agree to a property
settlement in the divorce action. Affirming the lower court's decision to
vacate Ganger's conviction, Judge Craven held that the "conflict of interest
clearly denied Ganger the possibility of fair minded exercise of the prosecutor's discretion" 480 in such matters as whether to prosecute, whether to
reduce the charge, and whether to make a sentencing recommendation. 48 1 In
light of these circumstances, even though Ganger received only a six month
sentence upon conviction of a lesser assault, Craven felt that the court could
not assume that the prosecutor's improper conduct had been harmless.4 82
The misconduct of the prosecutor in Ganger was rather blatant. In
Boone v. Paderick,483 the misconduct was more subtle, but Judge Craven
found it to be no less prejudicial. Prior to trial, a detective promised a
prosecution witness leniency in return for cooperation. At the habeas corpus
proceeding, the prosecutor did not deny knowledge of this promise, although his closing argument at trial had pictured the witness as testifying
against his penal interest because of his conscience and civic duty. The
484
witness had also denied any promise of leniency.
The Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States48 5 found a denial of due
process in the prosecution's failure to inform the jury of an agreement not to
prosecute a government witness when knowledge of the agreement would
have been reasonably likely to change the verdict. In a two-step analysis,
Judge Craven first determined that Giglio applied to the situation in Boone
because "the jury may have been falsely led to believe that [the witness]
was motivated solely by conscience and altruism and that there was no deal
when in truth he responded to [the detective's] promises.''486 The basis of
this determination was a finding that the witness' denial of a promise, when
joined with the prosecutor's inaccurate description of the witness' motivation for testifying, amounted to "false evidence of which the prosecutor
4 87
knew or should have known."
479. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).

480. Id. at 712.
481. Id. at 713.
482. Id. at 714.

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
Id. at 449-50.
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
541 F.2d at 450 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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The second step of the analysis, which would control the grant of a new
trial, involved a determination of whether the false testimony could have
been reasonably likely to affect the judgment of the jury. 48 Judge Craven
found that the witness' testimony was the most incriminating evidence that
the prosecution had. 48 9 Moreover, he believed that with the evidence of the
promise and without the prosecutor's inaccurate claims during his closing
argument supporting the witness' credibility, a reasonable likelihood existed
that the jury's verdict would have been different. 4 ° Craven held that the
withheld evidence was sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.4 9'
UnitedStates v. Sutton4 92 involved a claim similar to the one raised in
Boone. The petitioner alleged that an FBI agent had threatened a witness
with prosecution in order to convince him to testify against petitioner. The
prosecutor did not know of the threat, and he told the jury that the witness
had not been threatened. Judge Craven held for the court that what the agent
knew was imputed to the prosecutor. 493 As in Boone, the witness' testimony
was crucial to conviction. Craven concluded that the jury's decision might
have changed if the jury had been aware of the witness' fear of prosecution,
for this fear detracted from his credibility.4 94
Ganger, Boone and Sutton involved prosecutorial misconduct during
trial. It is common knowledge that in most jurisdictions, the majority of
defendants plead guilty and never go to trial. Many of these pleas are the
result of plea bargaining, a process that seems to work best when all
promises are fully disclosed and recorded. Failure to do so can lead to a later
challenge of the plea, which necessitates further adjudication. Judge Craven
recognized the utility of plea bargaining, and he was a strong advocate of its
proper implementation. In one of his opinions, he made the following
remarks:
We think that plea bargaining serves a useful purpose both for
society and the prisoner and is a permanent part of the criminal
courtroom scene, but we think that it ought to be brought out into
the open. We do not suggest that defense counsel and the prosecutor actually conduct their negotiations in open court, but we do
urge that in this circuit a full and complete disclosure of such
negotiations be announced to the court and made a part of the
record. The matter is, after all, public business, and we deplore the
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. at 451 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 451-53.
See id.
542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).

493. Id. at 1241 n.2.
494. Id. at 1243.
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hypocrisy of silent pretense that it has not occurred ...
[D]isclosure would enable the trial judge to exercise a proper
controlling influence and to reject any such arrangement
he
495
deemed unfair either to the defendant or to the public.
Being only advice, these urgings were not always followed. In Walters v.
Harris,496 Craven ordered the expansion of the district courts' rule 1149
inquiry in an attempt to ensure the disclosure of any plea bargain.
Petitioner in Walters asserted that he pleaded guilty in exchange for a
ten-year sentence. He claimed that five witnesses, including his attorney,
heard an Assistant United States Attorney confirm the bargain. When he
pleaded guilty, petitioner said that no promises had been made to him and
that he understood that the judge had complete control over the length of his
sentence. Judge Craven held that it was error for the district court to dismiss
the petition solely because Walters had denied that his plea was induced by
any promises. 498 Craven observed that compliance with rule 11 procedure
cannot always justify summary dismissal of attacks on guilty pleas:
Examination of the defendant alone will not always bring out into
the open a promise that has induced his guilty plea. It is well known
that a defendant will sometimes deny the existence of a bargain
that has in fact occurred . . . out of fear that a truthful response
would jeopardize the bargain. . . .The danger that a Rule 11

inquiry will not uncover a plea bargain is sufficient that the defendant's responses alone to a general Rule 11 inquiry cannot be considered conclusive evidence that no bargaining has occurred. 499
To remedy this lack of certainty, Judge Craven's opinion ordered
district court judges to expand their rule 11 inquiries. 50° The judges were
instructed to ask the prosecutor, the defendant and the defense counsel
whether plea bargaining had taken place.5 0' Then, before receiving a response, the judge should advise the parties that the Supreme Court has
approved plea bargaining and that any bargain should be revealed without
fear of the court's disapproval. 50 2 In Craven's view, "[A] negative response
495. United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940,948-49 (4th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (footnotes and

citations omitted).
496. 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).
497. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(d). Pursuant to rule 11, the trial judge must find that the guilty plea

was made intelligently and voluntarily. To do so, the judge must: (1) speak to the defendant to
inform him of and to determine his understanding of the nature of the charged offense and the
consequence of pleading guilty to it; and (2) address the defendant personally to determine that

the plea is voluntary and not coerced in any manner.
498. 460 F.2d at 992-93.

499. Id.at 993 (citations omitted).
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
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to such an inquiry would finally conclude the subject matter and prevent
subsequent litigation. '503
Several cases have extended the ideas that Judge Craven propounded in
Walters. 5 4 This line of cases, which ends with the Supreme Court's
decision in Allison v. Blackledge,50 5 firmly established the proposition that
a defendant's answers to the inquiries that seek to document the knowing
and voluntary nature of his guilty plea are not conclusive under all circumstances.
Convictions obtained through guilty pleas obviate much of the need to
present evidence. Ina full trial, however, the presentation of evidence and
the evidentiary rulings of the court can be of the utmost importance. With
respect to testimony about the identification of defendants, two of Judge
Craven's opinions meshed with decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit
to formulate jury instructions to be used with such testimony. In the first of
Craven's decisions, UnitedStates v. Levi, 506 the court of appeals found that
the evidence, which included eyewitness identification testimony by one
witness, was sufficient for conviction. Because of the frequency of appeals
disputing the sufficiency of such identification testimony, Craven adopted a
rule that required trial judges, on request, to give a special instruction to the
jury when the defendant has raised the issue of his identification. 07 This
rule, designed by the District of Columbia Circuit, instructed the judge to
tell the jury
(1) "that the evidence raises the question of whether the defendant
was in fact the criminal actor and necessitates the juror's resolving
any conflict in testimony upon this issue," and (2) "that the burden
of proof is upon the prosecution with reference to every element of
the crime charged and this burden includes the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime charged." 508
503. Id.
504. In Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975), the court adopted the

following rule: "[Tihe accuracy and truth of an accused's statements at a Rule 11 proceeding in
which his guilty plea is accepted are 'conclusively' established by that proceeding unless and
until he makes some reasonable allegation why this should not be so." Id. at 350 (citation
omitted). Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976),
involved the claims of two petitioners. As to the state petitioner, the court held that because the
trial judge had not asked specifically about the existence of a plea bargain, the petitioner would
be allowed a chance to show that his plea was involuntarily induced by his attorney's promise of
a certain sentence. Id. at 1377. The court held that the second petitioner, a federal prisoner,
could challenge his answers at his guilty plea proceeding if the answers were not true but merely
intended to assure the acceptance of the plea. Id. at 1380. The court extended this aspect of
Edwards to state prisoners in Allison v. Blackledge, 553 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1976), which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
505. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
506. 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968).
507. Id. at 382.
508. Id. at 382-83 (quoting Jones v. United States, 361 F.2d 537, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
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Craven also decreed that a district court should not allow a criminal case to
go to the jury when the prosecution relied on the identification testimony of
a single eyewitness unless the judge "is himself persuaded by the demeanor,
appearance and degree of apparent certainty of the witness, and by other
factors affecting the integrity of the identification, that in all probability it is

correct.' 59
The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in United States v. Telfaire5 10 viewed the decision in Levi as "the correct approach,''511 and
extended the reasoning of Levi by requiring, in effect, that the Levi
instruction to the trial judge be used by the judge to instruct the jury. For this
purpose, the court adopted a flexible model instruction. Judge Craven's next
opinion on this topic in United States v. Holley5 12 "agree[d] that to guard
against misidentification and the conviction of the innocent it is not enough
that the trial judge himself be specifically alerted to the detailed factors that
enter into the totality of the circumstances, but that the jury should also be so
charged." 5 1 3 To achieve this result, Craven approved the Telfaire rule and
held that the substantial equivalent of the model instruction, with appropriate modifications to reflect differing circumstances, should be given any
5 14
time the identity of the defendant is at issue.
In Levi and Holley, Judge Craven sought to protect the defendants
from the risk of conviction based on uncertain eyewitness identification
testimony. He contemplated the trial judge providing this protection through
suitable instructions to the jury. In cases of this sort, when the main issue
was the credibility of the identification testimony, Craven sought to afford
defendants substantial protection in order to reduce the likelihood that an
innocent person would be convicted. This approach was similar to his
approach in cases in which the issue was whether the identification tes509. Id. at 383. Craven expanded on this notion:
In deciding whether to permit a criminal case to go to the jury, where identification
rests upon the testimony of one witness, the district judge ought to consider with
respect to identification testimony the lapse of time between the occurrence of the

crime and the first confrontation, the opportunity during the crime to identify as
compared with the opportunity of other witnesses who may be unable to do so, the

reasons, if any, for failure to conduct a line-up or use similar techniques short of lineup, and the district judge's own appraisal of the capacity of the identifying witness to
observe and remember facial and other features. In short, the district judge should

concern himself as to whether the totality of the circumstances "give[s] rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."

Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (citations and footnotes
omitted)).
510. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
511. Id. at 555 n.5.
512. 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974).

513. Id. at 275.
514. Id.
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timony should be excluded because it arose out of impermissibly suggestive
circumstances. Craven was not a great proponent of the exclusionary rules
of evidence. Although he was sometimes forced by precedent of the Supreme Court to "vote to let the criminal go free because the constable
blundered,''515 the opinions that he authored rarely did so. Nevertheless,
these opinions do not reflect any less concern for avoiding the conviction of
innocent defendants than do his decisions about the credibility of identification testimony.
In Patlerv. Slayton,5 16 two women had seen a person near the scene of
the crime for which Patler stood trial. They each viewed Patler at improper
show-ups, but the trial judge allowed them to testify only to what they saw
at the scene of the crime and how it compared to Patler's appearance.
Consequently, neither was subsequently able to identify him positively at
trial. One testified that the person she saw "looked something like" petitioner, and the other said "only that the appearance of Patler was not 'in
conflict' with the person she had seen." 5 17 Because of the trial judge's
actions and the lack of positive identification testimony, Judge Craven
declined to apply the Wade-Gilbert1 8 exclusionary rule.5 19 Even though the
police had committed flagrant violations of the show-up standards, Craven
held that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule was served by the
520
trial judge's refusal to allow any testimony from the show-ups.
A judge sitting without a jury convicted petitioner in Smith v.
Paderick.5 21 Judge Craven felt that the identification testimony was the
result of a confrontation that was" 'unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification.' "522 Although such evidence should
have been excluded if the trial had been to a jury, Craven held that a
different standard applied to a trial before a judge.5 23 He pointed out that a
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to reduce
the very appreciable danger of convicting the innocent. Positive
identification testimony is the most dangerous evidence known to
515. Paean to Pragamatism,supra note 1, at 978.
516. 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974).

517. Id. at 477.
518. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

Under the Wade-Gilbert rule, positive identification testimony would have been excluded
because it was obtained through an identification procedure at which Patler was denied the
informed presence of counsel.
519. 503 F.2d at 476.

520. Id. at 477.
52.

519 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 (1975).

522. Id. at 74 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 302) (footnote omitted). The witness
had been unable to identify petitioner until petitioner was seen with three codefendants
previously identified by the witness.
523. Id. at 75.
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the law. That is true because it is easier to deceive ourselves than
others:

. .

a potential witness may be readily receptive to subtle,

even circumstantial, insinuation that the person viewed is the culprit. . .. [S]uch a witness.

.

. is

usually totally unaware of all the

influences that result in his say[ing], "That is the man." And that
enables him to speak 52with
conviction and utter honesty-further
4
enhancing the danger.
Because experienced trial judges are aware of this danger and put such
evidence in a proper light, Craven thought that they could hear evidence that
would be excluded at a jury trial. 51 Craven's decision in Smith was
reinforced by the fact that the trial judge had indicated that the verdict was
based on the evidence as a whole, with little reliance on the identification
testimony.5 26 Thus, as in Patler, Craven saw little probability that the
527
identification testimony caused the conviction of an innocent man.
An exclusionary rule is also applicable to cases that involve defendants' rights under the fourth amendment. Judge Craven's written decisions
in cases involving defendants' fourth amendment rights seem to show an
even greater reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule than do his identification cases. 528 In Anglin v. Director, Patuxent Institution,529 the police
presented petitioner's wife with a search warrant describing twenty-seven
items stolen in a burglary. She misunderstood the scope of the warrant and
helped the police identify over seven hundred pieces of stolen property,
which the police seized. As a result, Anglin was convicted of theft offenses
in addition to the one that was under investigation when the police obtained
the search warrant.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Anglin claimed that his
home had been subjected to a general exploratory search and seizure of
property not particularly described in the search warrant. In analyzing this
contention, Judge Craven stated that the seizure must be judged "on the
basis of whether it was an unreasonable extension of the valid power
contained in the search warrant."530 Because the warrant authorized entry
into the home, Craven felt that the large seizure did not exceed the limits of
524. Id. (footnote omitted).

525. Id.
526. Id. at 75-76.

527. Id. at 76.
528. It should be recognized that in those cases in which Judge Craven wrote opinions
upholding the introduction of various types of evidence, he was not ignoring any clear-cut
mandates of the Supreme Court. If such mandates were applicable to a case, he voted in
accordance with them. See Paean to Pragmatism, supra note I, at 978. Nevertheless, it is
possible to detect patterns in his decisions that were not dictated by binding precedent.

529. 439 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).
530. Id. at 1346.
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the warrant. 531 In reaching this conclusion, he treated as "almost dictum" 532
the following language in the Supreme Court's decision in Marron v.United
States:533 "The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant." 5 34 In addition to this extremely narrow reading of Marron,
Craven also pointed to other decisions that have created exceptions to this
broad ban. 535 Under the rationale of the plain view doctrine, 536 for example,
he reasoned that the search warrant gave the officers a "right to be in the
position" to see the seized items; thus there should be no need to obtain
another warrant to seize what was found in the course of the lawful
53 7
search.
Judge Craven thought that excluding evidence obtained in a lawful
search because the items were not described in the warrant would "tempt
the police to proceed without a warrant, for even now searches incident to
arrest are not so confined. . . .To hold otherwise will again put a premium
on search incident to arrest at the expense of the warrant procedure contemplated by the amendment itself.' '538
A warrantless search was the subject of United States v. Epperson ,539
in which defendant appealed his conviction for attempting to board an
531.

Id.

532. Id. at 1347.
533. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
534. Id. at 196.

535. 439 F.2d at 1347 (citing Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1967); Seymour
v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1966); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1964); United States v. Garris, 262 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1966)).
536. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).

537. 439 F.2d at 1347.
538. Id. at 1347-48. In United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 830 (1971), Judge Craven was again faced with a contention that a seizure of evidence was
beyond the scope of the search warrant. Appellants were convicted of federal gambling

charges. Included in the evidence introduced at trial was testimony about telephone conversations that FBI agents had with people who called the residence of one of the defendants during

an authorized search of the residence. The warrant contained a generalized description of items
relating to bookmaking operations; appellants contended that the seizure of the telephone
conversations was outside the authorization of the warrant under Marron.

Writing for the court, Judge Craven distinguished Marron on the grounds that the warrant
involved there was very specific and that the items seized were too unrelated to the specified
articles. Id. at 760. On the other hand, in Fuller, "[The description is necessarily general and
clearly contemplates that material relating to gambling activity but not precisely described
might be seized." Id. Because the telephone calls were part of the gambling operation, Craven

held that they were within the scope of the warrant. Id.
539. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
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aircraft engaged in interstate commerce while carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. Defendant was going towards his flight when he passed a
United States Marshal who was operating a magnetometer, an instrument
used to detect metal. The magnetometer indicated a very high reading, and
the marshal asked defendant if he had a large amount of metal. Epperson
displayed some metal objects, but the reading remained high. The marshal
then searched the jacket that Epperson was carrying and discovered a loaded
pistol. On appeal, Epperson contended that the use of the magnetometer was
an illegal warrantless search under the fourth amendment.
Judge Craven, writing for the court, agreed that such use of the
magnetometer was a search but held that it came within the exception to the
warrant requirement 54° established by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio.541 In Terry, the Court sustained convictions stemming from a police
officer's warrantless frisk of the outer clothing of two men who he thought
were about to commit a crime. Craven explained that "[t]he limited scope
and purpose of the search plus the element of danger and the necessity for
swift action excused getting a warrant in Terry. "542 In the case of airport
magnetometer searches, the warrant requirement was likewise excused
because of the government's compelling interest in preventing the dangers
543
of air piracy and because of the minor nature of the search's intrusion.
Judge Craven also determined that the search was reasonable under the
balancing test set out in Terry, a balancing of "the governmental interest in
searching against the invasion of privacy which the search entails." 544 In
meeting this test, Craven found the search to be "justified at its inception" 54' and "limited in scope to the circumstances which justified the
546
interference in the first place."
Judge Craven's decisions in these search and seizure cases seem to give
a great deal of consideration to the practical difficulties of law enforcement.
At the same time, however, he attempted to maintain the required balance of
individual rights. His practical approach is reflected by this quotation from
Anglin: " 'There is no war between the Constitution and common

sense.' "547
540. Id. at 770.
541.
542.
543.
544.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
454 F.2d at 771.
Id.
Id.

545. Id. at 772.
546. Id.
547. 439 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)).
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FEDERAL PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION: STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION AND AGENCY DECISIONMAKING

Perhaps in no other area of the law was Judge Craven's compassion and
sensitivity to people's problems more pronounced than in his review of
administrative and district court decisions denying claimants benefits provided under federal protective legislation. 548 In these cases the plaintiffs
characteristically had suffered serious physical injury but had been denied
benefits by an agency or district court through an unfavorable construction
of the relevant statute. 549 Presented with such a denial of benefits, Judge
Craven seemed willing to strain statutory interpretation in order to bring
claimants within the coverage of relevant statutes. 550 Judge Craven's aggressive approach in this area at times met with disapproval.
When the internal logic of a statutory scheme threatened a worthy
claim that seemed to fall within the policy of the statute, Judge Craven
tended to avoid the technically correct result and permit recovery. Implicit
in such holdings was the notion that to follow unswervingly the logical
implications of statutory language was not expressive of congressional
intent. At any rate, Judge Craven was not to be the one to assent to a
"technically correct" interpretation that denied a deserving claimant recovery. If, in such instances, there was indeed some substantive policy to be
implemented through a technical interpretation of federal protective legislation, he was willing to let the Supreme Court or Congress instruct him.
In Leftwich v. Gardner55 1 a claimant for social security disability
benefits could medically establish that he was permanently disabled within
the meaning of the statute. 552 Despite his considerable injuries, he managed
to hold down a full-time job as a dishwasher.5 53 The court of appeals was
548. E.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1397f (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1977 &
Supp. Pamphlet Nos. 2, 3).

549. This section will deal only with cases in which claimants were physically injured. For
similar cases dealing with economic injury, see Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490

(4th Cir. 1972) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Belton v. Traynor, 381 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act); Edwards v. Southern Ry., 376 F.2d 665 (4th Cir.
1967) (Interstate Commerce Act); United States v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 371 F.2d 705 (4th

Cir. 1967) (Walsh-Healy Act). Claimants in these cases were granted recovery on appeal.
550. Judge Craven was equally vigorous in his review of agency fact findings where
claimants had been denied benefits because of failure of proof. See Breeden v. Weinberger, 493
F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1974); Brandon v. Gardner, 377 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1967); Carico v. Gardner,
377 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1967).
551. 377 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967).
552. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970) provides in relevant part: "The term 'disability'

means-(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment .

.. "

553. Claimant, a disabled coalminer, had obtained his job at the Pinecrest Sanitarium
through political connections; however, his "position was not a 'made' job involving minimal or

PORTRAIT OF A PRAGMATIST

1978]

295

asked to decide whether the claimant's ability to hold down a full-time job
negated his medical proof that he was "unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity" as required by the statute. 554 To Judge Craven the solution
to this problem was clear:
In this unusual social security case, claimant Leftwich was denied
disability benefits at the administrative level largely because he has
the admirable motivation to insist upon working for the support of
his family despite physical inability to do so. There is more logic
than common sense in such a result,
and there is irony not intend555
ed, we think, by the Congress.
Technically, it would seem that claimant's ability to hold down a job would
belie his contention that he was unable to "engage in substantial gainful
activity" as required by the statute. 556 Nevertheless, Judge Craven felt that
those who would have qualified for benefits, but for their sheer determination to hold down a job, should not be penalized for their admirable
perseverance. Thus, he held in Leftwich that when a claimant could medically establish the requisite disability he would be deemed to have satisfied
the statutory standard despite his ability to work full time: 557 "We think the
Congress did not intend to exclude from the benefits of the Act those
persons who because of character and a sense of responsibility for their
558
dependents are most deserving."
Congressional response to the decision in Leftwich was swift and to the
point. It was overruled by 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act that
gave the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the power to provide
by regulation "the criteria for determining when services performed or
earnings derived from services demonstrate an individual's ability to engage
in substantial gainful activity." 559 Congress intended by these amendments
to make clear that "an individual who does substantial gainful work despite
an impairment. . . that otherwise might be considered disabling"56° is not
trifling tasks which make little or no demand on the individual and are of little or no utility to his
employer.

. .

."

377 F.2d at 289. The regulations provide that such "made work" "does not

demonstrate ability to engage in substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1532(d) (1977).
554. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
555. 377 F.2d at 288.
556. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
557. In support of its decision the court relied upon Hanes v. Celebrezze, 337 F.2d 209 (4th
Cir. 1964), and Flemming v. Booker, 283 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1960). In Hanes, however,
claimant's position involved very few duties that were often performed by his family. In
Flemming, the court borrowed the test of disability utilized in insurance policies to support its
conclusion that claimant's employment did not rebut substantial medical proof of his disability.
558. 377 F.2d at 291.
559. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(4) (1970); see Harris v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971)
(discussing effect of 1967 amendments on Leftwich).
560. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1967), reprintedin [19671 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2834, 2883.
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5 61
disabled within the meaning of the stafute.
In Smith v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 562 a Federal Employers
Liability Act 563 (FELA) case, the court of appeals was asked to consider
whether plaintiff Smith sustained his injuries while an " 'employee' of the
railroad within the meaning of the Act." '564 At the time he sustained his
injuries Smith was not directly employed by the railroad; rather, he was an
employee of a firm that unloaded automobiles for Norfolk and Western
Railway Company at a place in North Carolina. As he worked on the top tier
of an automobile-carrying railroad car, Smith fell to the ground and was
injured. The facts in Smith, then, posed a difficult question regarding the
scope of coverage afforded to injured workers like Smith by the statutory
language, which gave a cause of action for negligence against the railroad to
those workers who suffered injury "while. . . employed" by the railroad.
In effect, the court in Smith had to determine what definition of the
employment relation would satisfy the "while employed" clause of the
FELA565 in those instances when the injured worker was not directly
employed by the railroad.
Judge Craven, speaking for a unanimous panel, adopted a broad definition of "employment" that significantly extended the coverage of the Act.
According to Judge Craven, "if the injured worker [was] employed by an
agent or adjunct of the railroad he will be treated as an employee of the
railroad for purposes of the Act.'"566 In support of this proposition Judge
Craven cited a line of cases from the Sixth Circuit that, under similar
circumstances, had found the plaintiff to be an employee of the railroad for
purposes of the Act. 567 Judge Craven read these cases as establishing that
"traditional concepts of agency extend the coverage of the Act.''568
561.

The regulations adopted by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant

to his authority under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A),(1970) adhere to congressional intent. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1532 to .1534 (1977). Id. § 404.1532(a) provides in part:

If an individual performed work during any period in which he alleges that he was
under a disability . . . the work performed may demonstrate that such individual has
ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. If the work performed establishes that

an individual . . . is able to engage in substantial gainful activity, he is not under a
disability.
562. 407 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969).
563. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970). Section 51 provides in relevant part: "Every common
carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate] commerce. . . shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce." Id. § 51.
564. 407 F.2d at 502.
565. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).

566. 407 F.2d at 502.
567. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Barlion, 172 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1949); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Roth,
163 F.2d 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830 (1947); Cimorelli v. New York Cent. R.R.,
148 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1945).
568. 407 F.2d at 502.
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In fact, the use of agency concepts to determine when the coverage of
the Act "extends. . .to those injured workers not directly employed by the
railroad itself' 569 was a novel interpretation of the Act.57 Prior case law had
analyzed such "three-party relationship[s] between two employers and a
worker" 57 1 strictly in terms of the more restrictive doctrine of master and
servant.5 72 Modem FELA cases had de-emphasized the narrow, technical
tests of traditional master-servant law and instead determined the presence
of an employment relationship by reference to all the relevant factors in a
given situation. 573 This more flexible analysis of the employment relationship tended to extend the coverage of the Act when three-party relationships
were involved; nevertheless, the more restrictive concepts of control and
right to control inherent in the master-servant relationship, although interpreted in a pragmatic manner by the cases, were never abandoned. 574 Thus,
the Sixth Circuit cases relied upon by Judge Craven were premised on a
finding that a master-servant relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant railroad. 575 An FELA plaintiff in the Sixth Circuit, then, still
faced the heavier burden of establishing a master-servant relationship between himself and the railroad, while an FELA plaintiff in the Fourth Circuit
needed only to establish an agency relationship between his employer and
the railroad in order to bring himself within the scope of the Act.
The decision in Smith, like that in Leftwich, was short-lived. The
Supreme Court rejected Smith by name in Kelley v. Southern Pacific
Co. ,576 where, on facts identical to those in Smith, it held that no employment relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant railroad. The
Court stressed that in three-party situations "a finding of agency is not
tantamount to a finding of a master-servant relationship.1 577 A plaintiff
could not satisfy the employment test under the holding in Kelley by
569. 407 F.2d at 502.
570. See generally Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323 (1974).

571. Id. at 324.
572. To establish an agency one need only show that the agent was employed to perform

services that are part of the regular business of the principal. Smith v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 407
F.2d at 503. To establish a master-servant relationship one must further show that the employer

had control or the right to control the manner in which those services were performed. Kelley v.
Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 324 (1974).

573. Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 U.S. 396 (1960) (per curiam); Baker v. Texas &

Pac. Ry., 359 U.S. 227 (1959) (per curiam). Modern cases have referred to the pragmatic
definition of the master-servant relationship found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §

220 (1957) "as a source of principles which provide a basis for the factual decision as to whether
an individual is an employee for FELA purposes." Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318,
337 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
574. Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
575. See cases cited note 567 supra.
576. 419 U.S. 318, 320 (1974).

577. Id. at 325.
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showing that his employer was an agent of the railroad; rather, the " 'control or right to control' test . . .[could] be met only if it were shown that
the role of the second company was that of a conventional common-law
servant."578 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit test for FELA coverage was
579
found to be "too broad."
Judge Craven's insights could generally be considered as valid extensions of legal doctrine that was either in its formative stages or ready for
reexamination. 58 If an area of the law was settled, Judge Craven would
typically desist from further exploration, even when the result reached did
not satisfy his sense of justice. 58 1 Leftwich and Smith illustrate the risks

inherent in an activist judicial philosophy. Inevitably the activist judge will
be tempted to overreach. Judge Craven readily admitted that he was not

immune from such temptations. His frank recognition of this predilection,
578. Id. at 326. The Court laid down the following test:
Under common law principles there are basically three methods by which a plaintiff
can establish his 'employment' with a rail carrier for FELA purposes even while he is
nominally employed by another. First, the employer could be serving as the borrowed
servant of the railroad at the time of his injury. Second, he could be deemed to be
acting for two masters simultaneously. Finally, he could be a subservant of a company
that was in turn a servant of the railroad.
Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
579. Id. at 326. Other liberal constructions of federal protective legislation by Judge
Craven have aroused spirited debate among the circuits. See I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review
dissenting), noted in 54 N.C.L. REv. 925
Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975) (Craven, J.,
(1976), modified on rehearingen banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976). Judge Craven's dissent in
LT.O. adopted a broad interpretation of the coverage provisions contained in the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). A majority of the circuits that have faced the question are in agreement
with Judge Craven's broad interpretation. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.); Sea-Land Serv. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d
533 (5th Cir. 1976); Stackman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976).
In Wallenius Bremen v. United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
958 (1970), annotated in Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 616 (1972), Judge Craven held that the
exclusive remedy provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)
(1970), did not bar the claims of a third party for indemnity against the federal government for
damages paid an injured government employee. This broad construction of the exclusive
remedy provision supplements the compensatory relief available to injured government employees under the act by permitting a third party tortfeasor who has been found liable to the
government employee to recover indemnity from the federal government whenever a duty to
indemnify exists. Thus, under Wallenius Bremen the government employee could conceivably
receive both compensatory relief and tort damages in the form of indemnity from the federal
government. No other circuit facing this issue has adopted Judge Craven's construction of the
exclusive remedy provision. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 616, 626 (1972 & Supp. 1976).
580. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Corp., 401 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1968)
(Craven, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 932 (1971), discussed at text accompanying notes 67-109 supra;Turner v. Blackburn,
389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (three-judge court). Turner is analyzed in Comment, Real
Property-Changesin North Carolina'sForeclosureLaw, 54 N.C.L. REv. 903 (1976).
581. See, e.g., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964), discussedat
text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
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together with his fine sense of the limits of the judicial power, however,
sharply checked his propensity to engage in such judicial "frolics and
detours.
A

CONCLUDING NOTE

Actions sounding in tort and contract arising under diversity jurisdiction or under federal acts 582 were quite special to Judge Craven, for the
factual questions they presented demanded human understanding as well as
legal expertise. His opinions in this area are distinguished by an intense,
583
probing review of the facts.
An excellent example of Judge Craven's method is found in the
diversity case of Webb v. Old Salem, Inc.58 4 The case presented a question
of contract interpretation that could be resolved only by reference to the
behavior and status of the parties. Webb, an experienced restorer of old
buildings, had contracted with Old Salem to restore two rooms in an old
house owned by Old Salem. The contract provided that Old Salem was to
"furnish and pay for the scaffolding and one or two painters to assist
[Webb] in the work as necessary.'"585Webb was injured when the scaffolding erected by the painters collapsed. He then sought damages alleging that
the scaffold had been negligently erected by agents of Old Salem. Webb
contended that "under their contract, Old Salem assumed the duty of safely
erecting the scaffolds.
...
586 The district court held that Smith could not
recover for defendant's negligence in assembling the scaffold since he
himself had been responsible for supervising that assembly.587 Implicit in
the district court's interpretation of Old Salem's contractual obligation to
582. Generally, the result on appeal would be favorable to plaintiff. See, e.g., Chestnut v.

Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971) (products liability); United States v. Kirkman, 426
F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1970) (bail bond practice); Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968)
(Federal Tort Claims Act); Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968) (Federal Tort
Claims Act); United States v. Glassman Constr. Co., 397 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1968) (Miller Act);

Harner v. John McShain, Inc., 394 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1968) (negligence). But see, e.g., Sacilotto
v. National Shipping Corp., 520 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976)
(admiralty); Joye v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1968) (negligence);

Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., 375 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1967) (negligence).
583. See, e.g., Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. M/V Harry W. Adams, 537 F.2d

1222 (4th Cir. 1976) (admiralty); Johnson v. United States, 528 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1975) (Federal
Tort Claims Act); Mays v. Pioneer Lumber Corp., 502 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975) (negligence); Golden v. Oil Screw Frank T. Sherman, 455 F.2d 133, 135 (4th

Cir.) (Craven, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972) (admiralty); Elkins v. United
States, 429 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1970) (Federal Tort Claims Act) (Craven, J., dissenting);
Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968) (Federal Tort Claims Act).
584. 416 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1969).
585. Id. at 224 (emphasis by court).

586. Id. at 225.
587. Id.
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"furnish and pay for scaffolding" 588 was the assumption that Webb was
essentially an ordinary painter. As most commercial painters set up their
own scaffolding, it followed that Old Salem's duty under the contract was
limited to the furnishing of materials for the scaffolds. On appeal, Judge
Craven disagreed with this interpretation of Old Salem's contractual duty.
He thought that Webb's distinctive professional skills and his well established working habits were crucial to the meaning of the term "scaffolding"
in the contract.58 9 Judge Craven's convincing description of Webb's career
and method of operation made it clear that Webb was no ordinary painter
and that the contractual duty to provide safe scaffolding should therefore rest
with Old Salem:
Beginning when he was 14 years old, and continuing steadily until
he was 66, Robert Webb worked at painting and restoration of
murals and building interiors. . . .Though sometimes required to
use a scaffold to reach his selected work area, never in his long
career had Webb erected or moved scaffolding into place ...
Webb was no ordinary painter working under contract, who
might properly be thought willing to assume the more menial burdens of setting up his working environment, such as constructing
mechanical contrivances for his own elevation to the work area.
Instead, he was a uniquely skilled artisan, sought after for his
expertise in restoration and in teaching subordinates and directing
their work on restoration projects. . . .The 66-year-old Webb had
never erected scaffolding nor moved it into place in his life. We
think it plain that he never intended to assume the burden for doing
so at this late date in his career. Webb's background and method of
operation were well known to Old Salem. It seems to us very
unlikely that the company intended to pay handsome remuneration
of his time in the
to an artist who would then spend even a part
59
occupation of a relatively unskilled carpenter.
Thus Webb, a journeyman painter with little bargaining power in the eyes of
the district judge, was found by Judge Craven to be a skilled artist who
possessed considerable bargaining power. Craven thus concluded that by
"scaffolding" the parties contemplated a "system of scaffolding" that
would be set up by Old Salem.
Judge Craven's concern with attaining a detailed understanding of the
human problems underlying the litigation was not limited to cases that
588. Id. at 224.
589. Id. at 225-26. "Scaffolding" could mean "materials for scaffolds" to be furnished by
Old Salem and assembled by Webb or "a system of scaffolds" to be erected by Old Salem for
Webb. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)).
590. Id. at 224-26.
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turned on "question[s] or opinion with respect to the facts.'"591 It was Judge
Craven's habit, even in cases dominated by technical questions of law, to
keep in sharp perspective the human "stuff" that had given birth to the legal
issues being disputed. 592 Such keen involvement with the human dimensions
of a case, as has been previously noted, 5 93 tempted the judge to depart from
the legal framework. But to Judge Craven the presence of such tension was
absolutely crucial to the proper disposition of a case. The judge, he felt, had
to feel the conflicting demands of life and logic for ultimately the "life of
the law [was] not logic but experience. " 594 Judge Craven found in the
following verse of Yeats an appropriate description of this attitude: "God
mind alone; He that sings a
guard me from those thoughts men think In the
5 95
lasting song thinks in (the) marow-bone."
MOSES LusKI
RAYMOND E. OWENS, JR.
MARK

A. STERNLICHT

591. Nuckoles v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 372 F.2d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1967).
592. See, e.g., In re Braverman, 549 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1976) (controversial attorney);
I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975) (Craven, J.,dissenting), modified on rehearing en banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (pragmatic definition of
"maritime employment"); Evans v. Wright, 505 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1974) (power of federal
judge to comment on the evidence); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (tax
prosecution of controversial Quaker defendants), discussed at text accompanying notes 49-66,
368-76 supra; United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1970) (bail bond practiceinexperienced sureties); United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1967)
(habeas corpus-refusal of Army to release enlisted man), discussed at text accompanying
notes 358-60 supra; Brunwasser v. Suave, 400 F.2d 600 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1083
(1968) (saga of disputatious attorney).
593. See text accompanying notes 582-83 supra.
594. Paeanto Pragmatism,supra note 1, at 980 (citing Holmes' aphorism).
595. Id. (quoting from W.B. Yeats, "A Prayer for Old Age") (footnote omitted).

